Narrative:

I was first officer flying the leg into lax. We were slowed to 180 KTS approach altitude 2000 ft just abeam numbers for runway 24R. Approach called traffic at 1 O'clock moving to 2 O'clock. I told my cap I had a widebody transport at 2 O'clock low. He reported traffic in sight, approach cleared us for a visual behind the heavy. 'He's going to the right, you are cleared for the left.' my captain kept reading back the wrong clearance to approach and I was in a turn to base leg. I had dialed in the localizer for runway 24L but was unaware it was not operation. As my captain was trying to clarify what runway we were cleared to, I was trying to give instruction for more flaps, gear down, final destination checklist, etc. It became very busy and somewhat confusing. About the time they told us to contact tower, I realized that runway 24L localizer was not coming on line so I crosschecked the NDB and realized we had already flown through the bearing to runway 24L. 1 big factor was once I rolled into the turn to base, I was not able to keep our traffic in sight (because of bank angle and haze). Slant range visibility was not good. I immediately rolled into a tight turn back toward final when tower then cleared us to land on runway 24R. Approximately 10-15 seconds later, tower called us and said they showed us south of course. We told them we were corrective for runway 24R. We landed without further incident and nothing further was said. A variety of events led to this situation. Being high and cleared for approach put us behind right away. Visibility was not good and created further confusion. Breakdown of communication in cockpit caused further distrs. And being cleared to another runway while we were still trying to catch up from the previous breakdown of communication. In the future, I will probably ask for an extended downwind to lose excessive altitude. I now feel that informing controllers about the need to go around would have increased both safety and passenger comfort.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LAX VISUAL APCH.

Narrative: I WAS FO FLYING THE LEG INTO LAX. WE WERE SLOWED TO 180 KTS APCH ALT 2000 FT JUST ABEAM NUMBERS FOR RWY 24R. APCH CALLED TFC AT 1 O'CLOCK MOVING TO 2 O'CLOCK. I TOLD MY CAP I HAD A WDB AT 2 O'CLOCK LOW. HE RPTED TFC IN SIGHT, APCH CLRED US FOR A VISUAL BEHIND THE HVY. 'HE'S GOING TO THE R, YOU ARE CLRED FOR THE L.' MY CAPT KEPT READING BACK THE WRONG CLRNC TO APCH AND I WAS IN A TURN TO BASE LEG. I HAD DIALED IN THE LOC FOR RWY 24L BUT WAS UNAWARE IT WAS NOT OP. AS MY CAPT WAS TRYING TO CLARIFY WHAT RWY WE WERE CLRED TO, I WAS TRYING TO GIVE INSTRUCTION FOR MORE FLAPS, GEAR DOWN, FINAL DEST CHKLIST, ETC. IT BECAME VERY BUSY AND SOMEWHAT CONFUSING. ABOUT THE TIME THEY TOLD US TO CONTACT TWR, I REALIZED THAT RWY 24L LOC WAS NOT COMING ON LINE SO I XCHKED THE NDB AND REALIZED WE HAD ALREADY FLOWN THROUGH THE BEARING TO RWY 24L. 1 BIG FACTOR WAS ONCE I ROLLED INTO THE TURN TO BASE, I WAS NOT ABLE TO KEEP OUR TFC IN SIGHT (BECAUSE OF BANK ANGLE AND HAZE). SLANT RANGE VISIBILITY WAS NOT GOOD. I IMMEDIATELY ROLLED INTO A TIGHT TURN BACK TOWARD FINAL WHEN TWR THEN CLRED US TO LAND ON RWY 24R. APPROX 10-15 SECONDS LATER, TWR CALLED US AND SAID THEY SHOWED US S OF COURSE. WE TOLD THEM WE WERE CORRECTIVE FOR RWY 24R. WE LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT AND NOTHING FURTHER WAS SAID. A VARIETY OF EVENTS LED TO THIS SIT. BEING HIGH AND CLRED FOR APCH PUT US BEHIND RIGHT AWAY. VISIBILITY WAS NOT GOOD AND CREATED FURTHER CONFUSION. BREAKDOWN OF COM IN COCKPIT CAUSED FURTHER DISTRS. AND BEING CLRED TO ANOTHER RWY WHILE WE WERE STILL TRYING TO CATCH UP FROM THE PREVIOUS BREAKDOWN OF COM. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL PROBABLY ASK FOR AN EXTENDED DOWNWIND TO LOSE EXCESSIVE ALT. I NOW FEEL THAT INFORMING CTLRS ABOUT THE NEED TO GO AROUND WOULD HAVE INCREASED BOTH SAFETY AND PAX COMFORT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.