Narrative:

After takeoff at 4-500 ft AGL on initial climb out a series of compressor stalls (loud bangs) were heard for 8-10 seconds. No abnormal EICAS or engine readings were viewed initially. Noises were obviously from left side of aircraft and tower called reporting large flames emitted from my engine. With captain's concurrence I slowly retarded #1 thrust lever. Compressor stalls ceased, engine indications appeared within normal parameters. Requested straight ahead climb, declared emergency and gave initial intentions to dump fuel (requested 8000 ft/45-60 required) then return to dtw. Emergency checklists were reviewed for engine severe damage, fire, and failure but decision was made not to secure the #1 engine since no fire indication warnings or visible damage was apparent and engine now operated smoothly at idle power. Coordinated use of one off duty crew member to establish communication with company dispatch/maintenance control. They agreed that we should not secure engine but consider continue on to msp. WX in msp was cavok with clear runways. Dtw was - X4 overcast 1 1/4 F. Decided msp was a better landing option. Obtained ATC clearance to msp, secured fuel jettison (at 8000 ft) and proceeded to msp. En route, we determined that aircraft would still be over maximum gross for landing (maximum 630000 #). With atl acknowledgement, dumped additional 9000 pounds at FL260 - projected landing weight at 639 K. Uneventful approach landing runway 29L at msp. Normal taxi to gate. Landing weight was 628700 #. During fuel dump near dtw, all engine parameters were checked at normal. Reviewed central maintenance computer pages for engine parameter exceedance - none noted or recorded. Made maximum use of off duty cockpit crew for cabin/company communication, visual inspections in-flight, and procedure checklist review. Supplemental information from acn 262709: we were proceeding through engine failure shutdown checklist when my first officer asked me 'are you sure that you want to shut down the #1 engine?' my mind had fixated on shutting it down due to the severe compressor stalling. When this mindset was suddenly challenged by this question, it suddenly opened the thought process to alternate thinking: why shut it down really? Had we hit a flock of birds? (Birds were in the NOTAMS.) if so perhaps another engine could be affected. An evidently idling engine is better than so much dead weight if another one goes... Hydraulics, electrical power, etc. Sure nice to have those accessories...! I then asked the other captain and first officer if they had any objections or concerns about 'keeping it.' no. I report this as I see it as an excellent example of cockpit resource management input on the part of my first officer, and a clear example of the value of cockpit resource management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B-747-400 COMPRESSOR STALLS REQUIRE A DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE AFTER EMER DECLARED, FUEL DUMPED.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF AT 4-500 FT AGL ON INITIAL CLBOUT A SERIES OF COMPRESSOR STALLS (LOUD BANGS) WERE HEARD FOR 8-10 SECONDS. NO ABNORMAL EICAS OR ENG READINGS WERE VIEWED INITIALLY. NOISES WERE OBVIOUSLY FROM L SIDE OF ACFT AND TWR CALLED REPORTING LARGE FLAMES EMITTED FROM MY ENG. WITH CAPT'S CONCURRENCE I SLOWLY RETARDED #1 THRUST LEVER. COMPRESSOR STALLS CEASED, ENG INDICATIONS APPEARED WITHIN NORMAL PARAMETERS. REQUESTED STRAIGHT AHEAD CLB, DECLARED EMER AND GAVE INITIAL INTENTIONS TO DUMP FUEL (REQUESTED 8000 FT/45-60 REQUIRED) THEN RETURN TO DTW. EMER CHKLISTS WERE REVIEWED FOR ENG SEVERE DAMAGE, FIRE, AND FAILURE BUT DECISION WAS MADE NOT TO SECURE THE #1 ENG SINCE NO FIRE INDICATION WARNINGS OR VISIBLE DAMAGE WAS APPARENT AND ENG NOW OPERATED SMOOTHLY AT IDLE PWR. COORDINATED USE OF ONE OFF DUTY CREW MEMBER TO ESTABLISH COM WITH COMPANY DISPATCH/MAINT CTL. THEY AGREED THAT WE SHOULD NOT SECURE ENG BUT CONSIDER CONTINUE ON TO MSP. WX IN MSP WAS CAVOK WITH CLR RWYS. DTW WAS - X4 OVCST 1 1/4 F. DECIDED MSP WAS A BETTER LNDG OPTION. OBTAINED ATC CLRNC TO MSP, SECURED FUEL JETTISON (AT 8000 FT) AND PROCEEDED TO MSP. ENRTE, WE DETERMINED THAT ACFT WOULD STILL BE OVER MAX GROSS FOR LNDG (MAX 630000 #). WITH ATL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, DUMPED ADDITIONAL 9000 LBS AT FL260 - PROJECTED LNDG WT AT 639 K. UNEVENTFUL APCH LNDG RWY 29L AT MSP. NORMAL TAXI TO GATE. LANDING WEIGHT WAS 628700 #. DURING FUEL DUMP NEAR DTW, ALL ENG PARAMETERS WERE CHKED AT NORMAL. REVIEWED CENTRAL MAINT COMPUTER PAGES FOR ENG PARAMETER EXCEEDANCE - NONE NOTED OR RECORDED. MADE MAX USE OF OFF DUTY COCKPIT CREW FOR CABIN/COMPANY COM, VISUAL INSPECTIONS INFLT, AND PROC CHKLIST REVIEW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 262709: WE WERE PROCEEDING THROUGH ENG FAILURE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST WHEN MY FO ASKED ME 'ARE YOU SURE THAT YOU WANT TO SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG?' MY MIND HAD FIXATED ON SHUTTING IT DOWN DUE TO THE SEVERE COMPRESSOR STALLING. WHEN THIS MINDSET WAS SUDDENLY CHALLENGED BY THIS QUESTION, IT SUDDENLY OPENED THE THOUGHT PROCESS TO ALTERNATE THINKING: WHY SHUT IT DOWN REALLY? HAD WE HIT A FLOCK OF BIRDS? (BIRDS WERE IN THE NOTAMS.) IF SO PERHAPS ANOTHER ENG COULD BE AFFECTED. AN EVIDENTLY IDLING ENG IS BETTER THAN SO MUCH DEAD WT IF ANOTHER ONE GOES... HYDS, ELECTRICAL PWR, ETC. SURE NICE TO HAVE THOSE ACCESSORIES...! I THEN ASKED THE OTHER CAPT AND FO IF THEY HAD ANY OBJECTIONS OR CONCERNS ABOUT 'KEEPING IT.' NO. I REPORT THIS AS I SEE IT AS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT INPUT ON THE PART OF MY FO, AND A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THE VALUE OF COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.