Narrative:

Flight landing at XX00 on sep/xx/94. Problem: communication, dfw approach control to incident aircraft, during vectors for final approach. Result: came too close to aircraft landing parallel runway. Contributing factors: both captain and first officer less than 100 hours in aircraft. First officer, little experience in dfw operations. TCASII RA too loud, unable to hear ATC. Similar sounding call signs. Busy, VFR morning rush at dfw. Flight being vectored onto the left localizer. It started when I missed ATC's first call instructing us to turn base. ATC's second call to us, controller noticeably upset over missed first call. We acknowledged and turned base. We are now on base for the left runway with traffic at our 1 O'clock for the right runway. We then get a 'traffic' call from TCASII and then an RA from TCASII because of traffic at our 12 O'clock now. The captain initiated a turn onto final to parallel the conflicting traffic. The next thing I hear is turn left immediately heading 090 degrees, left turn immediately 090 degrees' (the localizer heading is 172 degrees). The controllers voice was very loud and frantic! I believe that the controller gave us a very tight intercept onto the localizer and when he called to give us the quick 90 degree turn onto final, we missed it, because of the TCASII RA. The TCASII is very loud in the saab 340. We are now receiving vectors around for a second approach and the controller sounds very frustrated with us. The frequency is still very congested and he is busy. At this point another call was missed by our aircraft. I thought I heard XY123 who was also on frequency, but ATC was giving us our turn back onto base. ATC is very upset with us now and we were advised to give him a call on the ground. I learned a lot from the incident. Having flown in san diego for the past 10 yrs, I thought I was used to airport congestion until dallas. I should have never missed the first call from ATC, and it just snowballed from there. I could see the entire event unfolding before my eyes and could almost guess what was going to happen, but in the few seconds while it transpired, there was just no way to get all this information to the controller. We had to wait for it to play out on his screen and take it from there. I will be as diligent as humanly possible in the future. I would suggest, however, that the volume on TCASII be lowered. If I had heard a new heading assignment, I could have answered and reduced the controller/ aircraft tension. Finally, a shallower, 30 degree intercept for the localizer would be much safer, allowing a few more seconds before conflicts become critical.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HDG TRACK DEV DURING A NON ADHERENCE TO ATC CLRNC INSTRUCTION. POTENTIAL CONFLICT LTSS.

Narrative: FLT LNDG AT XX00 ON SEP/XX/94. PROB: COM, DFW APCH CTL TO INCIDENT ACFT, DURING VECTORS FOR FINAL APCH. RESULT: CAME TOO CLOSE TO ACFT LNDG PARALLEL RWY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: BOTH CAPT AND FO LESS THAN 100 HRS IN ACFT. FO, LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN DFW OPS. TCASII RA TOO LOUD, UNABLE TO HEAR ATC. SIMILAR SOUNDING CALL SIGNS. BUSY, VFR MORNING RUSH AT DFW. FLT BEING VECTORED ONTO THE L LOC. IT STARTED WHEN I MISSED ATC'S FIRST CALL INSTRUCTING US TO TURN BASE. ATC'S SECOND CALL TO US, CTLR NOTICEABLY UPSET OVER MISSED FIRST CALL. WE ACKNOWLEDGED AND TURNED BASE. WE ARE NOW ON BASE FOR THE L RWY WITH TFC AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK FOR THE R RWY. WE THEN GET A 'TFC' CALL FROM TCASII AND THEN AN RA FROM TCASII BECAUSE OF TFC AT OUR 12 O'CLOCK NOW. THE CAPT INITIATED A TURN ONTO FINAL TO PARALLEL THE CONFLICTING TFC. THE NEXT THING I HEAR IS TURN L IMMEDIATELY HDG 090 DEGS, L TURN IMMEDIATELY 090 DEGS' (THE LOC HDG IS 172 DEGS). THE CTLRS VOICE WAS VERY LOUD AND FRANTIC! I BELIEVE THAT THE CTLR GAVE US A VERY TIGHT INTERCEPT ONTO THE LOC AND WHEN HE CALLED TO GIVE US THE QUICK 90 DEG TURN ONTO FINAL, WE MISSED IT, BECAUSE OF THE TCASII RA. THE TCASII IS VERY LOUD IN THE SAAB 340. WE ARE NOW RECEIVING VECTORS AROUND FOR A SECOND APCH AND THE CTLR SOUNDS VERY FRUSTRATED WITH US. THE FREQ IS STILL VERY CONGESTED AND HE IS BUSY. AT THIS POINT ANOTHER CALL WAS MISSED BY OUR ACFT. I THOUGHT I HEARD XY123 WHO WAS ALSO ON FREQ, BUT ATC WAS GIVING US OUR TURN BACK ONTO BASE. ATC IS VERY UPSET WITH US NOW AND WE WERE ADVISED TO GIVE HIM A CALL ON THE GND. I LEARNED A LOT FROM THE INCIDENT. HAVING FLOWN IN SAN DIEGO FOR THE PAST 10 YRS, I THOUGHT I WAS USED TO ARPT CONGESTION UNTIL DALLAS. I SHOULD HAVE NEVER MISSED THE FIRST CALL FROM ATC, AND IT JUST SNOWBALLED FROM THERE. I COULD SEE THE ENTIRE EVENT UNFOLDING BEFORE MY EYES AND COULD ALMOST GUESS WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN, BUT IN THE FEW SECONDS WHILE IT TRANSPIRED, THERE WAS JUST NO WAY TO GET ALL THIS INFO TO THE CTLR. WE HAD TO WAIT FOR IT TO PLAY OUT ON HIS SCREEN AND TAKE IT FROM THERE. I WILL BE AS DILIGENT AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE. I WOULD SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT THE VOLUME ON TCASII BE LOWERED. IF I HAD HEARD A NEW HDG ASSIGNMENT, I COULD HAVE ANSWERED AND REDUCED THE CTLR/ ACFT TENSION. FINALLY, A SHALLOWER, 30 DEG INTERCEPT FOR THE LOC WOULD BE MUCH SAFER, ALLOWING A FEW MORE SECONDS BEFORE CONFLICTS BECOME CRITICAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.