Narrative:

The PIC is a private pilot (asel), instrument rated and current. Right seat was occupied by a passenger who was also a commercial pilot (asel), who is also instrument rated (but not instrument current at the time). The flight was being conducted under part 91 IFR. Approaching gee, conditions were IMC. Clearance for the VOR-a approach to 6g3 was obtained from the roc 'western' controller on 123.70. Flight plan indicated that the aircraft did not have DME: I advised the controller that radar identify of dusti and rhine would be necessary. Controller advised that radar identify could be expected from next controller. I was then advised to contact roc approach on 119.55 the handoff was then completed. Upon passing gee, I was well above the charted minimum altitude of 2800 MSL, as well as my assigned crossing altitude, which was a bit higher. Conditions included light turbulence, but I was below the clouds and had VFR visibility. In attempt to effectively utilize cockpit resources, PIC requested the passenger in the right seat to hold the nos IAP chart for the approach. As PIC I also asked the chart holder to read the minimum altitude for the segment being flown. Referring to the profile segment of the IAP, the chart holder stated minimum altitude was 1700 ft. (A rubber band hid the word 'dusti' above the 'gee 11.3 DME.') he saw the gee, and took the 2800 ft to be the altitude for crossing gee instead of the altitude for crossing dusti. I continued descent past 2800 ft to slightly less than 2000 ft. At approximately this time, I personally viewed the IAP chart again (I had looked at it before beginning the approach), noticed that 2800 ft was the minimum crossing dusti, realized that dusti had not yet been called by the controller, and commenced a full power climb back to 2800. At 2800 ft we were below the clouds and had VFR visibility. The controller on 119.55 was directing considerable traffic: the frequency was quite congested. When asked if we were approaching dusti, he responded that we were then 1 mi 'inside' of dusti. He had been too busy with other traffic to identify dusti. Thus, it is possible that descent below published minimums may not have occurred. Nonetheless, it may have, and certainly could have. At this point, as the controller stated I was 'inside' of dusti, I commenced descent toward 1700 ft. Shortly thereafter, in VFR conditions, I idented the town just south of 6g3, and called approach to cancel IFR. Approach accommodated immediately and apologized for also missing the identify of rhine. Flight was completed without incident. Analysis: basic problem was PIC depending on a pilot that was instrument rated but not instrument current to read an IAP and provide minimum altitude information to PIC. This was compounded by the distraction of working with a busy controller who missed radar identify of a key step-down fix, and later, the FAF. It was also compounded by a rubber band, holding the nos IAP open, which obscured the word 'dusti' on the profile view. I look forward to the new ring-bound nos charts that will not need rubber bands to hold them open! An additional contributing factor is that the plan view of the subject approach 'starts' at gee, but the profile view 'starts' at dusti. Lessons learned: first, while I continue to be convinced that 2 pilots are better than 1, especially in IMC, I am also convinced that in sits where 1 pilot is flying the approach and the other performing key navigational duties, both should be personally reviewing the actual charts or IAP. Indeed, duplicate copies would be a good idea. Second: when relying on an assistant, PIC should ensure assistant is familiar with the exact subject matter. Third: always try to back up radar identify with supplementary means. (I have flown this approach numerous times before, both with and without DME. When without DME, never has the controller missed an identify, until this flight).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALTDEV ALT XING RESTR NOT MET. MISREAD CHART.

