Narrative:

This was the captain's first trip since finishing IOE and the first time he had checked out in the dc-8. The engine had 300 hours and I had 340 hours respectively in the dc-8. The engine and I had received no INS training. We were told we would learn everything we needed to know while 'on the road.' since jun/xx/94 I have been flying international except for 4 days in july, 5 days in august, and 2 days in september. Our emergency occurred sep/xx/94. On august I had called the chief of scheduling from cairo and told her I needed to go home. I told her I was exhausted, fatigued, tired, and just not feeling well. She told me the company didn't have enough dc-8 crews to allow me time off. Adding to the fact that I have had little time off, on jun/xx/94, I suffered from food poisoning in bahrain and lost 15 pounds. The engineer's 17 yr old son dies in a motorcycle accident less than 3 weeks prior to the incident. On sep/xx/94 we pushed back at brussels at XA05Z and taxied to runway 26L. We were rushing to make a slot time of XA25Z. During taxi the red warning lights came on for the #1 and #2 INS's. I pushed the test switch and the lights went out. At takeoff the WX was 1900 scattered, 2600 broken, 9000 broken, visibility 10 kilometers with a wet runway. After takeoff we turned left at 8 DME to a 143 degree course to our first fix. Sometime during the departure we were cleared to FL280. After passing 11000 ft the red warning lights for #1, #2, and #3 INS's came on. I again pushed the test switches and the lights went out, only to come back on again in a few seconds. We were navigating using the vors. I checked all 3 INS's and they were not advancing past 01. (About a week earlier on a different dc-8-73F, all 3 INS's failed at night. The captain said to turn all 3 off to get rid of the 3 red warning lights. We flew the remainder of that trip using VOR's and ADF's.) passing FL240 I told the captain all 3 INS's were worthless. I then asked: 'do you want to turn them off to get rid of the 3 red lights.' he said yes and we simultaneously turned off #1 and #3. Immediately every warning flag, horn and buzzer went off in the aircraft. I then remembered that the system in this dc-8 were different than the system in the previous dc-8 I had flown. This aircraft got its gyros from the INS's. The other aircraft did not. We both immediately turned the #1 and #3 INS's back on. We immediately lost our heading indicators. I told ATC we were IMC and had lost our heading indicators. ATC gave us a start turn stop turn heading. By this time we had also lost the 2 primary attitude indicators. The standby attitude indicator only lasted 2-3 mins and was then unreliable. It showed a 30 degree climb while vvi and altimeter were rapidly decreasing. We then declared an emergency. I requested higher altitude because I could see blue sky above us. ATC told us an airport they would direct us to. I told ATC I wanted an airport that was VMC with no WX to penetrate and 9000 ft of runway. Before being granted higher altitude we busted FL280 by climbing to FL285. We were then given FL310 and broke out of the WX at FL300. By the time we leveled off at FL310 our heading and attitude indicators were operating correctly. The captain said to cancel the emergency and request ATC clear us to our destination: they did. During the entire emergency, while communication with ATC, I was giving the captain airspeed, altitude, and vvi indications. No INS training. Different system for the same type of aircraft. I was exhausted, fatigued, tired, and just didn't feel well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF HVT DECLARED AN EMER WHEN THE ATTITUDE AND HDG INST BECAME INOP DURING IMC AT HIGH ALT CRUISE. RUSHED TO MEET ATC RELEASE TIME. FO FAILED TO NOTE CODE FOR MALFUNCTION AS INDICATED BY WARNING LIGHT. INS NEEDED RESET OF NUMBERS ON GND. TEMPORARY LOSS OF ACFT CTL.

