Narrative:

Level 13000 ft, 20 mi south of butler VOR (bum). First officer was the PF. ZKC assigns us to cross 10 mi north of bum at 8000 ft and maintain 8000 ft. I acknowledge by reading back the instructions. The first officer begins the descent almost immediately with a 1000 FPM minimum descent. A short time later, I noticed our descent rate has been reduced to 500 FPM, which would not allow us to meet the crossing restr. I pointed this out by telling the first officer, 'we're not going to make it at that rate.' the first officer responded by increasing his descent rate. At this time we were about 10 mi south of the VOR. About a min later, I noticed again that our descent rate is 500 FPM. Again I tell him to increase his descent rate. He does. Since we are approaching mci airspace, I tune in and write down the ATIS. I look up, after writing down the ATIS, and notice we're 0.5 mi from the crossing fix, and still 1200 ft too high, with a 500 FPM descent. I immediately pull the power levers to flight idle, and push the nose down in a vain attempt to get us to 8000 ft. By the time we reached 8000 ft we were 2 mi past our crossing fix. When I asked the first officer why he didn't make the crossing restr, he replied, 'we still have plenty of time, it was 30 mi north, right?' I tell him that it was 10 mi north. He replies that he thought he heard 30 north. He was wrong. Fortunately, there was no conflicting traffic. As captain, I should have realized a problem existed when I had to advise the first officer a second time about the leisurely rate of descent. Instead of merely commenting about the descent rate the second time, I should have questioned the first officer as to why he was using such a minimal descent rate. If I had, I am sure the misunderstanding on the part of the first officer would have been uncovered and resolved. Also, I should not have delayed obtaining the ATIS, given this particular situation, until we complied with the ATC instructions. Another factor in this situation to be considered, is that our type of airplane makes it necessary to wear-noise-attenuating headsets. The problem is when 1 pilot transmits, the other cannot hear what that pilot is saying on the radio because there is no sidetone. Had our equipment not had this limitation, the first officer would have heard my readback. And at the very least, would have questioned whether one of us had not misunderstood center's instructions.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC ASSIGNS CROSS 10 N BUM FO MISUNDERSTANDS TO 30 N BUM AT 8000 FT. CAPT NOT AWARE OF FO PLAN. FLC MISS ALT RESTR BY 2 MI.

Narrative: LEVEL 13000 FT, 20 MI S OF BUTLER VOR (BUM). FO WAS THE PF. ZKC ASSIGNS US TO CROSS 10 MI N OF BUM AT 8000 FT AND MAINTAIN 8000 FT. I ACKNOWLEDGE BY READING BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS. THE FO BEGINS THE DSCNT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY WITH A 1000 FPM MINIMUM DSCNT. A SHORT TIME LATER, I NOTICED OUR DSCNT RATE HAS BEEN REDUCED TO 500 FPM, WHICH WOULD NOT ALLOW US TO MEET THE XING RESTR. I POINTED THIS OUT BY TELLING THE FO, 'WE'RE NOT GOING TO MAKE IT AT THAT RATE.' THE FO RESPONDED BY INCREASING HIS DSCNT RATE. AT THIS TIME WE WERE ABOUT 10 MI S OF THE VOR. ABOUT A MIN LATER, I NOTICED AGAIN THAT OUR DSCNT RATE IS 500 FPM. AGAIN I TELL HIM TO INCREASE HIS DSCNT RATE. HE DOES. SINCE WE ARE APCHING MCI AIRSPACE, I TUNE IN AND WRITE DOWN THE ATIS. I LOOK UP, AFTER WRITING DOWN THE ATIS, AND NOTICE WE'RE 0.5 MI FROM THE XING FIX, AND STILL 1200 FT TOO HIGH, WITH A 500 FPM DSCNT. I IMMEDIATELY PULL THE PWR LEVERS TO FLT IDLE, AND PUSH THE NOSE DOWN IN A VAIN ATTEMPT TO GET US TO 8000 FT. BY THE TIME WE REACHED 8000 FT WE WERE 2 MI PAST OUR XING FIX. WHEN I ASKED THE FO WHY HE DIDN'T MAKE THE XING RESTR, HE REPLIED, 'WE STILL HAVE PLENTY OF TIME, IT WAS 30 MI N, RIGHT?' I TELL HIM THAT IT WAS 10 MI N. HE REPLIES THAT HE THOUGHT HE HEARD 30 N. HE WAS WRONG. FORTUNATELY, THERE WAS NO CONFLICTING TFC. AS CAPT, I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED A PROB EXISTED WHEN I HAD TO ADVISE THE FO A SECOND TIME ABOUT THE LEISURELY RATE OF DSCNT. INSTEAD OF MERELY COMMENTING ABOUT THE DSCNT RATE THE SECOND TIME, I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE FO AS TO WHY HE WAS USING SUCH A MINIMAL DSCNT RATE. IF I HAD, I AM SURE THE MISUNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF THE FO WOULD HAVE BEEN UNCOVERED AND RESOLVED. ALSO, I SHOULD NOT HAVE DELAYED OBTAINING THE ATIS, GIVEN THIS PARTICULAR SIT, UNTIL WE COMPLIED WITH THE ATC INSTRUCTIONS. ANOTHER FACTOR IN THIS SIT TO BE CONSIDERED, IS THAT OUR TYPE OF AIRPLANE MAKES IT NECESSARY TO WEAR-NOISE-ATTENUATING HEADSETS. THE PROB IS WHEN 1 PLT XMITS, THE OTHER CANNOT HEAR WHAT THAT PLT IS SAYING ON THE RADIO BECAUSE THERE IS NO SIDETONE. HAD OUR EQUIP NOT HAD THIS LIMITATION, THE FO WOULD HAVE HEARD MY READBACK. AND AT THE VERY LEAST, WOULD HAVE QUESTIONED WHETHER ONE OF US HAD NOT MISUNDERSTOOD CTR'S INSTRUCTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.