Narrative:

During a normal routine flight from sfo to atl my crew experienced a flameout of the #3 engine at cruise altitude. We were cruising at FL330, WX cavu, winds calm and over the mountains about 100 mi west of publication colorado VOR. Here are the chronological chain of events from my perspective as captain. The first officer declared that he needed to be excused. I put on my oxygen mask. He then slid back his chair. My mask had a sour odor to it and I asked the so for some alcohol swabs to clean the mask that are normally carried in the flight engineer desk. The so raised the desk top and rummaged through the desk looking for the swabs. I was observing him as he did this expecting him to hand one to me when he found one. The first officer exited his seat and left the cockpit during this time. There were no swabs in the desk. As I turned around to face forward I saw a fuel system light on the annunciator panel. I immediately called this out to the so and also noticed the #3 engine was unwinding. His first comment as I recall was that he did not have a light on his panel. A few seconds later he announced that he had a low fuel pressure light on the #3 engine. The aircraft yawed slightly as the engine flamed out. A small amount of rudder kept it in trim. For a few moments we gathered our wits as we observed what was happening. Airspeed was decreasing gradually and maximum continuous power was applied to engines 1 and 2. Airspeed continued to decrease. I then asked for a lower altitude from ZDV. This was denied. I then stated to center that one of our engines had flamed out and we needed a lower altitude. He asked if I was declaring an emergency. My affirmative response immediately got us a lower altitude of FL240 and a driftdown initiated. At this time I was hand flying the aircraft. The so suggested a relight attempt. I told him to do it since I was flying the aircraft and the first officer was not present. The relight attempt was not successful and the engine was shutdown. About this time the first officer returned to the cockpit, was quickly briefed about our situation and we were a 3 man crew again. I believe he initiated the suggestion to the so to check our driftdown altitude. The so announced a few moments later that it was FL200. ATC could not approve that but did clear us to FL190 which was satisfactory to us. As we drifted down I instructed the so to contact the company and advise them of what had happened. He attempted to do this for several mins but was unable to do so because of our location. While the so was busy with the radio I instructed the first officer to check his map for possible divert fields near our route in case we needed to land quickly. I then asked about our fuel situation if we continued to our destination. We all agreed that our quick calculation of the extra fuel burn would not leave us with as much fuel that we felt comfortable with. And since we were not in contact with flight control to help us more accurately determine our fuel and WX at the destination we decided to change our flight plan to fly over dfw leaving our options open. The in-flight service coordinator was asked to come to the cockpit and was briefed on our situation. The first officer asked if we had attempted a relight. The previous attempt occurred while he was out of the cockpit. Since we were at a lower altitude than the previous attempt we decided to try another. This time the so used the pilots operating manual relight procedure instead of the abbreviated procedure on the quick reference card. He and the first officer were accomplishing the procedure when it was discovered that the #3 engine fuel tank valve was closed! This switch is guarded by a plastic cover to prevent inadvertent movement. To close the valve requires raising the guard and depressing the switch. How this valve became closed is unknown. I know that the so did not close this valve because I was watching him look for swabs in the desk when the flameout occurred. The #3 engine started perfectly. We then canceled our emergency and requested a climb back to our cruising altitude and continued to our destination. Extra fuel consumption was about 1500-2000 pounds more than flight planned. Yes, we wrote up the flameout in the logbook. Now, how did the #3 tank valveclose? We don't know. We speculated later as to how it may have closed. At the time of the flameout I had requested that the so look for an alcohol swab in the flight engineer desk. His pilots operating manual was on top of the desk. He raised the desktop with the book still on top. This action could have caused the corner of the book to come in contact with the guard on the tank valve switch, raising the guard and unlatching the switch. We don't know if this caused the valve to close, but believe it could have. If this was the cause of the flameout then we have a potential problem in the future on all L-1011 aircraft. So's need to be advised that using their pilots operating manual in a L-1011 could be hazardous to their health. I want to pay a complement to my crew members. Their performance was professional and efficient. Everything that should have been accomplished was done. The problem was solved thus avoiding an off line landing and inconveniencing our passenger. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter revealed that he had gone to the chief pilot with his story regarding the pilots operating manual on the desk interfering with the fuel switch and the chief pilot had never heard of this before and apparently wasn't impressed with the information. The reporter then talked with some instrument pilots and they said, 'oh yeah! Didn't you know that and that was not the only time that had happened...' the flight engineer and so went to see the same chief pilot and mentioned this incident and referred to the pilots operating manual as a 'book.' the boss's reply was to the effect that...'we don't allow books or magazines in the cockpit and that was unauthorized...' the so didn't press much further as the chief pilot wasn't on target with the issue at all. The cap reporter contacted alpa and they hadn't heard of this anomaly either and obtained a copy of the ASRS report that the captain had sent to this office. At no time did the captain bring up the issue of the checklist deficiency of the quick review checklist regarding the absence of refto the fuel tank switch. Captain was counseled on the appropriateness of going back to the air carrier and suggesting that something be done to that short checklist. He stated that he would 'feed back' to this analyst any further information when it was received.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INFLT ENG SHUTDOWN EXPERIENCED IN L-1011 ACFT AT FL330.

