Narrative:

After pushback for deicing, the ground crew spoke to me (first officer) that they had 2 headsets and that the other one was broken and this one did not work. It was snowing. The aircraft did overnight in bos. It did snow all night, 6-12 inches. With the pushback crew departing, the captain was now faced with having to coordinate the deicing with operations. The deicing truck departed and we couldn't hear or see any further deicing, so the captain called operations to get the required logbook information to get released from the departure station. We were very close to the helicopter landing area. In fact, there was a helicopter landing at that time lifting a lot of snow. We were pretty distant from the gate area. We cannot recall the exact exchange, but either was, or thought the captain and I were not aware that another truck had commenced operations on the tail and that deicing was in fact not completed. The captain started #1 engine and then immediately shut it down when we realized the facts. The situation was very confusing, lack of personnel, not enough headsets, no situational awareness from operations, ground, lack of communication between the ramp, the cockpit, and operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN LGT ACR ACFT INADVERTENTLY STARTED 1 ENG DURING DEICING PROC.

Narrative: AFTER PUSHBACK FOR DEICING, THE GND CREW SPOKE TO ME (FO) THAT THEY HAD 2 HEADSETS AND THAT THE OTHER ONE WAS BROKEN AND THIS ONE DID NOT WORK. IT WAS SNOWING. THE ACFT DID OVERNIGHT IN BOS. IT DID SNOW ALL NIGHT, 6-12 INCHES. WITH THE PUSHBACK CREW DEPARTING, THE CAPT WAS NOW FACED WITH HAVING TO COORDINATE THE DEICING WITH OPS. THE DEICING TRUCK DEPARTED AND WE COULDN'T HEAR OR SEE ANY FURTHER DEICING, SO THE CAPT CALLED OPS TO GET THE REQUIRED LOGBOOK INFO TO GET RELEASED FROM THE DEP STATION. WE WERE VERY CLOSE TO THE HELI LNDG AREA. IN FACT, THERE WAS A HELI LNDG AT THAT TIME LIFTING A LOT OF SNOW. WE WERE PRETTY DISTANT FROM THE GATE AREA. WE CANNOT RECALL THE EXACT EXCHANGE, BUT EITHER WAS, OR THOUGHT THE CAPT AND I WERE NOT AWARE THAT ANOTHER TRUCK HAD COMMENCED OPS ON THE TAIL AND THAT DEICING WAS IN FACT NOT COMPLETED. THE CAPT STARTED #1 ENG AND THEN IMMEDIATELY SHUT IT DOWN WHEN WE REALIZED THE FACTS. THE SIT WAS VERY CONFUSING, LACK OF PERSONNEL, NOT ENOUGH HEADSETS, NO SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FROM OPS, GND, LACK OF COM BTWN THE RAMP, THE COCKPIT, AND OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.