Narrative:

WX was cavu, but warm (82 degrees). During briefing for takeoff, the first officer and I discussed the fact that we were 'performance limited' and only 100 pounds below that legal for the takeoff. Therefore, if we lost an engine after rotation, we could only expect minimum performance due to the density altitude. We began our roll on runway 35L. All engine parameters were normal and our SOP callout of '80 KTS, thrust set' from the first officer came quickly. At approximately 100 KIAS, I saw a bird fly from the left edge of the runway and towards the aircraft, followed by a slight 'thump' sound. There were no immediate engine indications, master cautions, or other indications of engine failure. There was a low level vibration that began and appeared to be increasing. We initiated a rejected takeoff at approximately 110 KIAS. It took a few moments to get through to tower to notify them of our abort, position on runway 35L and request for equipment, etc. We were informed of light smoke trailing the aircraft, but no flame observed. Emergency equipment confirmed no fire or further smoke. Damage to aircraft included replacing 3 pairs of first stage compressor blades and 2 tire and wheel assemblies. Bird went through fan section and not 'hot' section or damage would have been substantial to engine. The most difficult decision following abort at high speed is whether or not to evacuate/evacuation. When there are no cockpit indications of a fire, you have to rely on tower observations or other crews within sight. This is difficult at best, even during daylight VFR. Once equipment arrives you at least establish communications with an observer who can give you an 'eye' to the exterior stairs. Everything went well for us and I was pleasantly surprised by all the support. My only suggestion is that rescue equipment or airport ground/management crews carry chocks to help crews following high speed aborts. You are not supposed to set the brakes following a high speed abort if in the 'meltdown zone' or if maximum braking is used. The first assistance comes from rescue or airport management and it would be great if they had nosewheel chocks. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter is pleased with his performance as well as that of the airport and the crash crew. He did not want to set the brakes and did not want to start the APU because he thought that he might have hydraulic leak that could put fumes into the cabin. The airport representative that first met the aircraft will attempt to get chocks in his vehicle and on the fire trucks. The reporter will call the FAA safety hot line to pass on the idea of nosewheel chocks on emergency vehicles at all airports. The magpie was the only casualty.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR MLG INGESTED A MAGPIE.

Narrative: WX WAS CAVU, BUT WARM (82 DEGS). DURING BRIEFING FOR TKOF, THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT WE WERE 'PERFORMANCE LIMITED' AND ONLY 100 LBS BELOW THAT LEGAL FOR THE TKOF. THEREFORE, IF WE LOST AN ENG AFTER ROTATION, WE COULD ONLY EXPECT MINIMUM PERFORMANCE DUE TO THE DENSITY ALT. WE BEGAN OUR ROLL ON RWY 35L. ALL ENG PARAMETERS WERE NORMAL AND OUR SOP CALLOUT OF '80 KTS, THRUST SET' FROM THE FO CAME QUICKLY. AT APPROX 100 KIAS, I SAW A BIRD FLY FROM THE L EDGE OF THE RWY AND TOWARDS THE ACFT, FOLLOWED BY A SLIGHT 'THUMP' SOUND. THERE WERE NO IMMEDIATE ENG INDICATIONS, MASTER CAUTIONS, OR OTHER INDICATIONS OF ENG FAILURE. THERE WAS A LOW LEVEL VIBRATION THAT BEGAN AND APPEARED TO BE INCREASING. WE INITIATED A REJECTED TKOF AT APPROX 110 KIAS. IT TOOK A FEW MOMENTS TO GET THROUGH TO TWR TO NOTIFY THEM OF OUR ABORT, POS ON RWY 35L AND REQUEST FOR EQUIP, ETC. WE WERE INFORMED OF LIGHT SMOKE TRAILING THE ACFT, BUT NO FLAME OBSERVED. EMER EQUIP CONFIRMED NO FIRE OR FURTHER SMOKE. DAMAGE TO ACFT INCLUDED REPLACING 3 PAIRS OF FIRST STAGE COMPRESSOR BLADES AND 2 TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLIES. BIRD WENT THROUGH FAN SECTION AND NOT 'HOT' SECTION OR DAMAGE WOULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL TO ENG. THE MOST DIFFICULT DECISION FOLLOWING ABORT AT HIGH SPD IS WHETHER OR NOT TO EVAC. WHEN THERE ARE NO COCKPIT INDICATIONS OF A FIRE, YOU HAVE TO RELY ON TWR OBSERVATIONS OR OTHER CREWS WITHIN SIGHT. THIS IS DIFFICULT AT BEST, EVEN DURING DAYLIGHT VFR. ONCE EQUIP ARRIVES YOU AT LEAST ESTABLISH COMS WITH AN OBSERVER WHO CAN GIVE YOU AN 'EYE' TO THE EXTERIOR STAIRS. EVERYTHING WENT WELL FOR US AND I WAS PLEASANTLY SURPRISED BY ALL THE SUPPORT. MY ONLY SUGGESTION IS THAT RESCUE EQUIP OR ARPT GND/MGMNT CREWS CARRY CHOCKS TO HELP CREWS FOLLOWING HIGH SPD ABORTS. YOU ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO SET THE BRAKES FOLLOWING A HIGH SPD ABORT IF IN THE 'MELTDOWN ZONE' OR IF MAX BRAKING IS USED. THE FIRST ASSISTANCE COMES FROM RESCUE OR ARPT MGMNT AND IT WOULD BE GREAT IF THEY HAD NOSEWHEEL CHOCKS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR IS PLEASED WITH HIS PERFORMANCE AS WELL AS THAT OF THE ARPT AND THE CRASH CREW. HE DID NOT WANT TO SET THE BRAKES AND DID NOT WANT TO START THE APU BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HYD LEAK THAT COULD PUT FUMES INTO THE CABIN. THE ARPT REPRESENTATIVE THAT FIRST MET THE ACFT WILL ATTEMPT TO GET CHOCKS IN HIS VEHICLE AND ON THE FIRE TRUCKS. THE RPTR WILL CALL THE FAA SAFETY HOT LINE TO PASS ON THE IDEA OF NOSEWHEEL CHOCKS ON EMER VEHICLES AT ALL ARPTS. THE MAGPIE WAS THE ONLY CASUALTY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.