Narrative:

The problem was unclr. MEL guidance which may or may not have led to flying an aircraft in violation of MEL guidance. Flight to sdf arriving at the aircraft at the gate at bwi, I noticed 2 write-ups in the logbook which were MEL'ed, and both of which were deferred under 23-1 and 23-3. The 23-1 MEL deferment was the captain's overhead speaker and I had no problem with it. The 23-3 MEL was for the captain's headset jack and I was uncomfortable with the deferment on it because I basically had no way to hear ATC communication from the captain's seat without using the observer station headset on turning up the first officer's overhead speaker. I didn't think any part of the aircraft or deferments were unsafe, just a little awkward and unusual. I grabbed my MEL and called dispatch. Dispatch advised me that he had 'mr. X' from air carrier maintenance duty control on the telephone and if I had any questions about the 23-3 headset jack deferral I could talk to him. Mr X told me that the headset 'jack' problem had been discussed at length for most of the night and that it was maintenance's and the maintenance MEL experts opinion that the 'headset jack' fell under miscellaneous item descriptions under MEL 23-3 and was the same as 'headset' for the purposes of equipment description. As I realize, whether it is an inoperative headset or headset jack at the captain's station, I could not receive communication audio at my seat, so either one being inoperative was basically the same. No reception without using a speaker/headset at the observers first officer's station. As we had full radio transmit/receive capability on both communication VHF 1 and 2 I saw no safety hazard and took the aircraft. 2 legs later as I blocked flight into stl (st louis), dispatch called and dispatcher said on further discussion maintenance decided they weren't sure the headset jack was deferable and had decided to fix it in stl. Now my ATP was at risk because they said the poi and maintenance MEL expert hadn't really discussed the 23-3 problem at all before my takeoff from bwi to sdf. I'm upset because I was led to believe by mr X in maintenance duty control that 'headset jack' had been defined as the same thing as 'headset' under 23-3 by our MEL experts and by dispatch, and I was pressured heavily to the point of ridicule by mr X on the phone. Mr X had said I would have to 'park it...and all we can do then is send down parts and an a&P from mdw later' to fix the aircraft. I fell into 'mr X's' trap because he convinced me that all relevant parties had discussed MEL 23-3, concluded it was valid and applicable, and I was the only one who didn't understand the relevance. Later, when the dispatcher on flight stl-mdw became uncomfortable and pressed the issue duty control backed down and decided to fix the jet in stl. In the aftermath, dispatcher for stl-mdw and I have filed ASRS reports, maintenance duty control and dispatch held an emergency team meeting on aug/xx/94 to discuss pressing the limits of the MEL and pressuring pilots/dispatchers to fly aircraft, and an irregularity report has been filed with air carrier as I understand it by the dispatch office to alert management to this kind of safety trap. The problem was created by an ambiguous write-up at a non-maintenance station creating a maintenance problem on a late night terminator. Maintenance, to keep the aircraft from going down off-line, did a little creative interpretation, then strong-armed dispatch/pilot into believing they had fully researched and gotten overnight approval for the MEL 23-3 interpretation of 'miscellaneous equipment' from all responsible authorities. Then they changed their story when dispatch later began to press them for answers and names. Hopefully, the team meeting and these reports will help to correct an overly aggressive 'press on' attitude and preclude future events.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH OP OF AN ACR B-737 WHEN THE PIC ALLOWS A MEL REQUIREMENT TO BE MISINTERPRETED.

