Narrative:

Over the last several yrs portland approach control (P80) has entered into a LOA with a parachute jump operation. Although the LOA addresses the procedures to be used to control the operations, in reality, parachute aircraft and aircraft inbound to the portland airport are forced to operate in an extremely unsafe proximity to each other. Backgnd: para company operates from the mollala airport which is approximately 27 mi south of the portland airport and is less than 2 mi east of the moxee 3 arrival (STAR). The moxee arrival is 1 of 3 main turbojet/turboprop arrival rtes into portland. Routine operations are conducted at 10500 ft, 12500 ft and 14500 ft with up to 4 aircraft operating at any 1 time. The portland approach and seattle ARTCC airspace boundary lies 3 mi south of the mollala airport. Portland aircraft inbound on the moxee 3 arrival are descending to cross the airspace boundary at approximately 10000 ft depending on the runway flow at portland airport. Turboprop aircraft may be on the moxee arrival to cross the airspace boundary at 9000 ft. Problem: when para company started operating it was quickly recognized these operations were in direct conflict with portland arrs. Efforts were made to control these operations. Initially it was believed the parachute operation could not be conducted on a published arrival route, however that apparently was false. A LOA was agreed upon, yet has proved to be ineffective, and other solutions are presently being pursued. Meanwhile, parachute aircraft report climbing to a specific altitude, and commercial aircraft are instructed to descend through either the jump aircraft or the actual parachutists. A portland approach controller has approximately 60 seconds to advise both pilots, and/or take evasive action if necessary. This is assuming the aircraft communications transfer takes place in time and the controller is not having to concentrate on other traffic operations in his assigned airspace. Also, the approach controller cannot comply with paragraph 5-8 of FAA handbook 7110.65H, change 2 regarding merging target procedures. Note 5-8 of FAA handbook states, 'aircraft closure rates are so rapid that when applying merging target procedures, controller issuance of traffic must be commenced in ample time for procedures, controller issuance of traffic must be commenced in ample time for the pilot to decide if a vector is necessary.' add 4 jump aircraft climbing to different altitude, and numerous jet inbounds and the operation is uncontrolled and unsafe. Dozens of TCASII RA's have been reported to controllers involving this operation. An RA to descend or climb in this location because of a jump aircraft may force the TCASII aircraft into another aircraft above or below them on the arrival. Pilots have even reported jumpers falling directly in front of their aircraft. Solutions: immediately implement procedures to protect the jump operation from aircraft inbound on the moxee arrival. Restrict the jump aircraft from climbing above 9500 ft. Restrict turbojet and turboprop aircraft to altitudes 10000 ft and above. Pursue solutions already in process to allow the jump operation to conduct operations as desired without conflicting with an arrival route. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: representatives from ZSE have visited passenger to work out a solution to this problem. The agreement is expected to be that inbound aircraft will be turned approaching 'wylee' to avoid skydiving aircraft. The big problem is that the jump zone is just inside pdx airspace, so that TRACON has very little time to move aircraft if needed. The entire approach procedure into pdx is in the process of being reworked. The reporter does not want to see just an interim change to accommodate skydiving. Many TCASII events have been recorded over 'wylee' to the point that they have now become routine. The reporter has been advised to call the FAA aviation safety hotline to get another office looking at this problem. The reporter was not aware that many other facilities have been facing the same problem. The report sent to the ASRS was also sent to the facility manager.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THERE IS PARACHUTE JUMPING ON THE MOXEE 3 ARR RTE.

