Narrative:

I took possession of a C-310K at fort pierce, fl, for delivery to troy, al. The aircraft was being delivered for the purpose of sale or trade, I don't know which. I asked the owner of the aircraft for the maintenance records and he informed me that they were located elsewhere. I asked if the annual and the airworthiness directives were all complied with. He informed me they were. I took his word for it. Takeoff through cruise was uneventful except that I did not get a green indicator light on the right main after takeoff. I retracted the gear in a normal fashion and asked the tower if all 3 gears were up. They responded that they appeared to be up. The owner of the aircraft called the tower on the tower frequency and asked them to relay to me that the light in question had to be manipulated somewhat on occasion to illuminate. After passing cty VOR I felt a shudder and slight yaw to the left, I immediately checked fuel selectors were on proper tanks and fuel quantity indicators were within limits. Looking out behind the left nacelle I saw blue/gray smoke trailing behind the left engine. The left engine began to shudder violently and I immediately set both mixtures to full rich, propellers forward, I reduced both throttles to idle to begin a descent from 8500 ft. I was 6-8 mi northwest of cty on V-7. Visibility was at least 20 mi and cty airport was clearly in view. At approximately 5500 ft I moved the throttles forward to approximately 1800 RPM to slow my rate of descent. Upon doing so, the left engine inboard cowling was broken open by a cylinder which had separated in half, oil poured out liberally over the wing. When I had the runway assured, I lowered the gear, 2 green lights illuminated until I manipulated the third (3 green). The landing and rollout were normal. While clearing the runway, I lost sufficient airflow over the rudder to maintain steerability and stopped the aircraft. Over the next few weeks I accompanied an airframe and pwrplant mechanic to cty who conducted repair work on the affected engine. I conducted a thorough preflight once again. 3 quarts of oil were added to the right engine and 1 quart to the left. The right main tank fuel level was easily reached with my fuel tester. The right auxiliary tank was about 3/4 full. The left main fuel level could barely be reached with my fuel tester. The left auxiliary tank overflowed when I opened the cap. (15 gallons of fuel had been put into the left main during maintenance.) the left engine started after only about 4 revolutions. The right engine took about 3-4 mins to start due to having been flooded. Once started, both sets of engine instruments indicated normal. I conducted 3 magneto checks on each engine, cycled propellers 3 times and feather checked 3 times. I completed all pre-takeoff checks, reviewed V speeds and made a determination of where I would 'go-no-go,' based on runway length, aircraft performance, and my own limitations. At 4500 ft I set the throttles to 22 inches -- 2400 RPM, leaned mixtures for 14 gallons per hour on left and 13 gallons per hour on right. Abeam the perry foley airport, I attempted to contact tlh approach control. I heard them well, they said I was unreadable. At 27 mi for tlh I attempted to contact approach again. A flight relayed my transmission for me. I could hear tlh approach control perfectly and acknowledged their transmission with identify as instructed. When abeam runway 9 at tlh approximately 6 mi out, I began to again feel the same shudder as before and a slight intermittent yaw to the left. Engine instruments were all in the green, however, the left engine RPM continued to decrease and surge. I switched the left fuel selector back to the left main with no improvement in engine performance, then back to the left auxiliary. I selected both mixture controls to full rich, propellers forward, and throttles forward. I corrected the yaw with right rudder, idented the left engine as failing, verified with power reduction on left throttle, closed the left throttle, feathered the left engine, and closed the left mixture and fuel selector. I called tlh approach, informed them of the failed engine. I was cleared to land immediately. I maneuvered the aircraft for runway 9 at tlh. I did not lower the gear until I had the runway assured per my training and the checklist. I checked the gear lights and saw both green. My attention was primarily outside. I announced '3 in the green.' airspeed was 110 (10 mi per hour below vyse). Altitude was less than 300 AGL, these 2 conditions required a commitment to land. At touchdown the mains seemed solid, I lowered the nose to increase airflow over the rudder and to attempt to gain use of the nosewheel steering as the aircraft had drifted left of centerline. The moment the nosewheel touched, all 3 gear collapsed and the aircraft slid to a stop. While it slid, I secured the right fuel selector, magnetos, and master, and unlatched the cabin door. After all movement stopped, I unlatched my seat belt, opened the cabin door and exited the aircraft. I made several mistakes in this incident, beginning when I picked up the 310. I should have insisted on a chkout from the owner or qualified person. I did not. I should have insisted on having maintenance records. I did not. I should not have accepted the aircraft with inspection panels removed in the cabin and seats removed and stowed in the baggage area. Regarding the flight from cty to 71J, I should have asked the airframe and pwrplant if the aircraft was ready to fly. I did not. I did not know the aircraft had to be released by the mechanic prior to flight. I did not know the aircraft was considered unairworthy until the mechanic released it. From now on I will be sure of an aircraft's airworthiness before flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMT ON FERRY FLT HAS ENG PROB AND LNDG GEAR COLLAPSE ON ROLLOUT.

