Narrative:

Flight was planned to depart lot (lewis university airport, romeoville, il) and go directly to sdf (louisville, ky). WX was overcast. Good visibility, not a problem. Pilot and 3 passenger, who all work in kankakee, were delayed, and pilot decided to call to have aircraft fueled and ready for an after-hours departure from lot. When I called, I asked for an additional 15 gallons each tank, which would total 3/4 tanks (approximately 70 gallons total), more than adequate for 1 1/2 hour flight. I stopped at home for some last min items and to call flight service for a briefing (update) and file my IFR flight plan. One of my passenger called and asked if I could just pick them up in kankakee, as they were still delayed. I went to lot, did a preflight expecting 3/4 tanks, which the gauges read when power was applied to aircraft. As I did my walk around. I must have inadvertently left the right fuel cap unsecured, but secure enough not to depart the aircraft. 20 min flight to kankakee was VFR, uneventful. Picked up passenger with their baggage. Departed VFR and picked up IFR clearance en route. In-flight, level at 13000 ft, cruise checklist accomplished, noted fuel tanks below 1/2 (45 gallons) with right tank lower than left. Began power-on descent approximately 85 mi out of sdf, navigating RNAV direct with LORAN as backup. Typically, in this particular small aircraft in a descent, the fuel gauges read empty, which they did again this night. Having seen this before and landing shortly thereafter with approximately 30 gallons on board, I noted the position of the gauges, but was not overly concerned. I did think to myself for a moment of the aviation safety report on the small aircraft which I purchased as soon as it was published. The studies of the small aircraft show a lot of fuel-related problems, and I am very aware of this situation. Nevertheless, I continued the descent into the thin overcast and had the engine stop as we broke out of the clouds, approximately 2200 ft MSL. Engine was restarted by reselecting the right fuel tank and boost pump to high position. ATC was notified of engine trouble, passenger quickly briefed of seat belts and emergency landing possible. At approximately 8 mi out on final approach for sdf runway 11, I began to experience total engine failure again. Now at about 2000 ft MSL engine would not restart and ATC notified again of total engine failure. We were going to be awfully close to gliding into sdf, but all I could see between us and airport was congested area, housing, etc, with no escape route whatsoever. If we didn't make it. ATC was calling out a freeway behind and to the right, which I had noticed moments earlier, along with a river, for possible ditching. I opted for the highway, which only had 2 cars in the sbound lane, approximately XA30 local time. We sped past both cars, notified ATC of the situation again, that we had chosen the highway, and I briefed the passenger again of how to evacuate/evacuation aircraft and seat belts, but that it would be a normal landing. Selected gear down and mixture to idle cutoff, 10 degrees flaps, and landed on I-265 south, approximately 3-4 mi from sdf. Landing and rollout uneventful, pulled aircraft off highway on exit 5-A and stopped. Notified ATC via other aircraft on frequency we were ok, no crash trucks needed, to just send squad cars. I've replayed this whole sequence a thousand times in my head, and cannot believe (at least wish it weren't true) that this was due to my inadequate preflight. There are a hundred things I'd do differently, of course. It just doesn't make sense that after teaching several students in both the turbo small aircraft and the small aircraft that this would happen to a CFI.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL STARVATION LAND ON FREEWAY.

