Narrative:

I was first officer on a flight from dal to maf. After we were airborne, and well above 10000 ft, the C flight attendant came forward and told the captain that she and the a flight attendant were standing in the aisle when we started our takeoff roll. This may not sound like much, but it is our responsibility to be sure the aircraft is secure prior to takeoff. The flight attendants had a problem passenger that would not let them secure a bag prior to takeoff. The a flight attendant thought he could take care of the problem quickly and did not open the cockpit door to let us know what was going on. We (the cockpit crew) had already given the takeoff warning 1 min prior to takeoff. The flight attendant was unable to get to the cockpit door when he realized he had run out of time. We need a procedure change at air carrier to correct this kind of problem, and get the flight deck crew back into the loop. We are the only airline that I know of that has the flight attendants close the cockpit door prior to having the cabin secure for takeoff. Had our procedure been to close the cockpit door only after the cabin was secure, we would have never taken the runway. The flight attendants simply did not have time to get back to the front and open the door to tell us there was a problem. It was also interesting to note that when asked, the flight attendants said they were aware of the fact they had the authority to hold the aircraft on the ground until the cabin was secure, but were afraid to use that authority for fear of being chewed out by a captain. The very people that could keep us 'in the loop' and out of trouble area afraid to come forward and state they need more time! A little more cockpit resource management in this area may be needed as well.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAB ATTENDANTS STANDING IN AISLE AT BEGINNING OF TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: I WAS FO ON A FLT FROM DAL TO MAF. AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE, AND WELL ABOVE 10000 FT, THE C FLT ATTENDANT CAME FORWARD AND TOLD THE CAPT THAT SHE AND THE A FLT ATTENDANT WERE STANDING IN THE AISLE WHEN WE STARTED OUR TKOF ROLL. THIS MAY NOT SOUND LIKE MUCH, BUT IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO BE SURE THE ACFT IS SECURE PRIOR TO TKOF. THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD A PROB PAX THAT WOULD NOT LET THEM SECURE A BAG PRIOR TO TKOF. THE A FLT ATTENDANT THOUGHT HE COULD TAKE CARE OF THE PROB QUICKLY AND DID NOT OPEN THE COCKPIT DOOR TO LET US KNOW WHAT WAS GOING ON. WE (THE COCKPIT CREW) HAD ALREADY GIVEN THE TKOF WARNING 1 MIN PRIOR TO TKOF. THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS UNABLE TO GET TO THE COCKPIT DOOR WHEN HE REALIZED HE HAD RUN OUT OF TIME. WE NEED A PROC CHANGE AT ACR TO CORRECT THIS KIND OF PROB, AND GET THE FLT DECK CREW BACK INTO THE LOOP. WE ARE THE ONLY AIRLINE THAT I KNOW OF THAT HAS THE FLT ATTENDANTS CLOSE THE COCKPIT DOOR PRIOR TO HAVING THE CABIN SECURE FOR TKOF. HAD OUR PROC BEEN TO CLOSE THE COCKPIT DOOR ONLY AFTER THE CABIN WAS SECURE, WE WOULD HAVE NEVER TAKEN THE RWY. THE FLT ATTENDANTS SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE TIME TO GET BACK TO THE FRONT AND OPEN THE DOOR TO TELL US THERE WAS A PROB. IT WAS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT WHEN ASKED, THE FLT ATTENDANTS SAID THEY WERE AWARE OF THE FACT THEY HAD THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD THE ACFT ON THE GND UNTIL THE CABIN WAS SECURE, BUT WERE AFRAID TO USE THAT AUTHORITY FOR FEAR OF BEING CHEWED OUT BY A CAPT. THE VERY PEOPLE THAT COULD KEEP US 'IN THE LOOP' AND OUT OF TROUBLE AREA AFRAID TO COME FORWARD AND STATE THEY NEED MORE TIME! A LITTLE MORE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT IN THIS AREA MAY BE NEEDED AS WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.