Narrative:

The flight began as a simple pattern-only flight. The aircraft had just undergone a 100-hour inspection and I was anxious to check out a few of the items that had been repaired. Originally, I had planned to leave for the airport around xa pm, but unfortunately I was detained at home until xc pm. On my way to the airport, I listened to the latest ATIS report. The WX wasn't perfect, but because I wasn't planning on leaving the pattern, I was satisfied with what I heard: ceiling 2100 ft broken, visibility 5 mi, wind 290 degrees at 13 KTS. The report was for an adjacent airport (5 mi away), but since there was no other WX reporting capability in the area, it was the best I could get. The drive to the airport is no more than 10 mins and as I was parking, I noticed an small aircraft on final approach. I assumed he was VFR because the only instrument approach to the airport is a VOR circling approach that comes in from the northwest and the small aircraft appeared to be doing a straight-in approach from the northeast. Since my aircraft was hangared, it took a little longer than normal to preflight, but I estimate that I taxied out at approximately XC45 pm. It was dusk outside and the runway lights had just been turned on. I turned on the interior panel lighting and to my disappointment, the instrument lights and the post lighting would not dim. Apparently, they were worked on during the inspection, but the rheostat was still not working, making it impossible to dim them. Since it was still fairly light outside, I elected to leave the lights on. Before I taxied out, I attempted to get the latest ATIS, but either I was at a low point on the airport or the ATIS was being updated because I was unsuccessful. During the runup, I checked again, but heard nothing. A visual inspection of the sky proved useless as well due to the clouds and the darkness. As I was climbing out just before turning crosswind, I noticed that the post lights and instrument lights were still on and were exceedingly bright due to the increased darkness outside. Reaching up to the ceiling mounted switch, I turned the lights off and adjusted the flood lights. By this time, I was passing through 700-800 ft AGL and as I looked back outside, clearing for my turn to crosswind, I noticed the reflection of the strobes in the sky in front of me and realized that I was no longer in VMC. Transitioning to instruments, I made a turn back to the airport and as I recall, the altimeter was reading 1400 ft MSL (800 ft AGL). I immediately attempted to regain sight of the airport, but couldn't see the low- intensity runway lights. Looking back at the instruments, I realized I had descended 100 ft and was in a 20 degree bank. At this point, realizing there were several towers in the vicinity and the WX had obviously deteriorated greatly, I made the decision to climb, transition back to instruments, and call approach for an IFR clearance. I called approach, informing them of my situation. I was IMC and needed an immediate IFR clearance to the initial approach fix of the ILS at the adjacent airport from which I had originally received the ATIS broadcast. Approach came back and cleared me to the IAF specifying that I remain VFR. After initially acknowledging the call and as I was contemplating whether approach had misunderstood me, I received another call from approach asking me to confirm that I was VMC. I immediately responded in the negative, specifying that I was still IMC and needed a clearance, at which point I received anther clearance direct to the IAF. Because there was another aircraft on the approach to the airport which I was leaving and because the approach facility is non radar, I believe there was a minimum separation conflict and accordingly approach had the other aircraft commence holding. The WX at the time of my landing was 700 ft broken, visibility 2 mi in fog. After landing, the approach controller informed me that because I had entered IMC without a clearance and because I couldn't maintain VMC when he queried me, he would have to notify the local FSDO of the incident. Later, I reflected on the episode, I feel that my decision to fly, even though I wasn't planning on leaving the pattern, was a poor one, considering the WX information I had. The decision was influenced by the fact that I was late in getting to the airport and that I wanted to get in at least 1 pattern before darkness. After my ill-fated takeoff, I quickly realized that I was hardly ready to fly an approach at night in the WX. Fortunately, I had all my charts, flashlights, and approach plates with me, but unfortunately, the approach plates were in the seat behind me! Despite the fact that I was initially unprepared to fly the approach, I felt that it was a much safer option than scud-running and searching for the airport in marginal to IMC conditions at night. Had there been daylight to see the clouds in front of me and above me, this situation probably would not have occurred. Hence my newly found vigilance for aircraft operations at night and during poor WX conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DIVERT NEARBY ARPT ACCOUNT IMC CONDITIONS AT DEP POINT.

