Narrative:

I was approaching the kalamazoo/battle creek international airport from the northeast in a cessna 150. When I was handed over to the tower from approach control, my landing approach instructions were to report a 2 mi right base for runway 27. Winds were 260 degrees at 11 KTS. I reported on the 2 mi base as instructed and was given a clearance to land. Also included in my clearance was an instruction to square my turn to final which I complied with. Then while still on the base leg I performed my pre-landing checklist and began to configure the aircraft for landing. Immediately after turning final I started scanning the intersecting runway 35 for traffic. Runway 35 is kalamazoo's main instrument runway. Runway 35/17 is used by all the commuter airlines servicing the airport. As I looked down to the approach end of runway 35 there was a commuter aircraft holding short of the runway. As I continued my approach the commuter aircraft was given clearance to taxi in position and hold. At this point I was a mi out and still had clearance to land. At a 1/2 mi and 300 ft AGL, the commuter aircraft was given clearance to takeoff. Without delay I executed a go around. My approach speed was 70 KTS. I turned sharply to the south in an attempt to pass behind the commuter aircraft. 5-7 seconds elapsed between the time the commuter aircraft was given clearance for takeoff and when I called the tower informing them I was going around. When I passed over the intersection of runways 35 and 27 I was directly overhead of the commuter aircraft (about 300-350 ft) and the other aircraft had just left the ground and climbing. He was around 20- 30 ft off the surface. Most pilots approaching runway 27 touch down at the intersection of runway 27 and runway 35. There are obstructions on the approach so I don't go for the numbers. I usually land 500-700 ft down from the threshold or where the 2 runways meet. If a pilot in this situation would have not heard the other aircraft's clearance for takeoff, and then lowered his/her left wing for a crosswind landing, this situation could have developed into the needless deaths of several people. After landing I went to the tower to file a formal complaint. I was told that they were training ATC personnel here. The commuter aircraft was departing on an IFR flight to ord. I was told that this aircraft had to leave within a 2 min time frame in order to be cleared into ord on their time slot or wait on the ground at least an additional 1/2 hour. Also, the pilots of the departing aircraft did not seem to be aware of my position in the traffic pattern. There are pilots who don't question the abilities of ATC personnel. This is a very taxing situation to ask a private pilot with 160 hours to execute a go around when he has a commuter aircraft screaming at him! I feel that ATC had a moral obligation to give me a go around first, then insure that I was clear of the intersection, before giving the other aircraft clearance to takeoff. I understand that airline aircraft are operating under a very tight schedule, but I don't feel that this fact should be allowed to create potentially dangerous sits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CESSNA 150 ON FINAL APCH MAKES GAR TO AVOID COMMUTER WHICH WAS CLRED FOR TKOF.

Narrative: I WAS APCHING THE KALAMAZOO/BATTLE CREEK INTL ARPT FROM THE NE IN A CESSNA 150. WHEN I WAS HANDED OVER TO THE TWR FROM APCH CTL, MY LNDG APCH INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO RPT A 2 MI R BASE FOR RWY 27. WINDS WERE 260 DEGS AT 11 KTS. I RPTED ON THE 2 MI BASE AS INSTRUCTED AND WAS GIVEN A CLRNC TO LAND. ALSO INCLUDED IN MY CLRNC WAS AN INSTRUCTION TO SQUARE MY TURN TO FINAL WHICH I COMPLIED WITH. THEN WHILE STILL ON THE BASE LEG I PERFORMED MY PRE-LNDG CHKLIST AND BEGAN TO CONFIGURE THE ACFT FOR LNDG. IMMEDIATELY AFTER TURNING FINAL I STARTED SCANNING THE INTERSECTING RWY 35 FOR TFC. RWY 35 IS KALAMAZOO'S MAIN INST RWY. RWY 35/17 IS USED BY ALL THE COMMUTER AIRLINES SVCING THE ARPT. AS I LOOKED DOWN TO THE APCH END OF RWY 35 THERE WAS A COMMUTER ACFT HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY. AS I CONTINUED MY APCH THE COMMUTER ACFT WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO TAXI IN POS AND HOLD. AT THIS POINT I WAS A MI OUT AND STILL HAD CLRNC TO LAND. AT A 1/2 MI AND 300 FT AGL, THE COMMUTER ACFT WAS GIVEN CLRNC TO TKOF. WITHOUT DELAY I EXECUTED A GAR. MY APCH SPD WAS 70 KTS. I TURNED SHARPLY TO THE S IN AN ATTEMPT TO PASS BEHIND THE COMMUTER ACFT. 5-7 SECONDS ELAPSED BTWN THE TIME THE COMMUTER ACFT WAS GIVEN CLRNC FOR TKOF AND WHEN I CALLED THE TWR INFORMING THEM I WAS GOING AROUND. WHEN I PASSED OVER THE INTXN OF RWYS 35 AND 27 I WAS DIRECTLY OVERHEAD OF THE COMMUTER ACFT (ABOUT 300-350 FT) AND THE OTHER ACFT HAD JUST LEFT THE GND AND CLBING. HE WAS AROUND 20- 30 FT OFF THE SURFACE. MOST PLTS APCHING RWY 27 TOUCH DOWN AT THE INTXN OF RWY 27 AND RWY 35. THERE ARE OBSTRUCTIONS ON THE APCH SO I DON'T GO FOR THE NUMBERS. I USUALLY LAND 500-700 FT DOWN FROM THE THRESHOLD OR WHERE THE 2 RWYS MEET. IF A PLT IN THIS SIT WOULD HAVE NOT HEARD THE OTHER ACFT'S CLRNC FOR TKOF, AND THEN LOWERED HIS/HER L WING FOR A XWIND LNDG, THIS SIT COULD HAVE DEVELOPED INTO THE NEEDLESS DEATHS OF SEVERAL PEOPLE. AFTER LNDG I WENT TO THE TWR TO FILE A FORMAL COMPLAINT. I WAS TOLD THAT THEY WERE TRAINING ATC PERSONNEL HERE. THE COMMUTER ACFT WAS DEPARTING ON AN IFR FLT TO ORD. I WAS TOLD THAT THIS ACFT HAD TO LEAVE WITHIN A 2 MIN TIME FRAME IN ORDER TO BE CLRED INTO ORD ON THEIR TIME SLOT OR WAIT ON THE GND AT LEAST AN ADDITIONAL 1/2 HR. ALSO, THE PLTS OF THE DEPARTING ACFT DID NOT SEEM TO BE AWARE OF MY POS IN THE TFC PATTERN. THERE ARE PLTS WHO DON'T QUESTION THE ABILITIES OF ATC PERSONNEL. THIS IS A VERY TAXING SIT TO ASK A PVT PLT WITH 160 HRS TO EXECUTE A GAR WHEN HE HAS A COMMUTER ACFT SCREAMING AT HIM! I FEEL THAT ATC HAD A MORAL OBLIGATION TO GIVE ME A GAR FIRST, THEN INSURE THAT I WAS CLR OF THE INTXN, BEFORE GIVING THE OTHER ACFT CLRNC TO TKOF. I UNDERSTAND THAT AIRLINE ACFT ARE OPERATING UNDER A VERY TIGHT SCHEDULE, BUT I DON'T FEEL THAT THIS FACT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO CREATE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS SITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.