Narrative: THIS WAS THE CAPT'S FIRST TRIP SINCE FINISHING IOE AND THE FIRST TIME HE HAD CHKED OUT IN THE DC-8. THE ENG HAD 300 HRS AND I HAD 340 HRS RESPECTIVELY IN THE DC-8. THE ENG AND I HAD RECEIVED NO INS TRAINING. WE WERE TOLD WE WOULD LEARN EVERYTHING WE NEEDED TO KNOW WHILE 'ON THE ROAD.' SINCE JUN/XX/94 I HAVE BEEN FLYING INTL EXCEPT FOR 4 DAYS IN JULY, 5 DAYS IN AUGUST, AND 2 DAYS IN SEPTEMBER. OUR EMER OCCURRED SEP/XX/94. ON AUGUST I HAD CALLED THE CHIEF OF SCHEDULING FROM CAIRO AND TOLD HER I NEEDED TO GO HOME. I TOLD HER I WAS EXHAUSTED, FATIGUED, TIRED, AND JUST NOT FEELING WELL. SHE TOLD ME THE COMPANY DIDN'T HAVE ENOUGH DC-8 CREWS TO ALLOW ME TIME OFF. ADDING TO THE FACT THAT I HAVE HAD LITTLE TIME OFF, ON JUN/XX/94, I SUFFERED FROM FOOD POISONING IN BAHRAIN AND LOST 15 LBS. THE ENGINEER'S 17 YR OLD SON DIES IN A MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT LESS THAN 3 WKS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT. ON SEP/XX/94 WE PUSHED BACK AT BRUSSELS AT XA05Z AND TAXIED TO RWY 26L. WE WERE RUSHING TO MAKE A SLOT TIME OF XA25Z. DURING TAXI THE RED WARNING LIGHTS CAME ON FOR THE #1 AND #2 INS'S. I PUSHED THE TEST SWITCH AND THE LIGHTS WENT OUT. AT TKOF THE WX WAS 1900 SCATTERED, 2600 BROKEN, 9000 BROKEN, VISIBILITY 10 KILOMETERS WITH A WET RWY. AFTER TKOF WE TURNED L AT 8 DME TO A 143 DEG COURSE TO OUR FIRST FIX. SOMETIME DURING THE DEP WE WERE CLRED TO FL280. AFTER PASSING 11000 FT THE RED WARNING LIGHTS FOR #1, #2, AND #3 INS'S CAME ON. I AGAIN PUSHED THE TEST SWITCHES AND THE LIGHTS WENT OUT, ONLY TO COME BACK ON AGAIN IN A FEW SECONDS. WE WERE NAVIGATING USING THE VORS. I CHKED ALL 3 INS'S AND THEY WERE NOT ADVANCING PAST 01. (ABOUT A WK EARLIER ON A DIFFERENT DC-8-73F, ALL 3 INS'S FAILED AT NIGHT. THE CAPT SAID TO TURN ALL 3 OFF TO GET RID OF THE 3 RED WARNING LIGHTS. WE FLEW THE REMAINDER OF THAT TRIP USING VOR'S AND ADF'S.) PASSING FL240 I TOLD THE CAPT ALL 3 INS'S WERE WORTHLESS. I THEN ASKED: 'DO YOU WANT TO TURN THEM OFF TO GET RID OF THE 3 RED LIGHTS.' HE SAID YES AND WE SIMULTANEOUSLY TURNED OFF #1 AND #3. IMMEDIATELY EVERY WARNING FLAG, HORN AND BUZZER WENT OFF IN THE ACFT. I THEN REMEMBERED THAT THE SYS IN THIS DC-8 WERE DIFFERENT THAN THE SYS IN THE PREVIOUS DC-8 I HAD FLOWN. THIS ACFT GOT ITS GYROS FROM THE INS'S. THE OTHER ACFT DID NOT. WE BOTH IMMEDIATELY TURNED THE #1 AND #3 INS'S BACK ON. WE IMMEDIATELY LOST OUR HDG INDICATORS. I TOLD ATC WE WERE IMC AND HAD LOST OUR HDG INDICATORS. ATC GAVE US A START TURN STOP TURN HDG. BY THIS TIME WE HAD ALSO LOST THE 2 PRIMARY ATTITUDE INDICATORS. THE STANDBY ATTITUDE INDICATOR ONLY LASTED 2-3 MINS AND WAS THEN UNRELIABLE. IT SHOWED A 30 DEG CLB WHILE VVI AND ALTIMETER WERE RAPIDLY DECREASING. WE THEN DECLARED AN EMER. I REQUESTED HIGHER ALT BECAUSE I COULD SEE BLUE SKY ABOVE US. ATC TOLD US AN ARPT THEY WOULD DIRECT US TO. I TOLD ATC I WANTED AN ARPT THAT WAS VMC WITH NO WX TO PENETRATE AND 9000 FT OF RWY. BEFORE BEING GRANTED HIGHER ALT WE BUSTED FL280 BY CLBING TO FL285. WE WERE THEN GIVEN FL310 AND BROKE OUT OF THE WX AT FL300. BY THE TIME WE LEVELED OFF AT FL310 OUR HDG AND ATTITUDE INDICATORS WERE OPERATING CORRECTLY. THE CAPT SAID TO CANCEL THE EMER AND REQUEST ATC CLR US TO OUR DEST: THEY DID. DURING THE ENTIRE EMER, WHILE COM WITH ATC, I WAS GIVING THE CAPT AIRSPD, ALT, AND VVI INDICATIONS. NO INS TRAINING. DIFFERENT SYS FOR THE SAME TYPE OF ACFT. I WAS EXHAUSTED, FATIGUED, TIRED, AND JUST DIDN'T FEEL WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.