Narrative:

While en route from lrp to 69N, I observed that my fuel gauges indicated that my tanks were nearly empty, so I diverted to rdg. I contacted rdg approach when I was about 2 mi west. I notified the controller that I needed to land promptly because I was low on fuel. The controller asked me if I was declaring an emergency, and I replied, 'affirmative,' because I felt it was better judgement to risk disciplinary action than to engage in a discussion about the situation while traveling away from the airport to the northwest. The controller then immediately cleared me to land on runway 13. I landed without incident and telephoned the controller as he instructed me to do. While taxiing to the ramp with my tailwheel on the ground. The remaining gas in my tanks flowed to the rear causing my engine to stop about 50 ft from the tie-down area. The owner's manual states that the airplane holds 42 gallons, but only 37.5 gallons are usable. 1) I always monitor my fuel by 2 methods: a) the fuel gauges, and B) by keeping a written record of my tachometer time and the amount of fuel taken aboard at each refueling. The gauges serve as a rough measurement of flight time remaining, and the tach serves for flight planning and also when the remaining flight time is getting low. This airplane has always burned slightly more than 7.8 gallons per hour for the 21 yrs that I've owned it, and I've always used that rate in my 'tachometer time' flight planning. However, about 25 flight hours ago a mechanic disassembled the carburetor to examine the float in accordance with an aircraft advisory, and apparently when he reassembled the carburetor he set the fixed mixture adjustment substantially richer than it had been. I came to this conclusion after this incident by examining my written tach refueling records and discovering that I have been burning about 8.5 gallons per hour. 2) about 3 flight hours before this incident I noticed a slight reduction in engine performance upon takeoff and climb. I discovered that my carburetor heat push-pull control cable had broken, and as a result I had been flying with full carburetor heat on. This increased my fuel consumption even more. 3) on my flight to lrp on the day of the incident the WX was extremely hazy. Upon takeoff from easton airport I reported to allentown approach control and obtained flight following radar surveillance. Allentown then handed me off to final leg. As I neared lancaster airport the harrisburg controller vectored me a considerable distance on past the airport to then bring me back and line me up for my approach and landing. This extended my planned flying time about an additional 15 mins. I did not refuel at lancaster because they do not have 80 octane gasoline, and after paying for 2 major engine overhauls (the last one costing more than the airplane cost new) I avoid 100 octane whenever possible. Ordinarily, without those 3 unforeseen factors, I would have had more than enough fuel to fly from lancaster to slatington where I buy most of my 80 octane gas. The lancaster controller's actions throughout this incident were excellent and immediate. 2 things I 'learned about flying' from this are 1) if even just a slight change in engine performance is noted, investigate it before flying again (broken carburetor heat push-pull cable), and 2) if only 100 octane gas is available, half-fill the tanks if necessary to provide an ample safety margin for the flight to an airport with 80 octane. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter flies a 1955 cessna 170B. There is an outstanding ad on the carburetor of his engine requiring that the 2 piece venturi be inspected each yr, then replaced no later than december, 1966, on the advice of a mechanic. The reporter has replaced the 2 piece venturi with a new 1 piece venturi. He has found that this increased the fuel consumption as well as the other faults that he found in his report. He hopes that the ASRS can help promulgate the word on this fuel increase. The reporter is highly pleased with the handling that he got from rdg TRACON. He has heard nothing from the FAA about this incident. The reporter is now aware of the FAA aviation safety hotline and will rptthe fuel use increase there. This report is a copy of one that was sent aug/xx/94 and was never acknowledged by the ASRS.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SMA PLT RAN OUT OF FUEL WHILE TAXIING IN TO THE TIE DOWN AREA.