Narrative:

While on approach to manila's ninoy aquino international airport runway 24 air carrier X flight experienced the following. We were told we were radar contact 55 mi from the airport by approach control. We were cleared to descend to 7000 ft, proceeding direct to mia VOR. At about 25 mi we were given a 290 degree heading. The first officer and so had both been commenting on the poor quality of approach radar handling and of problems they had run into in the recent past with both vectors and altitudes approaching manila. As part of the approach briefing we discussed being extra watchful of poor vectors, no vectors or inappropriate altitudes. At 20 DME the first officer commented that from what he could see on the TCASII we were #1 for the airport. At 15 DME I asked the first officer to check with approach control about a lower altitude because we were now well above a 3-1 normal descent path. Approach control cleared us to 3500 ft. We configured the aircraft to flaps 15 degrees gear down to facilitate a rapid descent to recapture a normal glide path. As we neared the localizer as evident by the RMI on mia VOR and we crossed the 245 degree radial I asked the first officer to check and see if we were to intercept the localizer. By the time approach replied we had flown through the localizer. All approach said was yes intercept the localizer, descend on the GS, cleared for approach. No heading was given to reintercept the localizer. From this point, well above the GS, on the north side of the localizer, at 7 DME, descending through 4000 ft we were on our own to salvage the approach. At 1000 ft and 3 mi we were back to a normal stabilized approach. The only reason this approach did not end up in a missed approach or worse was that the crew anticipated the poor performance of approach control and slowed and configured the aircraft early in anticipation of being placed in a difficult position from which to make the approach. If this scenario had been caused by heavy traffic or was an isolated incident I could have accepted it, but the fact is that this is a recurring problem that is all too familiar to the entire crew on this flight. I believe that the radar control at manila's ninoy aquino international airport is incompetent, poorly managed and a danger to aviation. It would be much safer to not have any radar control than to have a radar control that is supposed to help but instead places aircraft in difficult if not unsafe position.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: POOR ATC HANDLING BY FOREIGN GOVT APCH CTL.

Narrative: WHILE ON APCH TO MANILA'S NINOY AQUINO INTL ARPT RWY 24 ACR X FLT EXPERIENCED THE FOLLOWING. WE WERE TOLD WE WERE RADAR CONTACT 55 MI FROM THE ARPT BY APCH CTL. WE WERE CLRED TO DSND TO 7000 FT, PROCEEDING DIRECT TO MIA VOR. AT ABOUT 25 MI WE WERE GIVEN A 290 DEG HDG. THE FO AND SO HAD BOTH BEEN COMMENTING ON THE POOR QUALITY OF APCH RADAR HANDLING AND OF PROBS THEY HAD RUN INTO IN THE RECENT PAST WITH BOTH VECTORS AND ALTS APCHING MANILA. AS PART OF THE APCH BRIEFING WE DISCUSSED BEING EXTRA WATCHFUL OF POOR VECTORS, NO VECTORS OR INAPPROPRIATE ALTS. AT 20 DME THE FO COMMENTED THAT FROM WHAT HE COULD SEE ON THE TCASII WE WERE #1 FOR THE ARPT. AT 15 DME I ASKED THE FO TO CHK WITH APCH CTL ABOUT A LOWER ALT BECAUSE WE WERE NOW WELL ABOVE A 3-1 NORMAL DSCNT PATH. APCH CTL CLRED US TO 3500 FT. WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT TO FLAPS 15 DEGS GEAR DOWN TO FACILITATE A RAPID DSCNT TO RECAPTURE A NORMAL GLIDE PATH. AS WE NEARED THE LOC AS EVIDENT BY THE RMI ON MIA VOR AND WE CROSSED THE 245 DEG RADIAL I ASKED THE FO TO CHK AND SEE IF WE WERE TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. BY THE TIME APCH REPLIED WE HAD FLOWN THROUGH THE LOC. ALL APCH SAID WAS YES INTERCEPT THE LOC, DSND ON THE GS, CLRED FOR APCH. NO HDG WAS GIVEN TO REINTERCEPT THE LOC. FROM THIS POINT, WELL ABOVE THE GS, ON THE N SIDE OF THE LOC, AT 7 DME, DSNDING THROUGH 4000 FT WE WERE ON OUR OWN TO SALVAGE THE APCH. AT 1000 FT AND 3 MI WE WERE BACK TO A NORMAL STABILIZED APCH. THE ONLY REASON THIS APCH DID NOT END UP IN A MISSED APCH OR WORSE WAS THAT THE CREW ANTICIPATED THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF APCH CTL AND SLOWED AND CONFIGURED THE ACFT EARLY IN ANTICIPATION OF BEING PLACED IN A DIFFICULT POS FROM WHICH TO MAKE THE APCH. IF THIS SCENARIO HAD BEEN CAUSED BY HVY TFC OR WAS AN ISOLATED INCIDENT I COULD HAVE ACCEPTED IT, BUT THE FACT IS THAT THIS IS A RECURRING PROBLEM THAT IS ALL TOO FAMILIAR TO THE ENTIRE CREW ON THIS FLT. I BELIEVE THAT THE RADAR CTL AT MANILA'S NINOY AQUINO INTL ARPT IS INCOMPETENT, POORLY MANAGED AND A DANGER TO AVIATION. IT WOULD BE MUCH SAFER TO NOT HAVE ANY RADAR CTL THAN TO HAVE A RADAR CTL THAT IS SUPPOSED TO HELP BUT INSTEAD PLACES ACFT IN DIFFICULT IF NOT UNSAFE POS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.