Narrative: DURING A NORMAL ROUTINE FLT FROM SFO TO ATL MY CREW EXPERIENCED A FLAMEOUT OF THE #3 ENG AT CRUISE ALT. WE WERE CRUISING AT FL330, WX CAVU, WINDS CALM AND OVER THE MOUNTAINS ABOUT 100 MI W OF PUB COLORADO VOR. HERE ARE THE CHRONOLOGICAL CHAIN OF EVENTS FROM MY PERSPECTIVE AS CAPT. THE FO DECLARED THAT HE NEEDED TO BE EXCUSED. I PUT ON MY OXYGEN MASK. HE THEN SLID BACK HIS CHAIR. MY MASK HAD A SOUR ODOR TO IT AND I ASKED THE SO FOR SOME ALCOHOL SWABS TO CLEAN THE MASK THAT ARE NORMALLY CARRIED IN THE FE DESK. THE SO RAISED THE DESK TOP AND RUMMAGED THROUGH THE DESK LOOKING FOR THE SWABS. I WAS OBSERVING HIM AS HE DID THIS EXPECTING HIM TO HAND ONE TO ME WHEN HE FOUND ONE. THE FO EXITED HIS SEAT AND LEFT THE COCKPIT DURING THIS TIME. THERE WERE NO SWABS IN THE DESK. AS I TURNED AROUND TO FACE FORWARD I SAW A FUEL SYS LIGHT ON THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL. I IMMEDIATELY CALLED THIS OUT TO THE SO AND ALSO NOTICED THE #3 ENG WAS UNWINDING. HIS FIRST COMMENT AS I RECALL WAS THAT HE DID NOT HAVE A LIGHT ON HIS PANEL. A FEW SECONDS LATER HE ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD A LOW FUEL PRESSURE LIGHT ON THE #3 ENG. THE ACFT YAWED SLIGHTLY AS THE ENG FLAMED OUT. A SMALL AMOUNT OF RUDDER KEPT IT IN TRIM. FOR A FEW MOMENTS WE GATHERED OUR WITS AS WE OBSERVED WHAT WAS HAPPENING. AIRSPD WAS DECREASING GRADUALLY AND MAX CONTINUOUS PWR WAS APPLIED TO ENGS 1 AND 2. AIRSPD CONTINUED TO DECREASE. I THEN ASKED FOR A LOWER ALT FROM ZDV. THIS WAS DENIED. I THEN STATED TO CTR THAT ONE OF OUR ENGS HAD FLAMED OUT AND WE NEEDED A LOWER ALT. HE ASKED IF I WAS DECLARING AN EMER. MY AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE IMMEDIATELY GOT US A LOWER ALT OF FL240 AND A DRIFTDOWN INITIATED. AT THIS TIME I WAS HAND FLYING THE ACFT. THE SO SUGGESTED A RELIGHT ATTEMPT. I TOLD HIM TO DO IT SINCE I WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND THE FO WAS NOT PRESENT. THE RELIGHT ATTEMPT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL AND THE ENG WAS SHUTDOWN. ABOUT THIS TIME THE FO RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT, WAS QUICKLY BRIEFED ABOUT OUR SIT AND WE WERE A 3 MAN CREW AGAIN. I BELIEVE HE INITIATED THE SUGGESTION TO THE SO TO CHK OUR DRIFTDOWN ALT. THE SO ANNOUNCED A FEW MOMENTS LATER THAT IT WAS FL200. ATC COULD NOT APPROVE THAT BUT DID CLR US TO FL190 WHICH WAS SATISFACTORY TO US. AS WE DRIFTED DOWN I INSTRUCTED THE SO TO CONTACT THE COMPANY AND ADVISE THEM OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE ATTEMPTED TO DO THIS FOR SEVERAL MINS BUT WAS UNABLE TO DO SO BECAUSE OF OUR LOCATION. WHILE THE SO WAS BUSY WITH THE RADIO I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO CHK HIS MAP FOR POSSIBLE DIVERT FIELDS NEAR OUR RTE IN CASE WE NEEDED TO LAND QUICKLY. I THEN ASKED ABOUT OUR FUEL SIT IF WE CONTINUED TO OUR DEST. WE ALL AGREED THAT OUR QUICK CALCULATION OF THE EXTRA FUEL BURN WOULD NOT LEAVE US WITH AS MUCH FUEL THAT WE FELT COMFORTABLE WITH. AND SINCE WE WERE NOT IN CONTACT WITH FLT CTL TO HELP US MORE ACCURATELY DETERMINE OUR FUEL AND WX AT THE DEST WE DECIDED TO CHANGE OUR FLT PLAN TO FLY OVER DFW LEAVING OUR OPTIONS OPEN. THE INFLT SVC COORDINATOR WAS ASKED TO COME TO THE COCKPIT AND WAS BRIEFED ON OUR SIT. THE FO ASKED IF WE HAD ATTEMPTED A RELIGHT. THE PREVIOUS ATTEMPT OCCURRED WHILE