Narrative:

When I assumed the ground control position, air carrier X was holding short of runway 15 on ground frequency. The local controller advised me 'cross runway 15, twice.' I instructed air carrier X to cross runway 15, and then instructed an small aircraft Z to follow. After a few xmissions to other aircraft, air carrier X advised me 'we're holding short, you cleared us to cross. That wouldn't have been a good idea.' I then observed cpr Y midfield. It had departed runway 15. I advised air carrier X to 'hold his position.' after a few xmissions to other aircraft, air carrier X advised me he was over the hold short lines for runway 15. I immediately advised the local controller 'I'm holding the 2, but air carrier is over the hold short lines.' local nodded in the affirmative and said, 'I know, I know.' by this time, traffic was building (departures) and approach control had put a stop on west departures. Air carrier X was a west departure. A few mins later, air carrier X advised 'ground, I told you we are over the hold lines. If you are going to keep using this runway, we need to be moved.' I then observed an small aircraft Z rotating on runway 15. I again, advised local of air carrier X position and local told me to 'cross runway 15.' at no time between the first and second crossing that local gave me, did I report clear of runway 15, and during that time, 2 takeoff clrncs were issued for that runway. I don't know if this could have been prevented. This was human error. However, there is question as to who said what between the ground and local controllers. If this type of coordination was required to be done on the override lines (recorded), there would be no question. Supplemental information from acn 259095: after holding short of runway 15 en route to runway 18, we and another aircraft behind us were given clearance to cross runway 15. As we approached the runway, a small jet in position on runway 15 started its takeoff roll. We stopped short of the runway edge line. But well over the hold line. After advising ground control of the takeoff, we then advised ground control that we were over the hold line. Tower then departed another small aircraft Z on runway 15. We again advised ground control that we were over the hold line and requested to taxi clear of the runway. We were then cleared to cross runway 15. Obviously, the near miss with the departure jet was a miscom with ground control and tower. However, either procedure needs to be changed or they were not followed when the tower departed another aircraft after we reported that we were over the hold line. All operations should be stopped immediately when any runway incursion takes place, and resumed only after a supervisor ascertains through direct radio contact that all aircraft involved are in safe position clear of the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION, ACR X HAD LTSS FROM CPR Y AND SMA Z. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: WHEN I ASSUMED THE GND CTL POS, ACR X WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 15 ON GND FREQ. THE LCL CTLR ADVISED ME 'CROSS RWY 15, TWICE.' I INSTRUCTED ACR X TO CROSS RWY 15, AND THEN INSTRUCTED AN SMA Z TO FOLLOW. AFTER A FEW XMISSIONS TO OTHER ACFT, ACR X ADVISED ME 'WE'RE HOLDING SHORT, YOU CLRED US TO CROSS. THAT WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A GOOD IDEA.' I THEN OBSERVED CPR Y MIDFIELD. IT HAD DEPARTED RWY 15. I ADVISED ACR X TO 'HOLD HIS POS.' AFTER A FEW XMISSIONS TO OTHER ACFT, ACR X ADVISED ME HE WAS OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINES FOR RWY 15. I IMMEDIATELY ADVISED THE LCL CTLR 'I'M HOLDING THE 2, BUT ACR IS OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINES.' LCL NODDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE AND SAID, 'I KNOW, I KNOW.' BY THIS TIME, TFC WAS BUILDING (DEPS) AND APCH CTL HAD PUT A STOP ON W DEPS. ACR X WAS A W DEP. A FEW MINS LATER, ACR X ADVISED 'GND, I TOLD YOU WE ARE OVER THE HOLD LINES. IF YOU ARE GOING TO KEEP USING THIS RWY, WE NEED TO BE MOVED.' I THEN OBSERVED AN SMA Z ROTATING ON RWY 15. I AGAIN, ADVISED LCL OF ACR X POS AND LCL TOLD ME TO 'CROSS RWY 15.' AT NO TIME BTWN THE FIRST AND SECOND XING THAT LCL GAVE ME, DID I RPT CLR OF RWY 15, AND DURING THAT TIME, 2 TKOF CLRNCS WERE ISSUED FOR THAT RWY. I DON'T KNOW IF THIS COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED. THIS WAS HUMAN ERROR. HOWEVER, THERE IS QUESTION AS TO WHO SAID WHAT BTWN THE GND AND LCL CTLRS. IF THIS TYPE OF COORD WAS REQUIRED TO BE DONE ON THE OVERRIDE LINES (RECORDED), THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 259095: AFTER HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 15 ENRTE TO RWY 18, WE AND ANOTHER ACFT BEHIND US WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 15. AS WE APCHED THE RWY, A SMALL JET IN POS ON RWY 15 STARTED ITS TKOF ROLL. WE STOPPED SHORT OF THE RWY EDGE LINE. BUT WELL OVER THE HOLD LINE. AFTER ADVISING GND CTL OF THE TKOF, WE THEN ADVISED GND CTL THAT WE WERE OVER THE HOLD LINE. TWR THEN DEPARTED ANOTHER SMA Z ON RWY 15. WE AGAIN ADVISED GND CTL THAT WE WERE OVER THE HOLD LINE AND REQUESTED TO TAXI CLR OF THE RWY. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO CROSS RWY 15. OBVIOUSLY, THE NEAR MISS WITH THE DEP JET WAS A MISCOM WITH GND CTL AND TWR. HOWEVER, EITHER PROC NEEDS TO BE CHANGED OR THEY WERE NOT FOLLOWED WHEN THE TWR DEPARTED ANOTHER ACFT AFTER WE RPTED THAT WE WERE OVER THE HOLD LINE. ALL OPS SHOULD BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY WHEN ANY RWY INCURSION TAKES PLACE, AND RESUMED ONLY AFTER A SUPVR ASCERTAINS THROUGH DIRECT RADIO CONTACT THAT ALL ACFT INVOLVED ARE IN SAFE POS CLR OF THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.