Narrative:

After landing on runway 8R at phx we were cleared to taxi to the executive ramp (via cross 8R, east, south, hold short of bravo). Upon passing bravo bravo the ground controller said, 'cross bb take your second left onto B, taxi to the executive ramp.' at the time we were already cleared to cross bb and had past it on the way to hold short of B. I was slightly confused on the wording of 'take your second' left, since that would put us on the runway of 26R, since B would have been our first left. (Controller must have not have seen that we were all ready past bb and have counted it as one of the left turns.) I did not think any more about it since I saw taxiway B and knew that we should make a left turn onto it. I started the after landing checklist now that I thought I knew where we were going. Halfway through the checklist I noticed we had crossed B and were heading towards the hold short line for runway 26R (landing runways had switch to 26R/left during our taxi). I told the PF that I thought we had passed B and should have turned onto it. He related to me that it was a second left, not the first left. I realized at this time that he thought the runway was the second left turn and it (the runway) was B, due to the slight downslope of the direction of travel and the heat radiating off the surface of the taxiway/runway it was hard to tell that it was a runway (except for the hold short line that he must not have noticed) that we were approaching. I then noticed out of the corner of my eye a 737 was beginning its takeoff roll and strongly emphasized that we should stop the aircraft now. Our tail was above the hold short line when we stopped and the nose was 6-7 ft from penetrating the runway. We were given instructions to hold short of runway 26R while the traffic cleared and then instructed to taxi down runway 26R to the next high speed then to the executive ramp, which we did. Contributing factors: 1) clearance given by the ground controller to take the second left. I think 'a left on bravo' would have lessened the confusion. 2) crew situational awareness of where it was on the airport and where the runways were located. 3) passing a hold short, without a clearance, should have been an obvious signal to stop the aircraft. 4) acknowledging to myself that the proper thing to do was to take a left onto bravo and not relating this to the PF and the controller. 5) heads down, doing a checklist while on an active taxi at an unfamiliar airport. 6) not stopping the aircraft immediately, when one of the crew was in doubt of the their position compared to the clearance that was issued.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN MLG ACR ACFT INADVERTENTLY FAILED TO FOLLOW TAXI TO PARKING INSTRUCTIONS AFTER LNDG RESULTING IN PASSING THE HOLD LINE ON A RWY ANOTHER ACFT WAS TAKING OFF.

Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 8R AT PHX WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO THE EXECUTIVE RAMP (VIA CROSS 8R, E, S, HOLD SHORT OF BRAVO). UPON PASSING BRAVO BRAVO THE GND CTLR SAID, 'CROSS BB TAKE YOUR SECOND L ONTO B, TAXI TO THE EXECUTIVE RAMP.' AT THE TIME WE WERE ALREADY CLRED TO CROSS BB AND HAD PAST IT ON THE WAY TO HOLD SHORT OF B. I WAS SLIGHTLY CONFUSED ON THE WORDING OF 'TAKE YOUR SECOND' L, SINCE THAT WOULD PUT US ON THE RWY OF 26R, SINCE B WOULD HAVE BEEN OUR FIRST L. (CTLR MUST HAVE NOT HAVE SEEN THAT WE WERE ALL READY PAST BB AND HAVE COUNTED IT AS ONE OF THE L TURNS.) I DID NOT THINK ANY MORE ABOUT IT SINCE I SAW TXWY B AND KNEW THAT WE SHOULD MAKE A L TURN ONTO IT. I STARTED THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST NOW THAT I THOUGHT I KNEW WHERE WE WERE GOING. HALFWAY THROUGH THE CHKLIST I NOTICED WE HAD CROSSED B AND WERE HDG TOWARDS THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 26R (LNDG RWYS HAD SWITCH TO 26R/L DURING OUR TAXI). I TOLD THE PF THAT I THOUGHT WE HAD PASSED B AND SHOULD HAVE TURNED ONTO IT. HE RELATED TO ME THAT IT WAS A SECOND L, NOT THE FIRST L. I REALIZED AT THIS TIME THAT HE THOUGHT THE RWY WAS THE SECOND L TURN AND IT (THE RWY) WAS B, DUE TO THE SLIGHT DOWNSLOPE OF THE DIRECTION OF TRAVEL AND THE HEAT RADIATING OFF THE SURFACE OF THE TXWY/RWY IT WAS HARD TO TELL THAT IT WAS A RWY (EXCEPT FOR THE HOLD SHORT LINE THAT HE MUST NOT HAVE NOTICED) THAT WE WERE APCHING. I THEN NOTICED OUT OF THE CORNER OF MY EYE A 737 WAS BEGINNING ITS TKOF ROLL AND STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THAT WE SHOULD STOP THE ACFT NOW. OUR TAIL WAS ABOVE THE HOLD SHORT LINE WHEN WE STOPPED AND THE NOSE WAS 6-7 FT FROM PENETRATING THE RWY. WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 26R WHILE THE TFC CLRED AND THEN INSTRUCTED TO TAXI DOWN RWY 26R TO THE NEXT HIGH SPD THEN TO THE EXECUTIVE RAMP, WHICH WE DID. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) CLRNC GIVEN BY THE GND CTLR TO TAKE THE SECOND L. I THINK 'A L ON BRAVO' WOULD HAVE LESSENED THE CONFUSION. 2) CREW SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF WHERE IT WAS ON THE ARPT AND WHERE THE RWYS WERE LOCATED. 3) PASSING A HOLD SHORT, WITHOUT A CLRNC, SHOULD HAVE BEEN AN OBVIOUS SIGNAL TO STOP THE ACFT. 4) ACKNOWLEDGING TO MYSELF THAT THE PROPER THING TO DO WAS TO TAKE A L ONTO BRAVO AND NOT RELATING THIS TO THE PF AND THE CTLR. 5) HEADS DOWN, DOING A CHKLIST WHILE ON AN ACTIVE TAXI AT AN UNFAMILIAR ARPT. 6) NOT STOPPING THE ACFT IMMEDIATELY, WHEN ONE OF THE CREW WAS IN DOUBT OF THE THEIR POS COMPARED TO THE CLRNC THAT WAS ISSUED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.