Narrative:

This event started after a long day. It was late in the evening, and fatigue was a factor. The crew had appropriate crew rest before the start of this day. The flight was normal until we started our approach into reno. As we approached reno, approach control told us to maintain 9000 ft, 190 KTS, and a 270 degree heading to intercept the irno backcourse localizer to runway 34L. The captain thought he was receiving an intercept indication on his flight director and started a T the course. I was retuning the 'no' marker to use as a reference. When I looked back to my HSI, I asked, 'did we get a turn.' the captain said, 'no, I thought I had an intercept (command from the flight director), but now...this thing is all screwed up.' at that moment approach control asked if we were still on a 270 degree heading. I told him we thought we had an intercept, but we were turning back O the 270 degree assigned heading. The captain was still having problems with his flight director and said he was going to ignore it and just use raw data. As we started our turn to intercept the localizer, the course needle was moving rapidly, and we shot through the course. As we were passing through the centerline, approach control called to give us a turn to the course. By this time the course needle was off scale, and approach control gave us a new intercept heading of 020 degrees. We were turning to intercept the course as the CDI moved to 2 dots to the left. The captain corrected to centerline and we started our descent. At 8500 ft the captain said, 'this isn't going to work, tell him we're going missed approach,' just as approach control called to ask if we wanted a missed approach to try it again. We received a vector straight ahead (north), then east, then south. When on the downwind leg (south) we got a ground proximity warning ('whoop, whoop, pull up') and the captain immediately climbed to 10000 ft. During this time I tried to call approach control, but he was busy directing an air carrier B and an air carrier a flight. As soon as possible, I told approach control about the GPWS warning and that we were now at 10000 ft. The controller said that we were ok at 9000 ft. He said that there were just a few peaks around our area. I replied, 'yeah, we just flew over one of them and climbed as directed' (by the GPWS). The so said that the radio altimeter never read below 1900 ft. It was probably rapidly raising terrain that set off the GPWS. When you are in the WX you do what your instruments tell you to do. I understand that the sector safe altitude that controllers use may be lower than our minimum safe altitude, but if we had climbed to a higher altitude upon our missed approach, we would not have encountered the GPWS warning. During long days we all must maintain continued vigilance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT HAS POOR VECTOR FOR INTERCEPT. MISSED APCH EXECUTED. RECEIVES GPWS ALERT ON DOWNWIND. INAPPROPRIATE USE OF ACFT EQUIP OPERATING PROCS ON APCH.

Narrative: THIS EVENT STARTED AFTER A LONG DAY. IT WAS LATE IN THE EVENING, AND FATIGUE WAS A FACTOR. THE CREW HAD APPROPRIATE CREW REST BEFORE THE START OF THIS DAY. THE FLT WAS NORMAL UNTIL WE STARTED OUR APCH INTO RENO. AS WE APCHED RENO, APCH CTL TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 9000 FT, 190 KTS, AND A 270 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT THE IRNO BACKCOURSE LOC TO RWY 34L. THE CAPT THOUGHT HE WAS RECEIVING AN INTERCEPT INDICATION ON HIS FLT DIRECTOR AND STARTED A T THE COURSE. I WAS RETUNING THE 'NO' MARKER TO USE AS A REF. WHEN I LOOKED BACK TO MY HSI, I ASKED, 'DID WE GET A TURN.' THE CAPT SAID, 'NO, I THOUGHT I HAD AN INTERCEPT (COMMAND FROM THE FLT DIRECTOR), BUT NOW...THIS THING IS ALL SCREWED UP.' AT THAT MOMENT APCH CTL ASKED IF WE WERE STILL ON A 270 DEG HDG. I TOLD HIM WE THOUGHT WE HAD AN INTERCEPT, BUT WE WERE TURNING BACK O THE 270 DEG ASSIGNED HDG. THE CAPT WAS STILL HAVING PROBS WITH HIS FLT DIRECTOR AND SAID HE WAS GOING TO IGNORE IT AND JUST USE RAW DATA. AS WE STARTED OUR TURN TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, THE COURSE NEEDLE WAS MOVING RAPIDLY, AND WE SHOT THROUGH THE COURSE. AS WE WERE PASSING THROUGH THE CTRLINE, APCH CTL CALLED TO GIVE US A TURN TO THE COURSE. BY THIS TIME THE COURSE NEEDLE WAS OFF SCALE, AND APCH CTL GAVE US A NEW INTERCEPT HDG OF 020 DEGS. WE WERE TURNING TO INTERCEPT THE COURSE AS THE CDI MOVED TO 2 DOTS TO THE L. THE CAPT CORRECTED TO CTRLINE AND WE STARTED OUR DSCNT. AT 8500 FT THE CAPT SAID, 'THIS ISN'T GOING TO WORK, TELL HIM WE'RE GOING MISSED APCH,' JUST AS APCH CTL CALLED TO ASK IF WE WANTED A MISSED APCH TO TRY IT AGAIN. WE RECEIVED A VECTOR STRAIGHT AHEAD (N), THEN E, THEN S. WHEN ON THE DOWNWIND LEG (S) WE GOT A GND PROX WARNING ('WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP') AND THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY CLBED TO 10000 FT. DURING THIS TIME I TRIED TO CALL APCH CTL, BUT HE WAS BUSY DIRECTING AN ACR B AND AN ACR A FLT. ASAP, I TOLD APCH CTL ABOUT THE GPWS WARNING AND THAT WE WERE NOW AT 10000 FT. THE CTLR SAID THAT WE WERE OK AT 9000 FT. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE JUST A FEW PEAKS AROUND OUR AREA. I REPLIED, 'YEAH, WE JUST FLEW OVER ONE OF THEM AND CLBED AS DIRECTED' (BY THE GPWS). THE SO SAID THAT THE RADIO ALTIMETER NEVER READ BELOW 1900 FT. IT WAS PROBABLY RAPIDLY RAISING TERRAIN THAT SET OFF THE GPWS. WHEN YOU ARE IN THE WX YOU DO WHAT YOUR INSTS TELL YOU TO DO. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECTOR SAFE ALT THAT CTLRS USE MAY BE LOWER THAN OUR MINIMUM SAFE ALT, BUT IF WE HAD CLBED TO A HIGHER ALT UPON OUR MISSED APCH, WE WOULD NOT HAVE ENCOUNTERED THE GPWS WARNING. DURING LONG DAYS WE ALL MUST MAINTAIN CONTINUED VIGILANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.