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE FROM LRP TO 69N, I OBSERVED THAT MY FUEL GAUGES INDICATED THAT MY TANKS WERE NEARLY EMPTY, SO I DIVERTED TO RDG. I CONTACTED RDG APCH WHEN I WAS ABOUT 2 MI W. I NOTIFIED THE CTLR THAT I NEEDED TO LAND PROMPTLY BECAUSE I WAS LOW ON FUEL. THE CTLR ASKED ME IF I WAS DECLARING AN EMER, AND I REPLIED, 'AFFIRMATIVE,' BECAUSE I FELT IT WAS BETTER JUDGEMENT TO RISK DISCIPLINARY ACTION THAN TO ENGAGE IN A DISCUSSION ABOUT THE SIT WHILE TRAVELING AWAY FROM THE ARPT TO THE NW. THE CTLR THEN IMMEDIATELY CLRED ME TO LAND ON RWY 13. I LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT AND TELEPHONED THE CTLR AS HE INSTRUCTED ME TO DO. WHILE TAXIING TO THE RAMP WITH MY TAILWHEEL ON THE GND. THE REMAINING GAS IN MY TANKS FLOWED TO THE REAR CAUSING MY ENG TO STOP ABOUT 50 FT FROM THE TIE-DOWN AREA. THE OWNER'S MANUAL STATES THAT THE AIRPLANE HOLDS 42 GALLONS, BUT ONLY 37.5 GALLONS ARE USABLE. 1) I ALWAYS MONITOR MY FUEL BY 2 METHODS: A) THE FUEL GAUGES, AND B) BY KEEPING A WRITTEN RECORD OF MY TACHOMETER TIME AND THE AMOUNT OF FUEL TAKEN ABOARD AT EACH REFUELING. THE GAUGES SERVE AS A ROUGH MEASUREMENT OF FLT TIME REMAINING, AND THE TACH SERVES FOR FLT PLANNING AND ALSO WHEN THE REMAINING FLT TIME IS GETTING LOW. THIS AIRPLANE HAS ALWAYS BURNED SLIGHTLY MORE THAN 7.8 GALLONS PER HR FOR THE 21 YRS THAT I'VE OWNED IT, AND I'VE ALWAYS USED THAT RATE IN MY 'TACHOMETER TIME' FLT PLANNING. HOWEVER, ABOUT 25 FLT HRS AGO A MECH DISASSEMBLED THE CARB TO EXAMINE THE FLOAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ACFT ADVISORY, AND APPARENTLY WHEN HE REASSEMBLED THE CARB HE SET THE FIXED MIXTURE ADJUSTMENT SUBSTANTIALLY RICHER THAN IT HAD BEEN. I CAME TO THIS CONCLUSION AFTER THIS INCIDENT BY EXAMINING MY WRITTEN TACH REFUELING RECORDS AND DISCOVERING THAT I HAVE BEEN BURNING ABOUT 8.5 GALLONS PER HR. 2) ABOUT 3 FLT HRS BEFORE THIS INCIDENT I NOTICED A SLIGHT REDUCTION IN ENG PERFORMANCE UPON TKOF AND CLB. I DISCOVERED THAT MY CARB HEAT PUSH-PULL CTL CABLE HAD BROKEN, AND AS A RESULT I HAD BEEN FLYING WITH FULL CARB HEAT ON. THIS INCREASED MY FUEL CONSUMPTION EVEN MORE. 3) ON MY FLT TO LRP ON THE DAY OF THE INCIDENT THE WX WAS EXTREMELY HAZY. UPON TKOF FROM EASTON ARPT I RPTED TO ALLENTOWN APCH CTL AND OBTAINED FLT FOLLOWING RADAR SURVEILLANCE. ALLENTOWN THEN HANDED ME OFF TO FINAL LEG. AS I NEARED LANCASTER ARPT THE HARRISBURG CTLR VECTORED ME A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE ON PAST THE ARPT TO THEN BRING ME BACK AND LINE ME UP FOR MY APCH AND LNDG. THIS EXTENDED MY PLANNED FLYING TIME ABOUT AN ADDITIONAL 15 MINS. I DID NOT REFUEL AT LANCASTER BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE 80 OCTANE GASOLINE, AND AFTER PAYING FOR 2 MAJOR ENG OVERHAULS (THE LAST ONE COSTING MORE THAN THE AIRPLANE COST NEW) I AVOID 100 OCTANE WHENEVER POSSIBLE. ORDINARILY, WITHOUT THOSE 3 UNFORESEEN FACTORS, I WOULD HAVE HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH FUEL TO FLY FROM LANCASTER TO SLATINGTON WHERE I BUY MOST OF MY 80 OCTANE GAS. THE LANCASTER CTLR'S ACTIONS THROUGHOUT THIS INCIDENT WERE EXCELLENT AND IMMEDIATE. 2 THINGS I 'LEARNED ABOUT FLYING' FROM THIS ARE 1) IF EVEN JUST A SLIGHT CHANGE IN ENG PERFORMANCE IS NOTED, INVESTIGATE IT BEFORE FLYING AGAIN (BROKEN CARB HEAT PUSH-PULL CABLE), AND 2) IF ONLY 100 OCTANE GAS IS AVAILABLE, HALF-FILL THE TANKS IF NECESSARY TO PROVIDE AN AMPLE SAFETY MARGIN FOR THE FLT TO AN ARPT WITH 80 OCTANE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR FLIES A 1955 CESSNA 170B. THERE IS AN OUTSTANDING AD ON THE CARB OF HIS ENG REQUIRING THAT THE 2 PIECE VENTURI BE INSPECTED EACH YR, THEN REPLACED NO LATER THAN DECEMBER, 1966, ON THE ADVICE OF A MECH. THE RPTR HAS REPLACED THE 2 PIECE VENTURI WITH A NEW 1 PIECE VENTURI. HE HAS FOUND THAT THIS INCREASED THE FUEL CONSUMPTION AS WELL AS THE OTHER FAULTS THAT HE FOUND IN HIS RPT. HE HOPES THAT THE ASRS CAN HELP PROMULGATE THE WORD ON THIS FUEL INCREASE. THE RPTR IS HIGHLY PLEASED WITH THE HANDLING THAT HE GOT FROM RDG TRACON. HE HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM THE FAA ABOUT THIS INCIDENT. THE RPTR IS NOW AWARE OF THE FAA AVIATION SAFETY HOTLINE AND WILL RPTTHE FUEL USE INCREASE THERE. THIS RPT IS A COPY OF ONE THAT WAS SENT AUG/XX/94 AND WAS NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE ASRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.