Narrative: FLT WAS PLANNED TO DEPART LOT (LEWIS UNIVERSITY ARPT, ROMEOVILLE, IL) AND GO DIRECTLY TO SDF (LOUISVILLE, KY). WX WAS OVCST. GOOD VISIBILITY, NOT A PROB. PLT AND 3 PAX, WHO ALL WORK IN KANKAKEE, WERE DELAYED, AND PLT DECIDED TO CALL TO HAVE ACFT FUELED AND READY FOR AN AFTER-HRS DEP FROM LOT. WHEN I CALLED, I ASKED FOR AN ADDITIONAL 15 GALLONS EACH TANK, WHICH WOULD TOTAL 3/4 TANKS (APPROX 70 GALLONS TOTAL), MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR 1 1/2 HR FLT. I STOPPED AT HOME FOR SOME LAST MIN ITEMS AND TO CALL FLT SVC FOR A BRIEFING (UPDATE) AND FILE MY IFR FLT PLAN. ONE OF MY PAX CALLED AND ASKED IF I COULD JUST PICK THEM UP IN KANKAKEE, AS THEY WERE STILL DELAYED. I WENT TO LOT, DID A PREFLT EXPECTING 3/4 TANKS, WHICH THE GAUGES READ WHEN PWR WAS APPLIED TO ACFT. AS I DID MY WALK AROUND. I MUST HAVE INADVERTENTLY LEFT THE R FUEL CAP UNSECURED, BUT SECURE ENOUGH NOT TO DEPART THE ACFT. 20 MIN FLT TO KANKAKEE WAS VFR, UNEVENTFUL. PICKED UP PAX WITH THEIR BAGGAGE. DEPARTED VFR AND PICKED UP IFR CLRNC ENRTE. INFLT, LEVEL AT 13000 FT, CRUISE CHKLIST ACCOMPLISHED, NOTED FUEL TANKS BELOW 1/2 (45 GALLONS) WITH R TANK LOWER THAN L. BEGAN PWR-ON DSCNT APPROX 85 MI OUT OF SDF, NAVING RNAV DIRECT WITH LORAN AS BACKUP. TYPICALLY, IN THIS PARTICULAR SMA IN A DSCNT, THE FUEL GAUGES READ EMPTY, WHICH THEY DID AGAIN THIS NIGHT. HAVING SEEN THIS BEFORE AND LNDG SHORTLY THEREAFTER WITH APPROX 30 GALLONS ON BOARD, I NOTED THE POS OF THE GAUGES, BUT WAS NOT OVERLY CONCERNED. I DID THINK TO MYSELF FOR A MOMENT OF THE AVIATION SAFETY RPT ON THE SMA WHICH I PURCHASED AS SOON AS IT WAS PUBLISHED. THE STUDIES OF THE SMA SHOW A LOT OF FUEL-RELATED PROBS, AND I AM VERY AWARE OF THIS SIT. NEVERTHELESS, I CONTINUED THE DSCNT INTO THE THIN OVCST AND HAD THE ENG STOP AS WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS, APPROX 2200 FT MSL. ENG WAS RESTARTED BY RESELECTING THE R FUEL TANK AND BOOST PUMP TO HIGH POS. ATC WAS NOTIFIED OF ENG TROUBLE, PAX QUICKLY BRIEFED OF SEAT BELTS AND EMER LNDG POSSIBLE. AT APPROX 8 MI OUT ON FINAL APCH FOR SDF RWY 11, I BEGAN TO EXPERIENCE TOTAL ENG FAILURE AGAIN. NOW AT ABOUT 2000 FT MSL ENG WOULD NOT RESTART AND ATC NOTIFIED AGAIN OF TOTAL ENG FAILURE. WE WERE GOING TO BE AWFULLY CLOSE TO GLIDING INTO SDF, BUT ALL I COULD SEE BTWN US AND ARPT WAS CONGESTED AREA, HOUSING, ETC, WITH NO ESCAPE RTE WHATSOEVER. IF WE DIDN'T MAKE IT. ATC WAS CALLING OUT A FREEWAY BEHIND AND TO THE R, WHICH I HAD NOTICED MOMENTS EARLIER, ALONG WITH A RIVER, FOR POSSIBLE DITCHING. I OPTED FOR THE HWY, WHICH ONLY HAD 2 CARS IN THE SBOUND LANE, APPROX XA30 LCL TIME. WE SPED PAST BOTH CARS, NOTIFIED ATC OF THE SIT AGAIN, THAT WE HAD CHOSEN THE HWY, AND I BRIEFED THE PAX AGAIN OF HOW TO EVAC ACFT AND SEAT BELTS, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE A NORMAL LNDG. SELECTED GEAR DOWN AND MIXTURE TO IDLE CUTOFF, 10 DEGS FLAPS, AND LANDED ON I-265 S, APPROX 3-4 MI FROM SDF. LNDG AND ROLLOUT UNEVENTFUL, PULLED ACFT OFF HWY ON EXIT 5-A AND STOPPED. NOTIFIED ATC VIA OTHER ACFT ON FREQ WE WERE OK, NO CRASH TRUCKS NEEDED, TO JUST SEND SQUAD CARS. I'VE REPLAYED THIS WHOLE SEQUENCE A THOUSAND TIMES IN MY HEAD, AND CANNOT BELIEVE (AT LEAST WISH IT WEREN'T TRUE) THAT THIS WAS DUE TO MY INADEQUATE PREFLT. THERE ARE A HUNDRED THINGS I'D DO DIFFERENTLY, OF COURSE. IT JUST DOESN'T MAKE SENSE THAT AFTER TEACHING SEVERAL STUDENTS IN BOTH THE TURBO SMA AND THE SMA THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN TO A CFI.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.