HE WAS OUT OF THE COCKPIT. SINCE WE WERE AT A LOWER ALT THAN THE PREVIOUS ATTEMPT WE DECIDED TO TRY ANOTHER. THIS TIME THE SO USED THE PLTS OPERATING MANUAL RELIGHT PROC INSTEAD OF THE ABBREVIATED PROC ON THE QUICK REF CARD. HE AND THE FO WERE ACCOMPLISHING THE PROC WHEN IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE #3 ENG FUEL TANK VALVE WAS CLOSED! THIS SWITCH IS GUARDED BY A PLASTIC COVER TO PREVENT INADVERTENT MOVEMENT. TO CLOSE THE VALVE REQUIRES RAISING THE GUARD AND DEPRESSING THE SWITCH. HOW THIS VALVE BECAME CLOSED IS UNKNOWN. I KNOW THAT THE SO DID NOT CLOSE THIS VALVE BECAUSE I WAS WATCHING HIM LOOK FOR SWABS IN THE DESK WHEN THE FLAMEOUT OCCURRED. THE #3 ENG STARTED PERFECTLY. WE THEN CANCELED OUR EMER AND REQUESTED A CLB BACK TO OUR CRUISING ALT AND CONTINUED TO OUR DEST. EXTRA FUEL CONSUMPTION WAS ABOUT 1500-2000 LBS MORE THAN FLT PLANNED. YES, WE WROTE UP THE FLAMEOUT IN THE LOGBOOK. NOW, HOW DID THE #3 TANK VALVECLOSE? WE DON'T KNOW. WE SPECULATED LATER AS TO HOW IT MAY HAVE CLOSED. AT THE TIME OF THE FLAMEOUT I HAD REQUESTED THAT THE SO LOOK FOR AN ALCOHOL SWAB IN THE FE DESK. HIS PLTS OPERATING MANUAL WAS ON TOP OF THE DESK. HE RAISED THE DESKTOP WITH THE BOOK STILL ON TOP. THIS ACTION COULD HAVE CAUSED THE CORNER OF THE BOOK TO COME IN CONTACT WITH THE GUARD ON THE TANK VALVE SWITCH, RAISING THE GUARD AND UNLATCHING THE SWITCH. WE DON'T KNOW IF THIS CAUSED THE VALVE TO CLOSE, BUT BELIEVE IT COULD HAVE. IF THIS WAS THE CAUSE OF THE FLAMEOUT THEN WE HAVE A POTENTIAL PROB IN THE FUTURE ON ALL L-1011 ACFT. SO'S NEED TO BE ADVISED THAT USING THEIR PLTS OPERATING MANUAL IN A L-1011 COULD BE HAZARDOUS TO THEIR HEALTH. I WANT TO PAY A COMPLEMENT TO MY CREW MEMBERS. THEIR PERFORMANCE WAS PROFESSIONAL AND EFFICIENT. EVERYTHING THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED WAS DONE. THE PROB WAS SOLVED THUS AVOIDING AN OFF LINE LNDG AND INCONVENIENCING OUR PAX. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR REVEALED THAT HE HAD GONE TO THE CHIEF PLT WITH HIS STORY REGARDING THE PLTS OPERATING MANUAL ON THE DESK INTERFERING WITH THE FUEL SWITCH AND THE CHIEF PLT HAD NEVER HEARD OF THIS BEFORE AND APPARENTLY WASN'T IMPRESSED WITH THE INFO. THE RPTR THEN TALKED WITH SOME INSTR PLTS AND THEY SAID, 'OH YEAH! DIDN'T YOU KNOW THAT AND THAT WAS NOT THE ONLY TIME THAT HAD HAPPENED...' THE FE AND SO WENT TO SEE THE SAME CHIEF PLT AND MENTIONED THIS INCIDENT AND REFERRED TO THE PLTS OPERATING MANUAL AS A 'BOOK.' THE BOSS'S REPLY WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT...'WE DON'T ALLOW BOOKS OR MAGAZINES IN THE COCKPIT AND THAT WAS UNAUTH...' THE SO DIDN'T PRESS MUCH FURTHER AS THE CHIEF PLT WASN'T ON TARGET WITH THE ISSUE AT ALL. THE CAP RPTR CONTACTED ALPA AND THEY HADN'T HEARD OF THIS ANOMALY EITHER AND OBTAINED A COPY OF THE ASRS RPT THAT THE CAPT HAD SENT TO THIS OFFICE. AT NO TIME DID THE CAPT BRING UP THE ISSUE OF THE CHKLIST DEFICIENCY OF THE QUICK REVIEW CHKLIST REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF REFTO THE FUEL TANK SWITCH. CAPT WAS COUNSELED ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF GOING BACK TO THE ACR AND SUGGESTING THAT SOMETHING BE DONE TO THAT SHORT CHKLIST. HE STATED THAT HE WOULD 'FEED BACK' TO THIS ANALYST ANY FURTHER INFO WHEN IT WAS RECEIVED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.