Narrative:

Dispatched with #1 fuel tank quantity indicator deferred per boeing MEL. Maintenance advised that fuel quantity of 9200 pounds was in tank #1. Fueling had been accomplished using transfer of known quantity from tank #2 and verified by drip stick readings. Fuel on board was approximately 28000 pounds. Required fuel approximately 19000 pounds and flight plan burn estimated approximately approximately 10000 pounds total. Departed cvg for bwi and noted a light wing heavy tendency which grew more pronounced during landing confign. The previous flight crew had written up the aircraft for out of trim condition. So we assumed same. Upon landing the #4 main tire blew out. We cleared the active runway and parked the aircraft on a crossing inactive runway, while we waited for airport operations to inspect our tires for damage. Shortly after parking the aircraft the #1 engine spooled down. Suddenly the lateral imbal became clear. 5000 pounds heavy in the right side caused the control wheel deflections and the heavy load that blew the tire. There was no fuel in the #1 tank. No maintenance writeup was entered into the aircraft logbook regarding the engine because the flight had been terminated (i.e., movement for the purpose of flight had ceased) and we knew that the cause of the engine failure was a fuel starvation situation which had been previously addressed in the deferred fuel gauge. Supplemental information from acn 265413: descending into bwi airspace we started to encounter clear structural icing. Once configured for landing and on final approach at 140 KIAS, I noted and responded to the captain that the aircraft was further out of lateral trim and was requiring more left rudder. I was concentrating on the approach due to the WX conditions. We had a left crosswind in light freezing rain. We made a fairly light touchdown on centerline. I lowered the nose and applied brakes and reverse thrust. The runway appeared slippery. After passing control to the captain. He started a slow taxi and noted that it appeared we had a right blown main tire and confirmed it with tower controller. While preparing to shut down, the #1 engine suddenly flamed out and shut down. We continued shutting down engines #2 and #3. The so had used approved fuel for dispatch computations prior to departure and had burned tank to engine the entire flight to keep fuel burn even due to the deferred fuel gauge. The only conclusion remaining is that the left fuel tank was imbalanced and did not have the fuel required, based on the totals we were given and that control trim problems never existed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B-727 FREIGHTER EXPERIENCES FLAMEOUT OF #1 ENG AFTER LNDG. FUEL STARVATION.

Narrative: DISPATCHED WITH #1 FUEL TANK QUANTITY INDICATOR DEFERRED PER BOEING MEL. MAINT ADVISED THAT FUEL QUANTITY OF 9200 LBS WAS IN TANK #1. FUELING HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED USING TRANSFER OF KNOWN QUANTITY FROM TANK #2 AND VERIFIED BY DRIP STICK READINGS. FUEL ON BOARD WAS APPROX 28000 LBS. REQUIRED FUEL APPROX 19000 LBS AND FLT PLAN BURN ESTIMATED APPROX APPROX 10000 LBS TOTAL. DEPARTED CVG FOR BWI AND NOTED A LIGHT WING HVY TENDENCY WHICH GREW MORE PRONOUNCED DURING LNDG CONFIGN. THE PREVIOUS FLC HAD WRITTEN UP THE ACFT FOR OUT OF TRIM CONDITION. SO WE ASSUMED SAME. UPON LNDG THE #4 MAIN TIRE BLEW OUT. WE CLRED THE ACTIVE RWY AND PARKED THE ACFT ON A XING INACTIVE RWY, WHILE WE WAITED FOR ARPT OPS TO INSPECT OUR TIRES FOR DAMAGE. SHORTLY AFTER PARKING THE ACFT THE #1 ENG SPOOLED DOWN. SUDDENLY THE LATERAL IMBAL BECAME CLR. 5000 LBS HVY IN THE R SIDE CAUSED THE CTL WHEEL DEFLECTIONS AND THE HVY LOAD THAT BLEW THE TIRE. THERE WAS NO FUEL IN THE #1 TANK. NO MAINT WRITEUP WAS ENTERED INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOK REGARDING THE ENG BECAUSE THE FLT HAD BEEN TERMINATED (I.E., MOVEMENT FOR THE PURPOSE OF FLT HAD CEASED) AND WE KNEW THAT THE CAUSE OF THE ENG FAILURE WAS A FUEL STARVATION SIT WHICH HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED IN THE DEFERRED FUEL GAUGE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 265413: DSNDING INTO BWI AIRSPACE WE STARTED TO ENCOUNTER CLR STRUCTURAL ICING. ONCE CONFIGURED FOR LNDG AND ON FINAL APCH AT 140 KIAS, I NOTED AND RESPONDED TO THE CAPT THAT THE ACFT WAS FURTHER OUT OF LATERAL TRIM AND WAS REQUIRING MORE L RUDDER. I WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE APCH DUE TO THE WX CONDITIONS. WE HAD A L XWIND IN LIGHT FREEZING RAIN. WE MADE A FAIRLY LIGHT TOUCHDOWN ON CTRLINE. I LOWERED THE NOSE AND APPLIED BRAKES AND REVERSE THRUST. THE RWY APPEARED SLIPPERY. AFTER PASSING CTL TO THE CAPT. HE STARTED A SLOW TAXI AND NOTED THAT IT APPEARED WE HAD A R BLOWN MAIN TIRE AND CONFIRMED IT WITH TWR CTLR. WHILE PREPARING TO SHUT DOWN, THE #1 ENG SUDDENLY FLAMED OUT AND SHUT DOWN. WE CONTINUED SHUTTING DOWN ENGS #2 AND #3. THE SO HAD USED APPROVED FUEL FOR DISPATCH COMPUTATIONS PRIOR TO DEP AND HAD BURNED TANK TO ENG THE ENTIRE FLT TO KEEP FUEL BURN EVEN DUE TO THE DEFERRED FUEL GAUGE. THE ONLY CONCLUSION REMAINING IS THAT THE L FUEL TANK WAS IMBALANCED AND DID NOT HAVE THE FUEL REQUIRED, BASED ON THE TOTALS WE WERE GIVEN AND THAT CTL TRIM PROBS NEVER EXISTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.