Narrative:

We (cpr a) were level at 2500 ft on a 270 degree heading being vectored for an ILS runway 36 at dca. Just prior to intercepting the localizer we received a TA on the TCASII. We looked for the traffic but due to the haze in-flight we were unable to see the intruder aircraft (air carrier B). (He was level at our altitude.) we assumed that he was the traffic we were following. About 10 seconds after the TA, we received an RA. Our command was to descend more than 2000 FPM, immediately after the RA (about 2 seconds) we saw the intruder aircraft. An A-320, in about a 20 degree left bank and climbing. (Going through a 080 degree heading). We initiated a left turn and a 2000 ft plus rate of descent. About 2-3 seconds after the RA, the controller advised us to turn immediately left to a 180 degree heading for traffic. I advised him we had the traffic in sight. On landing the captain contacted approach control on the landline and was given the following explanation. Training was being done on the west side of the localizer. We were being vectored by the east controller for an ILS to runway 36. We were to follow the A-320. The instructor-controller felt there was adequate separation between us but when the A-320 received the RA, he was in a left turn to a 020 degree heading, (he stopped the turn, and began his climb to respond to the RA). The controller felt the RA from the TCASII contributed to the less than a half mi separation (I believe) that existed. I completely disagree with the controller on the TCASII making the separation worse. We were already much too close when both aircraft received an RA. I believe the controller did not want to admit the error for whatever reason. Obviously we believe in TCASII.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLTDEV--LOSS OF SEPARATION BTWN CPR A AND ACR B AS A RESULT OF TCASII EVASIVE ACTION BY BOTH ACFT. CPR A WAS BEING SEQUENCED TO FOLLOW ACR B INTRAIL FROM THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION.

Narrative: WE (CPR A) WERE LEVEL AT 2500 FT ON A 270 DEG HDG BEING VECTORED FOR AN ILS RWY 36 AT DCA. JUST PRIOR TO INTERCEPTING THE LOC WE RECEIVED A TA ON THE TCASII. WE LOOKED FOR THE TFC BUT DUE TO THE HAZE INFLT WE WERE UNABLE TO SEE THE INTRUDER ACFT (ACR B). (HE WAS LEVEL AT OUR ALT.) WE ASSUMED THAT HE WAS THE TFC WE WERE FOLLOWING. ABOUT 10 SECONDS AFTER THE TA, WE RECEIVED AN RA. OUR COMMAND WAS TO DSND MORE THAN 2000 FPM, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RA (ABOUT 2 SECONDS) WE SAW THE INTRUDER ACFT. AN A-320, IN ABOUT A 20 DEG L BANK AND CLBING. (GOING THROUGH A 080 DEG HDG). WE INITIATED A L TURN AND A 2000 FT PLUS RATE OF DSCNT. ABOUT 2-3 SECONDS AFTER THE RA, THE CTLR ADVISED US TO TURN IMMEDIATELY L TO A 180 DEG HDG FOR TFC. I ADVISED HIM WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT. ON LNDG THE CAPT CONTACTED APCH CTL ON THE LANDLINE AND WAS GIVEN THE FOLLOWING EXPLANATION. TRAINING WAS BEING DONE ON THE W SIDE OF THE LOC. WE WERE BEING VECTORED BY THE E CTLR FOR AN ILS TO RWY 36. WE WERE TO FOLLOW THE A-320. THE INSTRUCTOR-CTLR FELT THERE WAS ADEQUATE SEPARATION BTWN US BUT WHEN THE A-320 RECEIVED THE RA, HE WAS IN A L TURN TO A 020 DEG HDG, (HE STOPPED THE TURN, AND BEGAN HIS CLB TO RESPOND TO THE RA). THE CTLR FELT THE RA FROM THE TCASII CONTRIBUTED TO THE LESS THAN A HALF MI SEPARATION (I BELIEVE) THAT EXISTED. I COMPLETELY DISAGREE WITH THE CTLR ON THE TCASII MAKING THE SEPARATION WORSE. WE WERE ALREADY MUCH TOO CLOSE WHEN BOTH ACFT RECEIVED AN RA. I BELIEVE THE CTLR DID NOT WANT TO ADMIT THE ERROR FOR WHATEVER REASON. OBVIOUSLY WE BELIEVE IN TCASII.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.