Narrative:

Flying heading 030 degrees at 5000 ft in IMC (the acton 4 arrival) approach assigned us heading 010 degrees and descent to 3000 ft. Out of approximately 4200 ft we broke out beneath the overcast. I told the first officer I had the airport in sight at 3 O'clock. He confirmed he had the field and advised ATC. The controller asked if we had the MD80 at our 2 O'clock in sight. The first officer (PNF) responded we had the MD80 at 2:30 O'clock in sight. The controller then assigned us a heading of 310 degrees and cleared us for a visual approach runway 13R behind the MD80, contact the tower at the OM. It was our perception the turn was to widen out on the MD80. In the turn to 310 degrees I lost the traffic and asked the first officer where the MD80 was. He said 'he is behind us and low.' I continued a descent (dividing attention inside to reference instruments and remain above the GS until established on final to avoid the MD80's wake) and began an east turn for the base leg. In the turn I saw an MD80 at my 12 O'clock position. The MD80 we were following was the wrong aircraft, although it was the aircraft we originally idented at our 2:30 O'clock position and turned to follow, when we accepted the visual approach. To avoid reducing separation further on the 12 O'clock aircraft, I continued a right turn to parallel the traffic. The first officer advised the controller we had the air carrier MD80 in sight. ATC responded slow as needed, cleared visual runway 13R. Reflecting on how to avoid this situation in the future many contributing factors become apparent: the transition from instrument to visual conditions requires considerable coordination between crew members. Our acceptance of a visual approach during a peak arrival time at a busy hub airport. While the MD80 was TCASII equipped, our class of aircraft is operating under an FAA approved extension to operate without TCASII. Beginning a turn without my having traffic in constant sight. While the above items may seem obvious, the environment under which we operate daily lends itself to human error. Scheduled reduced rest, no autoplt, multiple legs at hub airports during heavily traffic times, less than industry standard technology in our cockpits.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC MISIDENTED TFC ON APCH WHEN CLRED FOR VISUAL. WHEN SIGHTING ACTUAL INTERVAL ACFT, EVADED AND SLOWED FOR UNEVENTFUL LNDG.

Narrative: FLYING HDG 030 DEGS AT 5000 FT IN IMC (THE ACTON 4 ARR) APCH ASSIGNED US HDG 010 DEGS AND DSCNT TO 3000 FT. OUT OF APPROX 4200 FT WE BROKE OUT BENEATH THE OVCST. I TOLD THE FO I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT AT 3 O'CLOCK. HE CONFIRMED HE HAD THE FIELD AND ADVISED ATC. THE CTLR ASKED IF WE HAD THE MD80 AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK IN SIGHT. THE FO (PNF) RESPONDED WE HAD THE MD80 AT 2:30 O'CLOCK IN SIGHT. THE CTLR THEN ASSIGNED US A HDG OF 310 DEGS AND CLRED US FOR A VISUAL APCH RWY 13R BEHIND THE MD80, CONTACT THE TWR AT THE OM. IT WAS OUR PERCEPTION THE TURN WAS TO WIDEN OUT ON THE MD80. IN THE TURN TO 310 DEGS I LOST THE TFC AND ASKED THE FO WHERE THE MD80 WAS. HE SAID 'HE IS BEHIND US AND LOW.' I CONTINUED A DSCNT (DIVIDING ATTN INSIDE TO REF INSTS AND REMAIN ABOVE THE GS UNTIL ESTABLISHED ON FINAL TO AVOID THE MD80'S WAKE) AND BEGAN AN E TURN FOR THE BASE LEG. IN THE TURN I SAW AN MD80 AT MY 12 O'CLOCK POS. THE MD80 WE WERE FOLLOWING WAS THE WRONG ACFT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS THE ACFT WE ORIGINALLY IDENTED AT OUR 2:30 O'CLOCK POS AND TURNED TO FOLLOW, WHEN WE ACCEPTED THE VISUAL APCH. TO AVOID REDUCING SEPARATION FURTHER ON THE 12 O'CLOCK ACFT, I CONTINUED A R TURN TO PARALLEL THE TFC. THE FO ADVISED THE CTLR WE HAD THE ACR MD80 IN SIGHT. ATC RESPONDED SLOW AS NEEDED, CLRED VISUAL RWY 13R. REFLECTING ON HOW TO AVOID THIS SIT IN THE FUTURE MANY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS BECOME APPARENT: THE TRANSITION FROM INST TO VISUAL CONDITIONS REQUIRES CONSIDERABLE COORD BTWN CREW MEMBERS. OUR ACCEPTANCE OF A VISUAL APCH DURING A PEAK ARR TIME AT A BUSY HUB ARPT. WHILE THE MD80 WAS TCASII EQUIPPED, OUR CLASS OF ACFT IS OPERATING UNDER AN FAA APPROVED EXTENSION TO OPERATE WITHOUT TCASII. BEGINNING A TURN WITHOUT MY HAVING TFC IN CONSTANT SIGHT. WHILE THE ABOVE ITEMS MAY SEEM OBVIOUS, THE ENVIRONMENT UNDER WHICH WE OPERATE DAILY LENDS ITSELF TO HUMAN ERROR. SCHEDULED REDUCED REST, NO AUTOPLT, MULTIPLE LEGS AT HUB ARPTS DURING HEAVILY TFC TIMES, LESS THAN INDUSTRY STANDARD TECHNOLOGY IN OUR COCKPITS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.