Narrative:

While repositioning a citation jet from marsh harbor, bahamas (myam) to fort lauderdale executive, fl (fxe), as PNF, sitting in the right seat, I tuned and listened to the ATIS broadcast for our destination about 20 mins prior to our arrival. I was surprised to hear that although visual approachs to runway 26 were in use, there was a solid overcast reported at 5000 ft. It is common practice in our company to back up visual approachs with whatever alternative form of navigation that may be available for the particular runway that we are to use. In this case, the only available backup approach was an RNAV to runway 26. Although we are not authority/authorized to use such an approach, we tend to use such approachs as a guideline for terrain clearance and situational awareness when conducting visual approachs, whenever available. As we approached our destination, and after being handed off to local approach control, we were given further descent to 3000 ft. As we passed through about 4000 ft the controller indicated the position of the airport with reference to our current aircraft course. We were still in solid instrument meteorological conditions, and stated this to the controller. He seemed as surprised that we were still IMC at this point. He issued a further descent for us and explained that he would be giving us further vectors through the final approach course as we descended until we had the airport in sight. As we broke out into VMC conditions descending through about 3000 ft, about 8 NM east of the airfield and south of the final approach course, the PF stated that he had the destination airport in sight. I informed ATC and we were cleared for the visual approach and told to contact tower. After tuning in the tower frequency, and prior to initiating contact with them, I adjusted the GPS to indicate a route direct to the final approach fix on the RNAV runway 26 approach. I stated this to the PF and he acknowledged his understanding of this. As I checked in with the tower controller, I stated that we were established on left base visual for runway 26. In hindsight, this may have been a misleading description of our position. With the PF maneuvering to become established on the final approach course for the runway, we determined our position more in relation to our orientation to runway heading without enough thought about our distance (about 6 NM) from the airport. At this time, the tower controller seemed unclr as to our location and with other traffic approaching, asked us to restate our position. At this time, the PF idented other traffic ahead and above and determined that it was prudent to deviate north of the final approach course. The controller questioned as to whether we did in fact have the airport in sight, and I responded that we did, but that we were deviating for traffic. I don't believe that there was ever any true threat of collision, and that any deviation was made purely in extreme caution. My initial position report was probably confusing to the controller. I may have issued a better report if I had not been so consumed with reliance on the instruments for reference to our position. Instead, if I referenced the airport visually, as the PF was doing, I would have been more aware of our position in reference to the airport. Supplemental information from acn 605649: we saw an airport in front of us and assumed it was fxe, however, it was pmp. We then called the airport in sight and approach cleared us for the visual runway 26 at fxe. However, we were lined up for runway 33 at pmp. Descending through 1200 ft, we realized it was the wrong airport and maneuvered to the left for landing on runway 26 at fxe. While maneuvering, we came within 500-700 ft of another aircraft being vectored for runway 26 at fxe. The tower controller at fxe queried is as to what we were doing and we landed without incident at fxe. This problem could have been avoided if we had better situational awareness and relied more on our GPS positioning instead of our instincts when we broke out of the clouds.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C525 CREW MISIDENTED FXE, AND BEGAN A VISUAL APCH TO PMP INSTEAD OF FXE. THE PLTS WERE SEAT SWAPPING AT THE TIME.

