Flight crew confusion over TA given and TCASII TA RA advisories.

Attributes
ACN	279509
Time
Date	199407
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : jfk
State Reference	NY
Altitude	msl bound lower : 9000 msl bound upper : 9000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : n90
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	Other
Flight Phase	descent other
Route In Use	arrival other arrival star : star
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Commercial Fixed Wing
Operating Under FAR Part	other : unknown
Flight Phase	cruise other
Flight Plan	VFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 120 flight time total : 13000 flight time type : 2600
ASRS Report	279509
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

We were on 'keenebunk' 3 arrival at jfk, after passing 'rober,' descending through 9000 ft, cleared to 5000 ft and under radar control. We had a TA, intruder at 10 O'clock, about 5 NM on TCASII display--(aircraft X). I was unable to see the traffic but the controller gave us information about it. At the same time we had a RA 'climb crossing, climb'--I didn't comply because the approach controller was saying that traffic (aircraft Z) had us in visual contact and was passing behind--almost simultaneously the flight engineer, looking down at the TCASII display called for traffic very close, same altitude, while a second RA 'climb, crossing, climb' was going on. I promptly disengaged the autoplt and I reduced rate of descent. I believe that TCASII has generally positive effects in enhancing flight safety but sometimes too many inputs cause an overload on flight crew and could be difficult to select the right course of actions. I was in-flight listening to the information of ATC, while TCASII advisories and flight engineer shouting were like backgnd noise but actually very important complementary information I risked to miss.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC CONFUSION OVER TA GIVEN AND TCASII TA RA ADVISORIES.

Narrative: WE WERE ON 'KEENEBUNK' 3 ARR AT JFK, AFTER PASSING 'ROBER,' DSNDING THROUGH 9000 FT, CLRED TO 5000 FT AND UNDER RADAR CTL. WE HAD A TA, INTRUDER AT 10 O'CLOCK, ABOUT 5 NM ON TCASII DISPLAY--(ACFT X). I WAS UNABLE TO SEE THE TFC BUT THE CTLR GAVE US INFO ABOUT IT. AT THE SAME TIME WE HAD A RA 'CLB XING, CLB'--I DIDN'T COMPLY BECAUSE THE APCH CTLR WAS SAYING THAT TFC (ACFT Z) HAD US IN VISUAL CONTACT AND WAS PASSING BEHIND--ALMOST SIMULTANEOUSLY THE FE, LOOKING DOWN AT THE TCASII DISPLAY CALLED FOR TFC VERY CLOSE, SAME ALT, WHILE A SECOND RA 'CLB, XING, CLB' WAS GOING ON. I PROMPTLY DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND I REDUCED RATE OF DSCNT. I BELIEVE THAT TCASII HAS GENERALLY POSITIVE EFFECTS IN ENHANCING FLT SAFETY BUT SOMETIMES TOO MANY INPUTS CAUSE AN OVERLOAD ON FLC AND COULD BE DIFFICULT TO SELECT THE RIGHT COURSE OF ACTIONS. I WAS INFLT LISTENING TO THE INFO OF ATC, WHILE TCASII ADVISORIES AND FE SHOUTING WERE LIKE BACKGND NOISE BUT ACTUALLY VERY IMPORTANT COMPLEMENTARY INFO I RISKED TO MISS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.