Narrative:

I was acting as flight engineer on an L-1011 flying from cincinnati, oh, to london, england on aug/xx/94. The crossing over the atlantic was uneventful. Just prior to starting descent from FL370. The #1 tank quantity began to decrease abnormally. Initially suspecting a faulty fuel indicator we accomplished that checklist. This, however, did not prove to be the problem so we proceeded to accomplish the fuel leak checklist. I informed the captain that in order to control the leak we would have to shut down the #1 engine. The captain decided to leave the engine running and land immediately at london, gatwick airport. The fuel leak continued until after landing when we cleared the active runway where we were met by the fire department. Once clear of the runway we shut down the engine and controled the fuel leak. Then we taxied to the gate uneventfully. After inspecting the fuel line the problem resulted from a stress rupture in the high pressure fuel line. The split protruded from a stress point in the line where a 2 inch indentation in the line had occurred as a result of an object hitting or being dropped on the line. A closer inspection of the engine could have prevented the incident. Supplemental information from acn 279891: I instructed him to monitor the gauges and accomplish the fuel leak checklist. When fuel approached zero both low pressure lights came on and he initiated fuel class feed to sustain engine operation. I told the copilot to call london advise them of a suspected fuel leak, declare an emergency and request priority handling to gatwick to the nearest runway.gatwick was the most suitable airport predicted on altitude, time and conditions present. A high speed descent into gatwick was initiated with a speed of 350 KTS to 4000 ft and 15 mi to the airport. Tower informed us that fuel was observed coming from #1 engine cowl. After landing the aircraft was taxied off the runway and #1 engine secured in accordance with pilots operating manual procedures. Fire crews foamed the area to preclude fire and passenger were told to remain calm and advised of the reason for the fire trucks. Fuel remaining on board the aircraft was 14700 pounds. I examined the break in the high pressure fuel line and noticed a sizeable dent in the area of the split. This was probably caused by a hammer or other blunt object -- I am remiss to understand why maintenance did not replace the part when it happened or discern its existence during routine inspections had the failure occurred at (etp). #1 engine would have been shutdown but fuel to etp would have been marginal. The gatwick fire department did a professional job as did ATC and should be commended for their assistance. The engine could have been shut down at top of descent, but was not to keep that option open -- and could have been shut down at any time. The flight landed safely with no damage or injuries. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: call back to reporter revealed that he is under investigation by the FAA. The FAA has requested a letter from him, outlining his actions during the event. The flight was destined for gatwick, so no diversion was made. The flight was 38 mins out, just near the top of descent when the discovery of the fuel loss/leak was made by the so. The captain had, at departure, briefed the so of his desires to have fuel checks made at each point on the flight plan. The last fuel check was at 20 west, not at the succeeding one much further out from the top of descent. The L-1011 is allowed an imbalance of 1500 pounds. At this point the aircraft was about 14000 pounds out of balance due to lost fuel. About 11500 pounds total fuel was lost. Captain started descent and during the descent the fuel loss slowed. He assigned the first officer and the so the task of handling the checklists while he handled communication and flew. #1 engine was kept in idle all the way into airport. Captain states that the first officer and so did not voice any opposition to keeping the #1 engine at idle. The PIC wanted it in case of any unusual situation or if another engine failed. He did not know how the aircraft would be on just 1 engine and out of balance laterally. The PIC has had a company hearing and they said he failed to complete the checklist in not shutting the engine down. The captain contends that checklists are for guidance under most foreseen circumstances but not all. The broken line was a stainless steel line that had a 2 1/2 inch crack in it. It had been installed 2 weeks prior. The maintenance report was not conclusive and failed to mention the crack in the line. Captain says that the first officer/so had 'jumped ship' in that they had later disagreed with the captain's decision to not shut down the #1 engine. He says the captain has a lonely seat. The aircraft landed with 5000 lt imbal. He attributes the so's fatigue/lack of alertness to the deadhead from atl to cvg for the flight to gatwick. On duty about 11 hours. He did not rule out the possibility of any employee action in the damage to the fuel line. Air carrier is laying off a lot of people.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: L-1011-500 SUFFERS FUEL LEAK IN #1 ENG WHILE IN CRUISE IN FOREIGN AIRSPACE. OVERWATER OP. LACK OF CORRECT FLC COCKPIT COORD MGMNT IN FUEL USE PROCS NOTED. EMER DECLARED GND EQUIP.

Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS FE ON AN L-1011 FLYING FROM CINCINNATI, OH, TO LONDON, ENGLAND ON AUG/XX/94. THE XING OVER THE ATLANTIC WAS UNEVENTFUL. JUST PRIOR TO STARTING DSCNT FROM FL370. THE #1 TANK QUANTITY BEGAN TO DECREASE ABNORMALLY. INITIALLY SUSPECTING A FAULTY FUEL INDICATOR WE ACCOMPLISHED THAT CHKLIST. THIS, HOWEVER, DID NOT PROVE TO BE THE PROB SO WE PROCEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH THE FUEL LEAK CHKLIST. I INFORMED THE CAPT THAT IN ORDER TO CTL THE LEAK WE WOULD HAVE TO SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. THE CAPT DECIDED TO LEAVE THE ENG RUNNING AND LAND IMMEDIATELY AT LONDON, GATWICK ARPT. THE FUEL LEAK CONTINUED UNTIL AFTER LNDG WHEN WE CLRED THE ACTIVE RWY WHERE WE WERE MET BY THE FIRE DEPT. ONCE CLR OF THE RWY WE SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND CTLED THE FUEL LEAK. THEN WE TAXIED TO THE GATE UNEVENTFULLY. AFTER INSPECTING THE FUEL LINE THE PROB RESULTED FROM A STRESS RUPTURE IN THE HIGH PRESSURE FUEL LINE. THE SPLIT PROTRUDED FROM A STRESS POINT IN THE LINE WHERE A 2 INCH INDENTATION IN THE LINE HAD OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF AN OBJECT HITTING OR BEING DROPPED ON THE LINE. A CLOSER INSPECTION OF THE ENG COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 279891: I INSTRUCTED HIM TO MONITOR THE GAUGES AND ACCOMPLISH THE FUEL LEAK CHKLIST. WHEN FUEL APCHED ZERO BOTH LOW PRESSURE LIGHTS CAME ON AND HE INITIATED FUEL CLASS FEED TO SUSTAIN ENG OP. I TOLD THE COPLT TO CALL LONDON ADVISE THEM OF A SUSPECTED FUEL LEAK, DECLARE AN EMER AND REQUEST PRIORITY HANDLING TO GATWICK TO THE NEAREST RWY.GATWICK WAS THE MOST SUITABLE ARPT PREDICTED ON ALT, TIME AND CONDITIONS PRESENT. A HIGH SPD DSCNT INTO GATWICK WAS INITIATED WITH A SPD OF 350 KTS TO 4000 FT AND 15 MI TO THE ARPT. TWR INFORMED US THAT FUEL WAS OBSERVED COMING FROM #1 ENG COWL. AFTER LNDG THE ACFT WAS TAXIED OFF THE RWY AND #1 ENG SECURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLTS OPERATING MANUAL PROCS. FIRE CREWS FOAMED THE AREA TO PRECLUDE FIRE AND PAX WERE TOLD TO REMAIN CALM AND ADVISED OF THE REASON FOR THE FIRE TRUCKS. FUEL REMAINING ON BOARD THE ACFT WAS 14700 LBS. I EXAMINED THE BREAK IN THE HIGH PRESSURE FUEL LINE AND NOTICED A SIZEABLE DENT IN THE AREA OF THE SPLIT. THIS WAS PROBABLY CAUSED BY A HAMMER OR OTHER BLUNT OBJECT -- I AM REMISS TO UNDERSTAND WHY MAINT DID NOT REPLACE THE PART WHEN IT HAPPENED OR DISCERN ITS EXISTENCE DURING ROUTINE INSPECTIONS HAD THE FAILURE OCCURRED AT (ETP). #1 ENG