Narrative: I TOOK POSSESSION OF A C-310K AT FORT PIERCE, FL, FOR DELIVERY TO TROY, AL. THE ACFT WAS BEING DELIVERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE OR TRADE, I DON'T KNOW WHICH. I ASKED THE OWNER OF THE ACFT FOR THE MAINT RECORDS AND HE INFORMED ME THAT THEY WERE LOCATED ELSEWHERE. I ASKED IF THE ANNUAL AND THE AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES WERE ALL COMPLIED WITH. HE INFORMED ME THEY WERE. I TOOK HIS WORD FOR IT. TKOF THROUGH CRUISE WAS UNEVENTFUL EXCEPT THAT I DID NOT GET A GREEN INDICATOR LIGHT ON THE R MAIN AFTER TKOF. I RETRACTED THE GEAR IN A NORMAL FASHION AND ASKED THE TWR IF ALL 3 GEARS WERE UP. THEY RESPONDED THAT THEY APPEARED TO BE UP. THE OWNER OF THE ACFT CALLED THE TWR ON THE TWR FREQ AND ASKED THEM TO RELAY TO ME THAT THE LIGHT IN QUESTION HAD TO BE MANIPULATED SOMEWHAT ON OCCASION TO ILLUMINATE. AFTER PASSING CTY VOR I FELT A SHUDDER AND SLIGHT YAW TO THE L, I IMMEDIATELY CHKED FUEL SELECTORS WERE ON PROPER TANKS AND FUEL QUANTITY INDICATORS WERE WITHIN LIMITS. LOOKING OUT BEHIND THE L NACELLE I SAW BLUE/GRAY SMOKE TRAILING BEHIND THE L ENG. THE L ENG BEGAN TO SHUDDER VIOLENTLY AND I IMMEDIATELY SET BOTH MIXTURES TO FULL RICH, PROPS FORWARD, I REDUCED BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE TO BEGIN A DSCNT FROM 8500 FT. I WAS 6-8 MI NW OF CTY ON V-7. VISIBILITY WAS AT LEAST 20 MI AND CTY ARPT WAS CLRLY IN VIEW. AT APPROX 5500 FT I MOVED THE THROTTLES FORWARD TO APPROX 1800 RPM TO SLOW MY RATE OF DSCNT. UPON DOING SO, THE L ENG INBOARD COWLING WAS BROKEN OPEN BY A CYLINDER WHICH HAD SEPARATED IN HALF, OIL POURED OUT LIBERALLY OVER THE WING. WHEN I HAD THE RWY ASSURED, I LOWERED THE GEAR, 2 GREEN LIGHTS ILLUMINATED UNTIL I MANIPULATED THE THIRD (3 GREEN). THE LNDG AND ROLLOUT WERE NORMAL. WHILE CLRING THE RWY, I LOST SUFFICIENT AIRFLOW OVER THE RUDDER TO MAINTAIN STEERABILITY AND STOPPED THE ACFT. OVER THE NEXT FEW WKS I ACCOMPANIED AN AIRFRAME AND PWRPLANT MECH TO CTY WHO CONDUCTED REPAIR WORK ON THE AFFECTED ENG. I CONDUCTED A THOROUGH PREFLT ONCE AGAIN. 3 QUARTS OF OIL WERE ADDED TO THE R ENG AND 1 QUART TO THE L. THE R MAIN TANK FUEL LEVEL WAS EASILY REACHED WITH MY FUEL TESTER. THE R AUX TANK WAS ABOUT 3/4 FULL. THE L MAIN FUEL LEVEL COULD BARELY BE REACHED WITH MY FUEL TESTER. THE L AUX TANK OVERFLOWED WHEN I OPENED THE CAP. (15 GALLONS OF FUEL HAD BEEN PUT INTO THE L MAIN DURING MAINT.) THE L ENG STARTED AFTER ONLY ABOUT 4 REVOLUTIONS. THE R ENG TOOK ABOUT 3-4 MINS TO START DUE TO HAVING BEEN FLOODED. ONCE STARTED, BOTH SETS OF ENG INSTS INDICATED NORMAL. I CONDUCTED 3 MAGNETO CHKS ON EACH ENG, CYCLED PROPS 3 TIMES AND FEATHER CHKED 3 TIMES. I COMPLETED ALL PRE-TKOF CHKS, REVIEWED V SPDS AND MADE A DETERMINATION OF WHERE I WOULD 'GO-NO-GO,' BASED ON RWY LENGTH, ACFT PERFORMANCE, AND MY OWN