Narrative: OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YRS PORTLAND APCH CTL (P80) HAS ENTERED INTO A LOA WITH A PARACHUTE JUMP OP. ALTHOUGH THE LOA ADDRESSES THE PROCS TO BE USED TO CTL THE OPS, IN REALITY, PARACHUTE ACFT AND ACFT INBOUND TO THE PORTLAND ARPT ARE FORCED TO OPERATE IN AN EXTREMELY UNSAFE PROX TO EACH OTHER. BACKGND: PARA COMPANY OPERATES FROM THE MOLLALA ARPT WHICH IS APPROX 27 MI S OF THE PORTLAND ARPT AND IS LESS THAN 2 MI E OF THE MOXEE 3 ARR (STAR). THE MOXEE ARR IS 1 OF 3 MAIN TURBOJET/TURBOPROP ARR RTES INTO PORTLAND. ROUTINE OPS ARE CONDUCTED AT 10500 FT, 12500 FT AND 14500 FT WITH UP TO 4 ACFT OPERATING AT ANY 1 TIME. THE PORTLAND APCH AND SEATTLE ARTCC AIRSPACE BOUNDARY LIES 3 MI S OF THE MOLLALA ARPT. PORTLAND ACFT INBOUND ON THE MOXEE 3 ARR ARE DSNDING TO CROSS THE AIRSPACE BOUNDARY AT APPROX 10000 FT DEPENDING ON THE RWY FLOW AT PORTLAND ARPT. TURBOPROP ACFT MAY BE ON THE MOXEE ARR TO CROSS THE AIRSPACE BOUNDARY AT 9000 FT. PROB: WHEN PARA COMPANY STARTED OPERATING IT WAS QUICKLY RECOGNIZED THESE OPS WERE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH PORTLAND ARRS. EFFORTS WERE MADE TO CTL THESE OPS. INITIALLY IT WAS BELIEVED THE PARACHUTE OP COULD NOT BE CONDUCTED ON A PUBLISHED ARR RTE, HOWEVER THAT APPARENTLY WAS FALSE. A LOA WAS AGREED UPON, YET HAS PROVED TO BE INEFFECTIVE, AND OTHER SOLUTIONS ARE PRESENTLY BEING PURSUED. MEANWHILE, PARACHUTE ACFT RPT CLBING TO A SPECIFIC ALT, AND COMMERCIAL ACFT ARE INSTRUCTED TO DSND THROUGH EITHER THE JUMP ACFT OR THE ACTUAL PARACHUTISTS. A PORTLAND APCH CTLR HAS APPROX 60 SECONDS TO ADVISE BOTH PLTS, AND/OR TAKE EVASIVE ACTION IF NECESSARY. THIS IS ASSUMING THE ACFT COMS TRANSFER TAKES PLACE IN TIME AND THE CTLR IS NOT HAVING TO CONCENTRATE ON OTHER TFC OPS IN HIS ASSIGNED AIRSPACE. ALSO, THE APCH CTLR CANNOT COMPLY WITH PARAGRAPH 5-8 OF FAA HANDBOOK 7110.65H, CHANGE 2 REGARDING MERGING TARGET PROCS. NOTE 5-8 OF FAA HANDBOOK STATES, 'ACFT CLOSURE RATES ARE SO RAPID THAT WHEN APPLYING MERGING TARGET PROCS, CTLR ISSUANCE OF TFC MUST BE COMMENCED IN AMPLE TIME FOR PROCS, CTLR ISSUANCE OF TFC MUST BE COMMENCED IN AMPLE TIME FOR THE PLT TO DECIDE IF A VECTOR IS NECESSARY.' ADD 4 JUMP ACFT CLBING TO DIFFERENT ALT, AND NUMEROUS JET INBOUNDS AND THE OP IS UNCTLED AND UNSAFE. DOZENS OF TCASII RA'S HAVE BEEN RPTED TO CTLRS INVOLVING THIS OP. AN RA TO DSND OR CLB IN THIS LOCATION BECAUSE OF A JUMP ACFT MAY FORCE THE TCASII ACFT INTO ANOTHER ACFT ABOVE OR BELOW THEM ON THE ARR. PLTS HAVE EVEN RPTED JUMPERS FALLING DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF THEIR ACFT. SOLUTIONS: IMMEDIATELY IMPLEMENT PROCS TO PROTECT THE JUMP OP FROM ACFT INBOUND ON THE MOXEE ARR. RESTRICT THE JUMP ACFT FROM CLBING ABOVE 9500 FT. RESTRICT TURBOJET AND TURBOPROP ACFT TO ALTS 10000 FT AND ABOVE. PURSUE SOLUTIONS ALREADY IN PROCESS TO ALLOW THE JUMP OP TO CONDUCT OPS AS DESIRED WITHOUT CONFLICTING WITH AN ARR RTE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPRESENTATIVES FROM ZSE HAVE VISITED PAX TO WORK OUT A SOLUTION TO THIS PROB. THE AGREEMENT IS EXPECTED TO BE THAT INBOUND ACFT WILL BE TURNED APCHING 'WYLEE' TO AVOID SKYDIVING ACFT. THE BIG PROB IS THAT THE JUMP ZONE IS JUST INSIDE PDX AIRSPACE, SO THAT TRACON HAS VERY LITTLE TIME TO MOVE ACFT IF NEEDED. THE ENTIRE APCH PROC INTO PDX IS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REWORKED. THE RPTR DOES NOT WANT TO SEE JUST AN INTERIM CHANGE TO ACCOMMODATE SKYDIVING. MANY TCASII EVENTS HAVE BEEN RECORDED OVER 'WYLEE' TO THE POINT THAT THEY HAVE NOW BECOME ROUTINE. THE RPTR HAS BEEN ADVISED TO CALL THE FAA AVIATION SAFETY HOTLINE TO GET ANOTHER OFFICE LOOKING AT THIS PROB. THE RPTR WAS NOT AWARE THAT MANY OTHER FACILITIES HAVE BEEN FACING THE SAME PROB. THE RPT SENT TO THE ASRS WAS ALSO SENT TO THE FACILITY MGR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.