Narrative:

During descent into rdu, we encountered an oil filter bypass light on our #2 engine. Operating manual procedures called for reducing thrust or shutting down that engine. I elected to continue with the engine at reduced idle power. Main factor that influenced my decision was the WX conditions in and around rdu. As I started the approach, I had planned to keep the airplane clean as long as possible. My plan was to follow the 2 engine profile even though I still had all 3 engines running. My mistake was not coordinating this with ATC. The controller had descended us to 2200 ft and basically initiated our turns so that we intercepted the localizer and GS about 1 mi from the marker. Since I was flying at 210 KTS, I went through the localizer and, by the time we had intercepted, we were right over the marker just starting to configure the airplane for landing. We reached final confign at 800 ft. Under the circumstances this was unacceptable, we should have contacted approach and informed him that we wanted a vector to at least 5 mi from the OM. When he started to turn us so close, we should have initiated a go around and configured the airplane properly for landing. As the PF, I was too concerned with the possibility of having to execute a missed approach, but this fixation with the problem made me execute an unsafe approach, thus bringing the possibility of the missed approach that I did not want to do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR LGT MADE AN 'UNSAFE APCH.'

Narrative: DURING DSCNT INTO RDU, WE ENCOUNTERED AN OIL FILTER BYPASS LIGHT ON OUR #2 ENG. OPERATING MANUAL PROCS CALLED FOR REDUCING THRUST OR SHUTTING DOWN THAT ENG. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE WITH THE ENG AT REDUCED IDLE PWR. MAIN FACTOR THAT INFLUENCED MY DECISION WAS THE WX CONDITIONS IN AND AROUND RDU. AS I STARTED THE APCH, I HAD PLANNED TO KEEP THE AIRPLANE CLEAN AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. MY PLAN WAS TO FOLLOW THE 2 ENG PROFILE EVEN THOUGH I STILL HAD ALL 3 ENGS RUNNING. MY MISTAKE WAS NOT COORDINATING THIS WITH ATC. THE CTLR HAD DSNDED US TO 2200 FT AND BASICALLY INITIATED OUR TURNS SO THAT WE INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND GS ABOUT 1 MI FROM THE MARKER. SINCE I WAS FLYING AT 210 KTS, I WENT THROUGH THE LOC AND, BY THE TIME WE HAD INTERCEPTED, WE WERE RIGHT OVER THE MARKER JUST STARTING TO CONFIGURE THE AIRPLANE FOR LNDG. WE REACHED FINAL CONFIGN AT 800 FT. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE, WE SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED APCH AND INFORMED HIM THAT WE WANTED A VECTOR TO AT LEAST 5 MI FROM THE OM. WHEN HE STARTED TO TURN US SO CLOSE, WE SHOULD HAVE INITIATED A GAR AND CONFIGURED THE AIRPLANE PROPERLY FOR LNDG. AS THE PF, I WAS TOO CONCERNED WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH, BUT THIS FIXATION WITH THE PROB MADE ME EXECUTE AN UNSAFE APCH, THUS BRINGING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE MISSED APCH THAT I DID NOT WANT TO DO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.