LIMITATIONS. AT 4500 FT I SET THE THROTTLES TO 22 INCHES -- 2400 RPM, LEANED MIXTURES FOR 14 GALLONS PER HR ON L AND 13 GALLONS PER HR ON R. ABEAM THE PERRY FOLEY ARPT, I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT TLH APCH CTL. I HEARD THEM WELL, THEY SAID I WAS UNREADABLE. AT 27 MI FOR TLH I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT APCH AGAIN. A FLT RELAYED MY XMISSION FOR ME. I COULD HEAR TLH APCH CTL PERFECTLY AND ACKNOWLEDGED THEIR XMISSION WITH IDENT AS INSTRUCTED. WHEN ABEAM RWY 9 AT TLH APPROX 6 MI OUT, I BEGAN TO AGAIN FEEL THE SAME SHUDDER AS BEFORE AND A SLIGHT INTERMITTENT YAW TO THE L. ENG INSTS WERE ALL IN THE GREEN, HOWEVER, THE L ENG RPM CONTINUED TO DECREASE AND SURGE. I SWITCHED THE L FUEL SELECTOR BACK TO THE L MAIN WITH NO IMPROVEMENT IN ENG PERFORMANCE, THEN BACK TO THE L AUX. I SELECTED BOTH MIXTURE CTLS TO FULL RICH, PROPS FORWARD, AND THROTTLES FORWARD. I CORRECTED THE YAW WITH R RUDDER, IDENTED THE L ENG AS FAILING, VERIFIED WITH PWR REDUCTION ON L THROTTLE, CLOSED THE L THROTTLE, FEATHERED THE L ENG, AND CLOSED THE L MIXTURE AND FUEL SELECTOR. I CALLED TLH APCH, INFORMED THEM OF THE FAILED ENG. I WAS CLRED TO LAND IMMEDIATELY. I MANEUVERED THE ACFT FOR RWY 9 AT TLH. I DID NOT LOWER THE GEAR UNTIL I HAD THE RWY ASSURED PER MY TRAINING AND THE CHKLIST. I CHKED THE GEAR LIGHTS AND SAW BOTH GREEN. MY ATTN WAS PRIMARILY OUTSIDE. I ANNOUNCED '3 IN THE GREEN.' AIRSPD WAS 110 (10 MI PER HR BELOW VYSE). ALT WAS LESS THAN 300 AGL, THESE 2 CONDITIONS REQUIRED A COMMITMENT TO LAND. AT TOUCHDOWN THE MAINS SEEMED SOLID, I LOWERED THE NOSE TO INCREASE AIRFLOW OVER THE RUDDER AND TO ATTEMPT TO GAIN USE OF THE NOSEWHEEL STEERING AS THE ACFT HAD DRIFTED L OF CTRLINE. THE MOMENT THE NOSEWHEEL TOUCHED, ALL 3 GEAR COLLAPSED AND THE ACFT SLID TO A STOP. WHILE IT SLID, I SECURED THE R FUEL SELECTOR, MAGNETOS, AND MASTER, AND UNLATCHED THE CABIN DOOR. AFTER ALL MOVEMENT STOPPED, I UNLATCHED MY SEAT BELT, OPENED THE CABIN DOOR AND EXITED THE ACFT. I MADE SEVERAL MISTAKES IN THIS INCIDENT, BEGINNING WHEN I PICKED UP THE 310. I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON A CHKOUT FROM THE OWNER OR QUALIFIED PERSON. I DID NOT. I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON HAVING MAINT RECORDS. I DID NOT. I SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED THE ACFT WITH INSPECTION PANELS REMOVED IN THE CABIN AND SEATS REMOVED AND STOWED IN THE BAGGAGE AREA. REGARDING THE FLT FROM CTY TO 71J, I SHOULD HAVE ASKED THE AIRFRAME AND PWRPLANT IF THE ACFT WAS READY TO FLY. I DID NOT. I DID NOT KNOW THE ACFT HAD TO BE RELEASED BY THE MECH PRIOR TO FLT. I DID NOT KNOW THE ACFT WAS CONSIDERED UNAIRWORTHY UNTIL THE MECH RELEASED IT. FROM NOW ON I WILL BE SURE OF AN ACFT'S AIRWORTHINESS BEFORE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.