Narrative:

Descending for an ILS approach to runway 28L at port columbus international. A busy descent due to being held high by ATC and some deviation around build-ups in area. First officer was flying, ATIS called for 7 mi visibility and ILS/visual approachs to runway 28L/right. After being cleared for ILS runway 28L approach and on an intercept heading, we quickly configured aircraft for landing because we were high (not high enough to be considered a 'slam-dunk' approach). With aircraft stabilized on an intercept heading and descending at about 1500-1700 FPM to GS, I diverted my attention to completing the remaining checklist items and to tuning my navigation communication to the approach frequency (it was on runway 10L ILS for DME). First officer elected to use autoplt to intercept approach. Instead of turning left to capture localizer, aircraft turned right. After a moment of confusion, first officer disconnected autoplt and turned back left to recapture localizer. Approach control called and gave us a heading to reintercept ILS. I noted we had descended to 2400 ft. 300 ft below GS intercept altitude. I directed first officer to climb back to 2700 ft. ILS subsequently flown to landing. Runway was visually acquired 4-5 mi out. Problem caused by 2 factors. First, dfcg switch is normally in #2 position when first officer is flying. Due to use of omega in cruise, it was in #1 position and was not returned to #2 position during descent. Second, by using #1 navigation radio for DME, autoplt attempted to intercept back course localizer for runway 28R. Secondary factors included fatigue. At the end of a long 12 hour day, I think we were both 1/2 step behind the aircraft. Also, the busy cockpit of the S-80 contributed. More than any other aircraft I've flown, the s- 80 requires the PNF to take himself temporarily out of the loop to complete required checklist and procedural items. I've only been on the aircraft 4 months, and I'm still trying to find that perfect place in the approach to do this. Obviously, I did not find it this time. Finally, the first officer, though senior on the equipment, is somewhat reluctant to use the automatic functions available on the aircraft, such as automatic approachs and omega navigation. This should have been my clue to watch his work a bit more closely. Supplemental information from acn 276054: at a busy time with several things coming together all at once just outside the FAF, over confidence in automation and failure to properly monitor that the autoflt system did what I expected it to do allowed a deviation to occur. A check of the dfgl switch position was recently added to our descent checklist. Now that the majority of our airplanes have an omega installed on the captain's side which causes the dfgl switch to be placed out of its normal position when the first officer is flying, I have learned first hand the importance of ensuring that this step of the descent checklist is accomplished.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK ALTDEV ALT OVERSHOT IN DSCNT.

Narrative: DSNDING FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 28L AT PORT COLUMBUS INTL. A BUSY DSCNT DUE TO BEING HELD HIGH BY ATC AND SOME DEV AROUND BUILD-UPS IN AREA. FO WAS FLYING, ATIS CALLED FOR 7 MI VISIBILITY AND ILS/VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 28L/R. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR ILS RWY 28L APCH AND ON AN INTERCEPT HDG, WE QUICKLY CONFIGURED ACFT FOR LNDG BECAUSE WE WERE HIGH (NOT HIGH ENOUGH TO BE CONSIDERED A 'SLAM-DUNK' APCH). WITH ACFT STABILIZED ON AN INTERCEPT HDG AND DSNDING AT ABOUT 1500-1700 FPM TO GS, I DIVERTED MY ATTN TO COMPLETING THE REMAINING CHKLIST ITEMS AND TO TUNING MY NAV COM TO THE APCH FREQ (IT WAS ON RWY 10L ILS FOR DME). FO ELECTED TO USE AUTOPLT TO INTERCEPT APCH. INSTEAD OF TURNING L TO CAPTURE LOC, ACFT TURNED R. AFTER A MOMENT OF CONFUSION, FO DISCONNECTED AUTOPLT AND TURNED BACK L TO RECAPTURE LOC. APCH CTL CALLED AND GAVE US A HDG TO REINTERCEPT ILS. I NOTED WE HAD DSNDED TO 2400 FT. 300 FT BELOW GS INTERCEPT ALT. I DIRECTED FO TO CLB BACK TO 2700 FT. ILS SUBSEQUENTLY FLOWN TO LNDG. RWY WAS VISUALLY ACQUIRED 4-5 MI OUT. PROB CAUSED BY 2 FACTORS. FIRST, DFCG SWITCH IS NORMALLY IN #2 POS WHEN FO IS FLYING. DUE TO USE OF OMEGA IN CRUISE, IT WAS IN #1 POS AND WAS NOT RETURNED TO #2 POS DURING DSCNT. SECOND, BY USING #1 NAV RADIO FOR DME, AUTOPLT ATTEMPTED TO INTERCEPT BACK COURSE LOC FOR RWY 28R. SECONDARY FACTORS INCLUDED FATIGUE. AT THE END OF A LONG 12 HR DAY, I THINK WE WERE BOTH 1/2 STEP BEHIND THE ACFT. ALSO, THE BUSY COCKPIT OF THE S-80 CONTRIBUTED. MORE THAN ANY OTHER ACFT I'VE FLOWN, THE S- 80 REQUIRES THE PNF TO TAKE HIMSELF TEMPORARILY OUT OF THE LOOP TO COMPLETE REQUIRED CHKLIST AND PROCEDURAL ITEMS. I'VE ONLY BEEN ON THE ACFT 4 MONTHS, AND I'M STILL TRYING TO FIND THAT PERFECT PLACE IN THE APCH TO DO THIS. OBVIOUSLY, I DID NOT FIND IT THIS TIME. FINALLY, THE FO, THOUGH SENIOR ON THE EQUIP, IS SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT TO USE THE AUTO FUNCTIONS AVAILABLE ON THE ACFT, SUCH AS AUTO APCHS AND OMEGA NAV. THIS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MY CLUE TO WATCH HIS WORK A BIT MORE CLOSELY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 276054: AT A BUSY TIME WITH SEVERAL THINGS COMING TOGETHER ALL AT ONCE JUST OUTSIDE THE FAF, OVER CONFIDENCE IN AUTOMATION AND FAILURE TO PROPERLY MONITOR THAT THE AUTOFLT SYS DID WHAT I EXPECTED IT TO DO ALLOWED A DEV TO OCCUR. A CHK OF THE DFGL SWITCH POS WAS RECENTLY ADDED TO OUR DSCNT CHKLIST. NOW THAT THE MAJORITY OF OUR AIRPLANES HAVE AN OMEGA INSTALLED ON THE CAPT'S SIDE WHICH CAUSES THE DFGL SWITCH TO BE PLACED OUT OF ITS NORMAL POS WHEN THE FO IS FLYING, I HAVE LEARNED FIRST HAND THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THIS STEP OF THE DSCNT CHKLIST IS ACCOMPLISHED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.