Narrative: THE FLT BEGAN AS A SIMPLE PATTERN-ONLY FLT. THE ACFT HAD JUST UNDERGONE A 100-HR INSPECTION AND I WAS ANXIOUS TO CHK OUT A FEW OF THE ITEMS THAT HAD BEEN REPAIRED. ORIGINALLY, I HAD PLANNED TO LEAVE FOR THE ARPT AROUND XA PM, BUT UNFORTUNATELY I WAS DETAINED AT HOME UNTIL XC PM. ON MY WAY TO THE ARPT, I LISTENED TO THE LATEST ATIS RPT. THE WX WASN'T PERFECT, BUT BECAUSE I WASN'T PLANNING ON LEAVING THE PATTERN, I WAS SATISFIED WITH WHAT I HEARD: CEILING 2100 FT BROKEN, VISIBILITY 5 MI, WIND 290 DEGS AT 13 KTS. THE RPT WAS FOR AN ADJACENT ARPT (5 MI AWAY), BUT SINCE THERE WAS NO OTHER WX RPTING CAPABILITY IN THE AREA, IT WAS THE BEST I COULD GET. THE DRIVE TO THE ARPT IS NO MORE THAN 10 MINS AND AS I WAS PARKING, I NOTICED AN SMA ON FINAL APCH. I ASSUMED HE WAS VFR BECAUSE THE ONLY INST APCH TO THE ARPT IS A VOR CIRCLING APCH THAT COMES IN FROM THE NW AND THE SMA APPEARED TO BE DOING A STRAIGHT-IN APCH FROM THE NE. SINCE MY ACFT WAS HANGARED, IT TOOK A LITTLE LONGER THAN NORMAL TO PREFLT, BUT I ESTIMATE THAT I TAXIED OUT AT APPROX XC45 PM. IT WAS DUSK OUTSIDE AND THE RWY LIGHTS HAD JUST BEEN TURNED ON. I TURNED ON THE INTERIOR PANEL LIGHTING AND TO MY DISAPPOINTMENT, THE INST LIGHTS AND THE POST LIGHTING WOULD NOT DIM. APPARENTLY, THEY WERE WORKED ON DURING THE INSPECTION, BUT THE RHEOSTAT WAS STILL NOT WORKING, MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DIM THEM. SINCE IT WAS STILL FAIRLY LIGHT OUTSIDE, I ELECTED TO LEAVE THE LIGHTS ON. BEFORE I TAXIED OUT, I ATTEMPTED TO GET THE LATEST ATIS, BUT EITHER I WAS AT A LOW POINT ON THE ARPT OR THE ATIS WAS BEING UPDATED BECAUSE I WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. DURING THE RUNUP, I CHKED AGAIN, BUT HEARD NOTHING. A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE SKY PROVED USELESS AS WELL DUE TO THE CLOUDS AND THE DARKNESS. AS I WAS CLBING OUT JUST BEFORE TURNING XWIND, I NOTICED THAT THE POST LIGHTS AND INST LIGHTS WERE STILL ON AND WERE EXCEEDINGLY BRIGHT DUE TO THE INCREASED DARKNESS OUTSIDE. REACHING UP TO THE CEILING MOUNTED SWITCH, I TURNED THE LIGHTS OFF AND ADJUSTED THE FLOOD LIGHTS. BY THIS TIME, I WAS PASSING THROUGH 700-800 FT AGL AND AS I LOOKED BACK OUTSIDE, CLRING FOR MY TURN TO XWIND, I NOTICED THE REFLECTION OF THE STROBES IN THE SKY IN FRONT OF ME AND REALIZED THAT I WAS NO LONGER IN VMC. TRANSITIONING TO INSTS, I MADE A TURN BACK TO THE ARPT AND AS I RECALL, THE ALTIMETER WAS READING 1400 FT MSL (800 FT AGL). I IMMEDIATELY ATTEMPTED TO REGAIN SIGHT OF THE ARPT, BUT