WOULD HAVE BEEN SHUTDOWN BUT FUEL TO ETP WOULD HAVE BEEN MARGINAL. THE GATWICK FIRE DEPT DID A PROFESSIONAL JOB AS DID ATC AND SHOULD BE COMMENDED FOR THEIR ASSISTANCE. THE ENG COULD HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN AT TOP OF DSCNT, BUT WAS NOT TO KEEP THAT OPTION OPEN -- AND COULD HAVE BEEN SHUT DOWN AT ANY TIME. THE FLT LANDED SAFELY WITH NO DAMAGE OR INJURIES. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: CALL BACK TO RPTR REVEALED THAT HE IS UNDER INVESTIGATION BY THE FAA. THE FAA HAS REQUESTED A LETTER FROM HIM, OUTLINING HIS ACTIONS DURING THE EVENT. THE FLT WAS DESTINED FOR GATWICK, SO NO DIVERSION WAS MADE. THE FLT WAS 38 MINS OUT, JUST NEAR THE TOP OF DSCNT WHEN THE DISCOVERY OF THE FUEL LOSS/LEAK WAS MADE BY THE SO. THE CAPT HAD, AT DEP, BRIEFED THE SO OF HIS DESIRES TO HAVE FUEL CHKS MADE AT EACH POINT ON THE FLT PLAN. THE LAST FUEL CHK WAS AT 20 W, NOT AT THE SUCCEEDING ONE MUCH FURTHER OUT FROM THE TOP OF DSCNT. THE L-1011 IS ALLOWED AN IMBALANCE OF 1500 LBS. AT THIS POINT THE ACFT WAS ABOUT 14000 LBS OUT OF BAL DUE TO LOST FUEL. ABOUT 11500 LBS TOTAL FUEL WAS LOST. CAPT STARTED DSCNT AND DURING THE DSCNT THE FUEL LOSS SLOWED. HE ASSIGNED THE FO AND THE SO THE TASK OF HANDLING THE CHKLISTS WHILE HE HANDLED COM AND FLEW. #1 ENG WAS KEPT IN IDLE ALL THE WAY INTO ARPT. CAPT STATES THAT THE FO AND SO DID NOT VOICE ANY OPPOSITION TO KEEPING THE #1 ENG AT IDLE. THE PIC WANTED IT IN CASE OF ANY UNUSUAL SIT OR IF ANOTHER ENG FAILED. HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE ACFT WOULD BE ON JUST 1 ENG AND OUT OF BAL LATERALLY. THE PIC HAS HAD A COMPANY HEARING AND THEY SAID HE FAILED TO COMPLETE THE CHKLIST IN NOT SHUTTING THE ENG DOWN. THE CAPT CONTENDS THAT CHKLISTS ARE FOR GUIDANCE UNDER MOST FORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES BUT NOT ALL. THE BROKEN LINE WAS A STAINLESS STEEL LINE THAT HAD A 2 1/2 INCH CRACK IN IT. IT HAD BEEN INSTALLED 2 WKS PRIOR. THE MAINT RPT WAS NOT CONCLUSIVE AND FAILED TO MENTION THE CRACK IN THE LINE. CAPT SAYS THAT THE FO/SO HAD 'JUMPED SHIP' IN THAT THEY HAD LATER DISAGREED WITH THE CAPT'S DECISION TO NOT SHUT DOWN THE #1 ENG. HE SAYS THE CAPT HAS A LONELY SEAT. THE ACFT LANDED WITH 5000 LT IMBAL. HE ATTRIBUTES THE SO'S FATIGUE/LACK OF ALERTNESS TO THE DEADHEAD FROM ATL TO CVG FOR THE FLT TO GATWICK. ON DUTY ABOUT 11 HRS. HE DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY EMPLOYEE ACTION IN THE DAMAGE TO THE FUEL LINE. ACR IS LAYING OFF A LOT OF PEOPLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.