Narrative: THE PIC IS A PVT PLT (ASEL), INST RATED AND CURRENT. R SEAT WAS OCCUPIED BY A PAX WHO WAS ALSO A COMMERCIAL PLT (ASEL), WHO IS ALSO INST RATED (BUT NOT INST CURRENT AT THE TIME). THE FLT WAS BEING CONDUCTED UNDER PART 91 IFR. APCHING GEE, CONDITIONS WERE IMC. CLRNC FOR THE VOR-A APCH TO 6G3 WAS OBTAINED FROM THE ROC 'WESTERN' CTLR ON 123.70. FLT PLAN INDICATED THAT THE ACFT DID NOT HAVE DME: I ADVISED THE CTLR THAT RADAR IDENT OF DUSTI AND RHINE WOULD BE NECESSARY. CTLR ADVISED THAT RADAR IDENT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM NEXT CTLR. I WAS THEN ADVISED TO CONTACT ROC APCH ON 119.55 THE HDOF WAS THEN COMPLETED. UPON PASSING GEE, I WAS WELL ABOVE THE CHARTED MINIMUM ALT OF 2800 MSL, AS WELL AS MY ASSIGNED XING ALT, WHICH WAS A BIT HIGHER. CONDITIONS INCLUDED LIGHT TURB, BUT I WAS BELOW THE CLOUDS AND HAD VFR VISIBILITY. IN ATTEMPT TO EFFECTIVELY UTILIZE COCKPIT RESOURCES, PIC REQUESTED THE PAX IN THE R SEAT TO HOLD THE NOS IAP CHART FOR THE APCH. AS PIC I ALSO ASKED THE CHART HOLDER TO READ THE MINIMUM ALT FOR THE SEGMENT BEING FLOWN. REFERRING TO THE PROFILE SEGMENT OF THE IAP, THE CHART HOLDER STATED MINIMUM ALT WAS 1700 FT. (A RUBBER BAND HID THE WORD 'DUSTI' ABOVE THE 'GEE 11.3 DME.') HE SAW THE GEE, AND TOOK THE 2800 FT TO BE THE ALT FOR XING GEE INSTEAD OF THE ALT FOR XING DUSTI. I CONTINUED DSCNT PAST 2800 FT TO SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 2000 FT. AT APPROX THIS TIME, I PERSONALLY VIEWED THE IAP CHART AGAIN (I HAD LOOKED AT IT BEFORE BEGINNING THE APCH), NOTICED THAT 2800 FT WAS THE MINIMUM XING DUSTI, REALIZED THAT DUSTI HAD NOT YET BEEN CALLED BY THE CTLR, AND COMMENCED A FULL PWR CLB BACK TO 2800. AT 2800 FT WE WERE BELOW THE CLOUDS AND HAD VFR VISIBILITY. THE CTLR ON 119.55 WAS DIRECTING CONSIDERABLE TFC: THE FREQ WAS QUITE CONGESTED. WHEN ASKED IF WE WERE APCHING DUSTI, HE RESPONDED THAT WE WERE THEN 1 MI 'INSIDE' OF DUSTI. HE HAD BEEN TOO BUSY WITH OTHER TFC TO IDENT DUSTI. THUS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT DSCNT BELOW PUBLISHED MINIMUMS MAY NOT HAVE OCCURRED. NONETHELESS, IT MAY HAVE, AND CERTAINLY COULD HAVE. AT THIS POINT, AS THE CTLR STATED I WAS 'INSIDE' OF DUSTI, I COMMENCED DSCNT TOWARD 1700 FT. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, IN VFR CONDITIONS, I IDENTED THE TOWN JUST S OF 6G3, AND CALLED APCH TO CANCEL IFR. APCH ACCOMMODATED IMMEDIATELY AND APOLOGIZED FOR ALSO MISSING THE IDENT OF RHINE. FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. ANALYSIS: BASIC PROB WAS PIC DEPENDING ON A PLT THAT WAS INST RATED BUT NOT INST CURRENT TO READ AN IAP AND PROVIDE MINIMUM ALT INFO TO PIC. THIS WAS COMPOUNDED BY THE DISTRACTION OF WORKING WITH A BUSY CTLR WHO MISSED RADAR IDENT OF A KEY STEP-DOWN FIX, AND LATER, THE FAF. IT WAS ALSO COMPOUNDED BY A RUBBER BAND, HOLDING THE NOS IAP OPEN, WHICH OBSCURED THE WORD 'DUSTI' ON THE PROFILE VIEW. I LOOK FORWARD TO THE NEW RING-BOUND NOS CHARTS THAT WILL NOT NEED RUBBER BANDS TO HOLD THEM OPEN! AN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT THE PLAN VIEW OF THE SUBJECT APCH 'STARTS' AT GEE, BUT THE PROFILE VIEW 'STARTS' AT DUSTI. LESSONS LEARNED: FIRST, WHILE I CONTINUE TO BE CONVINCED THAT 2 PLTS ARE BETTER THAN 1, ESPECIALLY IN IMC, I AM ALSO CONVINCED THAT IN SITS WHERE 1 PLT IS FLYING THE APCH AND THE OTHER PERFORMING KEY NAVIGATIONAL DUTIES, BOTH SHOULD BE PERSONALLY REVIEWING THE ACTUAL CHARTS OR IAP. INDEED, DUPLICATE COPIES WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA. SECOND: WHEN RELYING ON AN ASSISTANT, PIC SHOULD ENSURE ASSISTANT IS FAMILIAR WITH THE EXACT SUBJECT MATTER. THIRD: ALWAYS TRY TO BACK UP RADAR IDENT WITH SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS. (I HAVE FLOWN THIS APCH NUMEROUS TIMES BEFORE, BOTH WITH AND WITHOUT DME. WHEN WITHOUT DME, NEVER HAS THE CTLR MISSED AN IDENT, UNTIL THIS FLT).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.