COULDN'T SEE THE LOW- INTENSITY RWY LIGHTS. LOOKING BACK AT THE INSTS, I REALIZED I HAD DSNDED 100 FT AND WAS IN A 20 DEG BANK. AT THIS POINT, REALIZING THERE WERE SEVERAL TWRS IN THE VICINITY AND THE WX HAD OBVIOUSLY DETERIORATED GREATLY, I MADE THE DECISION TO CLB, TRANSITION BACK TO INSTS, AND CALL APCH FOR AN IFR CLRNC. I CALLED APCH, INFORMING THEM OF MY SIT. I WAS IMC AND NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE IFR CLRNC TO THE INITIAL APCH FIX OF THE ILS AT THE ADJACENT ARPT FROM WHICH I HAD ORIGINALLY RECEIVED THE ATIS BROADCAST. APCH CAME BACK AND CLRED ME TO THE IAF SPECIFYING THAT I REMAIN VFR. AFTER INITIALLY ACKNOWLEDGING THE CALL AND AS I WAS CONTEMPLATING WHETHER APCH HAD MISUNDERSTOOD ME, I RECEIVED ANOTHER CALL FROM APCH ASKING ME TO CONFIRM THAT I WAS VMC. I IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED IN THE NEGATIVE, SPECIFYING THAT I WAS STILL IMC AND NEEDED A CLRNC, AT WHICH POINT I RECEIVED ANTHER CLRNC DIRECT TO THE IAF. BECAUSE THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT ON THE APCH TO THE ARPT WHICH I WAS LEAVING AND BECAUSE THE APCH FACILITY IS NON RADAR, I BELIEVE THERE WAS A MINIMUM SEPARATION CONFLICT AND ACCORDINGLY APCH HAD THE OTHER ACFT COMMENCE HOLDING. THE WX AT THE TIME OF MY LNDG WAS 700 FT BROKEN, VISIBILITY 2 MI IN FOG. AFTER LNDG, THE APCH CTLR INFORMED ME THAT BECAUSE I HAD ENTERED IMC WITHOUT A CLRNC AND BECAUSE I COULDN'T MAINTAIN VMC WHEN HE QUERIED ME, HE WOULD HAVE TO NOTIFY THE LCL FSDO OF THE INCIDENT. LATER, I REFLECTED ON THE EPISODE, I FEEL THAT MY DECISION TO FLY, EVEN THOUGH I WASN'T PLANNING ON LEAVING THE PATTERN, WAS A POOR ONE, CONSIDERING THE WX INFO I HAD. THE DECISION WAS INFLUENCED BY THE FACT THAT I WAS LATE IN GETTING TO THE ARPT AND THAT I WANTED TO GET IN AT LEAST 1 PATTERN BEFORE DARKNESS. AFTER MY ILL-FATED TKOF, I QUICKLY REALIZED THAT I WAS HARDLY READY TO FLY AN APCH AT NIGHT IN THE WX. FORTUNATELY, I HAD ALL MY CHARTS, FLASHLIGHTS, AND APCH PLATES WITH ME, BUT UNFORTUNATELY, THE APCH PLATES WERE IN THE SEAT BEHIND ME! DESPITE THE FACT THAT I WAS INITIALLY UNPREPARED TO FLY THE APCH, I FELT THAT IT WAS A MUCH SAFER OPTION THAN SCUD-RUNNING AND SEARCHING FOR THE ARPT IN MARGINAL TO IMC CONDITIONS AT NIGHT. HAD THERE BEEN DAYLIGHT TO SEE THE CLOUDS IN FRONT OF ME AND ABOVE ME, THIS SIT PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. HENCE MY NEWLY FOUND VIGILANCE FOR ACFT OPS AT NIGHT AND DURING POOR WX CONDITIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.