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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 474550 |
Time | |
Date | 200005 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | atc facility : sea.tower |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 359 msl bound upper : 359 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sea.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer only : 34l(ksea) |
Flight Phase | other |
Route In Use | approach : visual |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 113 flight time total : 12750 flight time type : 113 |
ASRS Report | 474550 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine pilot : commercial |
Events | |
Anomaly | cabin event other non adherence : company policies non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other other : cab #1 |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Ship had a forward cabin call button that stuck while in-flight. Our carrier specifies a 'double chime' as a final cabin preparation signal to our flight attendants, and this is done by twice pressing the forward cabin call button on the cockpit overhead panel. The first officer monitored the PA while attempting to actuate the stuck button, and when he did not hear our lead flight attendant begin the final cabin preparation PA, he actuated the mid and aft cabin call buttons. Shortly thereafter, the lead flight attendant began the appropriate PA and the first officer returned his attention to his cockpit duties. It was only when we were deplaning that the lead flight attendant told us we had landed with at least 2 flight attendants standing in the aft galley. The lead flight attendant informed us that the PA for final cabin preparation was done, not because they had heard the double chime, but because the lead heard the gear being lowered. For our part, once we heard the lead flight attendant begin the final cabin preparation PA, we de-selected the PA monitor on the audio control panel and returned to our cockpit duties. We considered our obligation to alert our flight attendants of our imminent landing to be satisfied once we heard the PA being made, even though we were not thoroughly sure we generated the double chime alert signal. We did generate an aircraft logbook entry against the stuck call button, and it was repaired and cleared during overnight maintenance. Part of my responsibility to my crew should have included a PA to be made, either by myself or by my first officer, to ensure that my flight attendants were properly stationed for landing. Since I was aware of the stuck button and its possible impact on our ability to alert them, this should have been my course of action. As a result, one of the flight attendants submitted an on-the-job injury report.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PLT RPT, B757, FORWARD CABIN CALL BUTTON IN COCKPIT STUCK, COULDN'T BE USED TO NOTIFY CABIN ATTENDANT OF LNDG, PLT FORGOT TO MAKE ANNOUNCEMENT. 2 CABIN ATTENDANTS STANDING FOR LNDG, 1 INJURY.
Narrative: SHIP HAD A FORWARD CABIN CALL BUTTON THAT STUCK WHILE INFLT. OUR CARRIER SPECIFIES A 'DOUBLE CHIME' AS A FINAL CABIN PREPARATION SIGNAL TO OUR FLT ATTENDANTS, AND THIS IS DONE BY TWICE PRESSING THE FORWARD CABIN CALL BUTTON ON THE COCKPIT OVERHEAD PANEL. THE FO MONITORED THE PA WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ACTUATE THE STUCK BUTTON, AND WHEN HE DID NOT HEAR OUR LEAD FLT ATTENDANT BEGIN THE FINAL CABIN PREPARATION PA, HE ACTUATED THE MID AND AFT CABIN CALL BUTTONS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT BEGAN THE APPROPRIATE PA AND THE FO RETURNED HIS ATTN TO HIS COCKPIT DUTIES. IT WAS ONLY WHEN WE WERE DEPLANING THAT THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT TOLD US WE HAD LANDED WITH AT LEAST 2 FLT ATTENDANTS STANDING IN THE AFT GALLEY. THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT INFORMED US THAT THE PA FOR FINAL CABIN PREPARATION WAS DONE, NOT BECAUSE THEY HAD HEARD THE DOUBLE CHIME, BUT BECAUSE THE LEAD HEARD THE GEAR BEING LOWERED. FOR OUR PART, ONCE WE HEARD THE LEAD FLT ATTENDANT BEGIN THE FINAL CABIN PREPARATION PA, WE DE-SELECTED THE PA MONITOR ON THE AUDIO CTL PANEL AND RETURNED TO OUR COCKPIT DUTIES. WE CONSIDERED OUR OBLIGATION TO ALERT OUR FLT ATTENDANTS OF OUR IMMINENT LNDG TO BE SATISFIED ONCE WE HEARD THE PA BEING MADE, EVEN THOUGH WE WERE NOT THOROUGHLY SURE WE GENERATED THE DOUBLE CHIME ALERT SIGNAL. WE DID GENERATE AN ACFT LOGBOOK ENTRY AGAINST THE STUCK CALL BUTTON, AND IT WAS REPAIRED AND CLRED DURING OVERNIGHT MAINT. PART OF MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MY CREW SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED A PA TO BE MADE, EITHER BY MYSELF OR BY MY FO, TO ENSURE THAT MY FLT ATTENDANTS WERE PROPERLY STATIONED FOR LNDG. SINCE I WAS AWARE OF THE STUCK BUTTON AND ITS POSSIBLE IMPACT ON OUR ABILITY TO ALERT THEM, THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MY COURSE OF ACTION. AS A RESULT, ONE OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS SUBMITTED AN ON-THE-JOB INJURY RPT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.