Narrative: WHILE REPOSITIONING A CITATION JET FROM MARSH HARBOR, BAHAMAS (MYAM) TO FORT LAUDERDALE EXECUTIVE, FL (FXE), AS PNF, SITTING IN THE R SEAT, I TUNED AND LISTENED TO THE ATIS BROADCAST FOR OUR DEST ABOUT 20 MINS PRIOR TO OUR ARR. I WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT ALTHOUGH VISUAL APCHS TO RWY 26 WERE IN USE, THERE WAS A SOLID OVCST RPTED AT 5000 FT. IT IS COMMON PRACTICE IN OUR COMPANY TO BACK UP VISUAL APCHS WITH WHATEVER ALTERNATIVE FORM OF NAV THAT MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR THE PARTICULAR RWY THAT WE ARE TO USE. IN THIS CASE, THE ONLY AVAILABLE BACKUP APCH WAS AN RNAV TO RWY 26. ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT AUTH TO USE SUCH AN APCH, WE TEND TO USE SUCH APCHS AS A GUIDELINE FOR TERRAIN CLRNC AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS WHEN CONDUCTING VISUAL APCHS, WHENEVER AVAILABLE. AS WE APCHED OUR DEST, AND AFTER BEING HANDED OFF TO LCL APCH CTL, WE WERE GIVEN FURTHER DSCNT TO 3000 FT. AS WE PASSED THROUGH ABOUT 4000 FT THE CTLR INDICATED THE POS OF THE ARPT WITH REF TO OUR CURRENT ACFT COURSE. WE WERE STILL IN SOLID INST METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS, AND STATED THIS TO THE CTLR. HE SEEMED AS SURPRISED THAT WE WERE STILL IMC AT THIS POINT. HE ISSUED A FURTHER DSCNT FOR US AND EXPLAINED THAT HE WOULD BE GIVING US FURTHER VECTORS THROUGH THE FINAL APCH COURSE AS WE DSNDED UNTIL WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. AS WE BROKE OUT INTO VMC CONDITIONS DSNDING THROUGH ABOUT 3000 FT, ABOUT 8 NM E OF THE AIRFIELD AND S OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE, THE PF STATED THAT HE HAD THE DEST ARPT IN SIGHT. I INFORMED ATC AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AND TOLD TO CONTACT TWR. AFTER TUNING IN THE TWR FREQUENCY, AND PRIOR TO INITIATING CONTACT WITH THEM, I ADJUSTED THE GPS TO INDICATE A RTE DIRECT TO THE FINAL APCH FIX ON THE RNAV RWY 26 APCH. I STATED THIS TO THE PF AND HE ACKNOWLEDGED HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THIS. AS I CHKED IN WITH THE TWR CTLR, I STATED THAT WE WERE ESTABLISHED ON L BASE VISUAL FOR RWY 26. IN HINDSIGHT, THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A MISLEADING DESCRIPTION OF OUR POS. WITH THE PF MANEUVERING TO BECOME ESTABLISHED ON THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR THE RWY, WE DETERMINED OUR POS MORE IN RELATION TO OUR ORIENTATION TO RWY HDG WITHOUT ENOUGH THOUGHT ABOUT OUR DISTANCE (ABOUT 6 NM) FROM THE ARPT. AT THIS TIME, THE TWR CTLR SEEMED UNCLR AS TO OUR LOCATION AND WITH OTHER TFC APCHING, ASKED US TO RESTATE OUR POS. AT THIS TIME, THE PF IDENTED OTHER TFC AHEAD AND ABOVE AND DETERMINED THAT IT WAS PRUDENT TO DEVIATE N OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE. THE CTLR QUESTIONED AS TO WHETHER WE DID IN FACT HAVE THE ARPT IN SIGHT, AND I RESPONDED THAT WE DID, BUT THAT WE WERE DEVIATING FOR TFC. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS EVER ANY TRUE THREAT OF COLLISION, AND THAT ANY DEV WAS MADE PURELY IN EXTREME CAUTION. MY INITIAL POS RPT WAS PROBABLY CONFUSING TO THE CTLR. I MAY HAVE ISSUED A BETTER RPT IF I HAD NOT BEEN SO CONSUMED WITH RELIANCE ON THE INSTS FOR REF TO OUR POS. INSTEAD, IF I REFED THE ARPT VISUALLY, AS THE PF WAS DOING, I WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AWARE OF OUR POS IN REF TO THE ARPT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 605649: WE SAW AN ARPT IN FRONT OF US AND ASSUMED IT WAS FXE, HOWEVER, IT WAS PMP. WE THEN CALLED THE ARPT IN SIGHT AND APCH CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL RWY 26 AT FXE. HOWEVER, WE WERE LINED UP FOR RWY 33 AT PMP. DSNDING THROUGH 1200 FT, WE REALIZED IT WAS THE WRONG ARPT AND MANEUVERED TO THE L FOR LNDG ON RWY 26 AT FXE. WHILE MANEUVERING, WE CAME WITHIN 500-700 FT OF ANOTHER ACFT BEING VECTORED FOR RWY 26 AT FXE. THE TWR CTLR AT FXE QUERIED IS AS TO WHAT WE WERE DOING AND WE LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AT FXE. THIS PROB COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WE HAD BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND RELIED MORE ON OUR GPS POSITIONING INSTEAD OF OUR INSTINCTS WHEN WE BROKE OUT OF THE CLOUDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.