Narrative: THE PROB WAS UNCLR. MEL GUIDANCE WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE LED TO FLYING AN ACFT IN VIOLATION OF MEL GUIDANCE. FLT TO SDF ARRIVING AT THE ACFT AT THE GATE AT BWI, I NOTICED 2 WRITE-UPS IN THE LOGBOOK WHICH WERE MEL'ED, AND BOTH OF WHICH WERE DEFERRED UNDER 23-1 AND 23-3. THE 23-1 MEL DEFERMENT WAS THE CAPT'S OVERHEAD SPEAKER AND I HAD NO PROB WITH IT. THE 23-3 MEL WAS FOR THE CAPT'S HEADSET JACK AND I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE DEFERMENT ON IT BECAUSE I BASICALLY HAD NO WAY TO HEAR ATC COM FROM THE CAPT'S SEAT WITHOUT USING THE OBSERVER STATION HEADSET ON TURNING UP THE FO'S OVERHEAD SPEAKER. I DIDN'T THINK ANY PART OF THE ACFT OR DEFERMENTS WERE UNSAFE, JUST A LITTLE AWKWARD AND UNUSUAL. I GRABBED MY MEL AND CALLED DISPATCH. DISPATCH ADVISED ME THAT HE HAD 'MR. X' FROM ACR MAINT DUTY CTL ON THE TELEPHONE AND IF I HAD ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE 23-3 HEADSET JACK DEFERRAL I COULD TALK TO HIM. MR X TOLD ME THAT THE HEADSET 'JACK' PROB HAD BEEN DISCUSSED AT LENGTH FOR MOST OF THE NIGHT AND THAT IT WAS MAINT'S AND THE MAINT MEL EXPERTS OPINION THAT THE 'HEADSET JACK' FELL UNDER MISC ITEM DESCRIPTIONS UNDER MEL 23-3 AND WAS THE SAME AS 'HEADSET' FOR THE PURPOSES OF EQUIP DESCRIPTION. AS I REALIZE, WHETHER IT IS AN INOP HEADSET OR HEADSET JACK AT THE CAPT'S STATION, I COULD NOT RECEIVE COM AUDIO AT MY SEAT, SO EITHER ONE BEING INOP WAS BASICALLY THE SAME. NO RECEPTION WITHOUT USING A SPEAKER/HEADSET AT THE OBSERVERS FO'S STATION. AS WE HAD FULL RADIO XMIT/RECEIVE CAPABILITY ON BOTH COM VHF 1 AND 2 I SAW NO SAFETY HAZARD AND TOOK THE ACFT. 2 LEGS LATER AS I BLOCKED FLT INTO STL (ST LOUIS), DISPATCH CALLED AND DISPATCHER SAID ON FURTHER DISCUSSION MAINT DECIDED THEY WEREN'T SURE THE HEADSET JACK WAS DEFERABLE AND HAD DECIDED TO FIX IT IN STL. NOW MY ATP WAS AT RISK BECAUSE THEY SAID THE POI AND MAINT MEL EXPERT HADN'T REALLY DISCUSSED THE 23-3 PROB AT ALL BEFORE MY TKOF FROM BWI TO SDF. I'M UPSET BECAUSE I WAS LED TO BELIEVE BY MR X IN MAINT DUTY CTL THAT 'HEADSET JACK' HAD BEEN DEFINED AS THE SAME THING AS 'HEADSET' UNDER 23-3 BY OUR MEL EXPERTS AND BY DISPATCH, AND I WAS PRESSURED HEAVILY TO THE POINT OF RIDICULE BY MR X ON THE PHONE. MR X HAD SAID I WOULD HAVE TO 'PARK IT...AND ALL WE CAN DO THEN IS SEND DOWN PARTS AND AN A&P FROM MDW LATER' TO FIX THE ACFT. I FELL INTO 'MR X'S' TRAP BECAUSE HE CONVINCED ME THAT ALL RELEVANT PARTIES HAD DISCUSSED MEL 23-3, CONCLUDED IT WAS VALID AND APPLICABLE, AND I WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE RELEVANCE. LATER, WHEN THE DISPATCHER ON FLT STL-MDW BECAME UNCOMFORTABLE AND PRESSED THE ISSUE DUTY CTL BACKED DOWN AND DECIDED TO FIX THE JET IN STL. IN THE AFTERMATH, DISPATCHER FOR STL-MDW AND I HAVE FILED ASRS RPTS, MAINT DUTY CTL AND DISPATCH HELD AN EMER TEAM MEETING ON AUG/XX/94 TO DISCUSS PRESSING THE LIMITS OF THE MEL AND PRESSURING PLTS/DISPATCHERS TO FLY ACFT, AND AN IRREGULARITY RPT HAS BEEN FILED WITH ACR AS I UNDERSTAND IT BY THE DISPATCH OFFICE TO ALERT MGMNT TO THIS KIND OF SAFETY TRAP. THE PROB WAS CREATED BY AN AMBIGUOUS WRITE-UP AT A NON-MAINT STATION CREATING A MAINT PROB ON A LATE NIGHT TERMINATOR. MAINT, TO KEEP THE ACFT FROM GOING DOWN OFF-LINE, DID A LITTLE CREATIVE INTERP, THEN STRONG-ARMED DISPATCH/PLT INTO BELIEVING THEY HAD FULLY RESEARCHED AND GOTTEN OVERNIGHT APPROVAL FOR THE MEL 23-3 INTERP OF 'MISC EQUIP' FROM ALL RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES. THEN THEY CHANGED THEIR STORY WHEN DISPATCH LATER BEGAN TO PRESS THEM FOR ANSWERS AND NAMES. HOPEFULLY, THE TEAM MEETING AND THESE RPTS WILL HELP TO CORRECT AN OVERLY AGGRESSIVE 'PRESS ON' ATTITUDE AND PRECLUDE FUTURE EVENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.