Narrative:

Flight control malfunction not covered in the aircraft's cockpit operating manual. Our first indication of a problem was 10 min out of dtw. A message was displayed: flaps/slats system 2 fault (meaning the flaps/slats will extend slower than normal). We selected flaps 1, then flaps 2 on a 10 mi final to runway 21R. At that time we received another message 'flaps fault.' this meant we would not get trailing edge flaps at all. We discontinued the approach. I flew the aircraft and declared an emergency while the first officer read through the communication procedure. We soon discovered the leading edge slats had also failed (without any related ECAM messages), and were stuck at leading edge 2. This confign (leading edge 2, trailing edge zero) was not in the communication, and we did not have any direct guidance to prepare for the approach. We could not determine a specific airspeed additive to have the aircraft fly a safe speed on the approach. We discussed our options of landing the aircraft. These were: use the closest airspee additive from a similar flap/slat failure (leading edge 3, trailing edge zero), use no-flap airspds, and reset the flap/slat computers. This computer reset was not on the 'approved' list. But, knowing that, I decided to attempt a reset to regain a normal landing confign rather than 'guess' at the best airspeed to use for landing. The flap system did reset. We obtained a normal landing confign, canceled the airborne emergency, and flew the aircraft to an uneventful landing. It was very uncomfortable being in an emergency flap confign, and not having specific guidance to apply to the problem. Any solution would have been outside of an approved procedure. I'm happy the reset worked. It was a tremendous relief to see the flaps extend. I'm not sure if a different course of action would have been better. But, without any specific guidance, the first officer and I did the best we could to safely get the aircraft on the ground. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the leading edge slats were stuck in the fully extended position with no fault warning and the flaps stuck up with a flap locked fault warning. He stated that he actually had a 4 computer control problem. 2 for the slats and 2 for the flaps. The supplemental procedure manual states that computer reset can be made in the air, but that caution is necessary before using this method since there are other system controled by these computers. The main problem, is that a flap lock out could happen upon computer reset and since the reporter already had this he was not creating a new problem. He reset the computers and it worked. He also since learned that the procedure manual does show this action for the condition but it was not clear at the time of the incident. He further stated that this matter has been thoroughly investigated by the FAA and company of which results indicate that the reporting captain took the appropriate action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN A320 ACFT DECLARED AN EMER WHEN THE WING FLAP SLATS FAILED TO EXTEND AS COMMANDED BUT SUBSEQUENTLY CANCELED AFTER RESTORING CTL BY USING A RESET PROC NOT LISTED IN THE COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL.

Narrative: FLT CTL MALFUNCTION NOT COVERED IN THE ACFT'S COCKPIT OPERATING MANUAL. OUR FIRST INDICATION OF A PROB WAS 10 MIN OUT OF DTW. A MESSAGE WAS DISPLAYED: FLAPS/SLATS SYS 2 FAULT (MEANING THE FLAPS/SLATS WILL EXTEND SLOWER THAN NORMAL). WE SELECTED FLAPS 1, THEN FLAPS 2 ON A 10 MI FINAL TO RWY 21R. AT THAT TIME WE RECEIVED ANOTHER MESSAGE 'FLAPS FAULT.' THIS MEANT WE WOULD NOT GET TRAILING EDGE FLAPS AT ALL. WE DISCONTINUED THE APCH. I FLEW THE ACFT AND DECLARED AN EMER WHILE THE FO READ THROUGH THE COM PROC. WE SOON DISCOVERED THE LEADING EDGE SLATS HAD ALSO FAILED (WITHOUT ANY RELATED ECAM MESSAGES), AND WERE STUCK AT LEADING EDGE 2. THIS CONFIGN (LEADING EDGE 2, TRAILING EDGE ZERO) WAS NOT IN THE COM, AND WE DID NOT HAVE ANY DIRECT GUIDANCE TO PREPARE FOR THE APCH. WE COULD NOT DETERMINE A SPECIFIC AIRSPD ADDITIVE TO HAVE THE ACFT FLY A SAFE SPD ON THE APCH. WE DISCUSSED OUR OPTIONS OF LNDG THE ACFT. THESE WERE: USE THE CLOSEST AIRSPEE ADDITIVE FROM A SIMILAR FLAP/SLAT FAILURE (LEADING EDGE 3, TRAILING EDGE ZERO), USE NO-FLAP AIRSPDS, AND RESET THE FLAP/SLAT COMPUTERS. THIS COMPUTER RESET WAS NOT ON THE 'APPROVED' LIST. BUT, KNOWING THAT, I DECIDED TO ATTEMPT A RESET TO REGAIN A NORMAL LNDG CONFIGN RATHER THAN 'GUESS' AT THE BEST AIRSPD TO USE FOR LNDG. THE FLAP SYS DID RESET. WE OBTAINED A NORMAL LNDG CONFIGN, CANCELED THE AIRBORNE EMER, AND FLEW THE ACFT TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. IT WAS VERY UNCOMFORTABLE BEING IN AN EMER FLAP CONFIGN, AND NOT HAVING SPECIFIC GUIDANCE TO APPLY TO THE PROB. ANY SOLUTION WOULD HAVE BEEN OUTSIDE OF AN APPROVED PROC. I'M HAPPY THE RESET WORKED. IT WAS A TREMENDOUS RELIEF TO SEE THE FLAPS EXTEND. I'M NOT SURE IF A DIFFERENT COURSE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER. BUT, WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC GUIDANCE, THE FO AND I DID THE BEST WE COULD TO SAFELY GET THE ACFT ON THE GND. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE LEADING EDGE SLATS WERE STUCK IN THE FULLY EXTENDED POS WITH NO FAULT WARNING AND THE FLAPS STUCK UP WITH A FLAP LOCKED FAULT WARNING. HE STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD A 4 COMPUTER CTL PROBLEM. 2 FOR THE SLATS AND 2 FOR THE FLAPS. THE SUPPLEMENTAL PROC MANUAL STATES THAT COMPUTER RESET CAN BE MADE IN THE AIR, BUT THAT CAUTION IS NECESSARY BEFORE USING THIS METHOD SINCE THERE ARE OTHER SYS CTLED BY THESE COMPUTERS. THE MAIN PROB, IS THAT A FLAP LOCK OUT COULD HAPPEN UPON COMPUTER RESET AND SINCE THE RPTR ALREADY HAD THIS HE WAS NOT CREATING A NEW PROB. HE RESET THE COMPUTERS AND IT WORKED. HE ALSO SINCE LEARNED THAT THE PROC MANUAL DOES SHOW THIS ACTION FOR THE CONDITION BUT IT WAS NOT CLR AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. HE FURTHER STATED THAT THIS MATTER HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED BY THE FAA AND COMPANY OF WHICH RESULTS INDICATE THAT THE RPTING CAPT TOOK THE APPROPRIATE ACTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.