Narrative:

During approach into green bay, wi, I set up an approach that would allow me to land farther down the runway than the touchdown zone. This would reduce the taxi time to my ramp destination. I believe there was a 5 KT tail wind for my runway at the time of landing. Upon application of brakes after landing, I noticed a reduction in braking effectiveness and proceeded to apply brakes more heavily than usual since my concern now was if there would be sufficient runway left to stop the aircraft with this reduced braking action. Once completely stopped, I added power to taxi to the ramp. It was then that I realized something was wrong, because near takeoff power was required to move the airplane and I could feel the tire imbal as I taxied. Once clear of the runway, I shut down the airplane and conducted a visual inspection of the airplane. It was then that I discovered that both main gear tires had blown out.factors that I feel contributed to the situation include: landing with a slight tail wind. Night-time effects on judging distances. Peer, not company, pressure to always try to arrive at the destination sooner than previous trips. A better decision would have been to plan the approach so as to arrive at the normal touchdown zone location for landing and taxi longer, but more safely than 'flying' down the runway toward the destination ramp. This would allow a better margin of safety should an abnormal or emergency situation occur during landing. In my case, it may have given me enough distance to recognize a possible blown tire and not have to resort to maximum braking which may have blown the other tire.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF AN SMT ATX CARGO ACFT BLEW BOTH MAIN GEAR TIRES DURING BRAKING ON LNDG ROLL.

Narrative: DURING APCH INTO GREEN BAY, WI, I SET UP AN APCH THAT WOULD ALLOW ME TO LAND FARTHER DOWN THE RWY THAN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. THIS WOULD REDUCE THE TAXI TIME TO MY RAMP DEST. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A 5 KT TAIL WIND FOR MY RWY AT THE TIME OF LNDG. UPON APPLICATION OF BRAKES AFTER LNDG, I NOTICED A REDUCTION IN BRAKING EFFECTIVENESS AND PROCEEDED TO APPLY BRAKES MORE HEAVILY THAN USUAL SINCE MY CONCERN NOW WAS IF THERE WOULD BE SUFFICIENT RWY LEFT TO STOP THE ACFT WITH THIS REDUCED BRAKING ACTION. ONCE COMPLETELY STOPPED, I ADDED PWR TO TAXI TO THE RAMP. IT WAS THEN THAT I REALIZED SOMETHING WAS WRONG, BECAUSE NEAR TKOF PWR WAS REQUIRED TO MOVE THE AIRPLANE AND I COULD FEEL THE TIRE IMBAL AS I TAXIED. ONCE CLR OF THE RWY, I SHUT DOWN THE AIRPLANE AND CONDUCTED A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE AIRPLANE. IT WAS THEN THAT I DISCOVERED THAT BOTH MAIN GEAR TIRES HAD BLOWN OUT.FACTORS THAT I FEEL CONTRIBUTED TO THE SIT INCLUDE: LNDG WITH A SLIGHT TAIL WIND. NIGHT-TIME EFFECTS ON JUDGING DISTANCES. PEER, NOT COMPANY, PRESSURE TO ALWAYS TRY TO ARRIVE AT THE DEST SOONER THAN PREVIOUS TRIPS. A BETTER DECISION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO PLAN THE APCH SO AS TO ARRIVE AT THE NORMAL TOUCHDOWN ZONE LOCATION FOR LNDG AND TAXI LONGER, BUT MORE SAFELY THAN 'FLYING' DOWN THE RWY TOWARD THE DEST RAMP. THIS WOULD ALLOW A BETTER MARGIN OF SAFETY SHOULD AN ABNORMAL OR EMER SIT OCCUR DURING LNDG. IN MY CASE, IT MAY HAVE GIVEN ME ENOUGH DISTANCE TO RECOGNIZE A POSSIBLE BLOWN TIRE AND NOT HAVE TO RESORT TO MAX BRAKING WHICH MAY HAVE BLOWN THE OTHER TIRE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.