Narrative:

I was working the local control position at the ZMP ATC tower during the events described below: an spc aircraft was scheduled to depart the minneapolis airport at approximately XX00 am nov/xx/94. The standard security plan coordinated by the advance team calls for a runway inspection/sweep 15 min prior to departure and that the runway remain secure until the spc left has departed. On this occasion, the area manager decided to deviate from these coordinated measures and continued to land aircraft on the departure runway until such a time that the vip was aboard the spc aircraft. This did not allow for the agreed upon time parameters for the airport personnel to perform the runway sweep. An abbreviated or 'hurried' runway inspection was completed as spc taxied toward the runway, it was delayed for approximately 30 seconds to allow the inspection vehicle to clear the runway. The additional arriving aircraft created unsafe and congested airspace above the inbound motorcade. On 2 occasions I had to circle the helicopter following the motorcade to allow arriving aircraft to pass through the airspace above it. This same type of action was experienced a few yrs ago during a visit by another vip and the same area manager authority/authorized the deviation from the coordinated security measures. I have confronted the area manager and received the response 'we don't have to abide by the coordinated measures, we can adjust them to accommodate our traffic needs.' I believe, in both instances mentioned above, that national security should take precedence. How can the responsible parties provide security when 1 individual decides to deviate from the coordinated measures because he personally feels them to be unnecessary.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC VIP PROC.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE LCL CTL POS AT THE ZMP ATC TWR DURING THE EVENTS DESCRIBED BELOW: AN SPC ACFT WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART THE MINNEAPOLIS ARPT AT APPROX XX00 AM NOV/XX/94. THE STANDARD SECURITY PLAN COORDINATED BY THE ADVANCE TEAM CALLS FOR A RWY INSPECTION/SWEEP 15 MIN PRIOR TO DEP AND THAT THE RWY REMAIN SECURE UNTIL THE SPC LEFT HAS DEPARTED. ON THIS OCCASION, THE AREA MGR DECIDED TO DEVIATE FROM THESE COORDINATED MEASURES AND CONTINUED TO LAND ACFT ON THE DEP RWY UNTIL SUCH A TIME THAT THE VIP WAS ABOARD THE SPC ACFT. THIS DID NOT ALLOW FOR THE AGREED UPON TIME PARAMETERS FOR THE ARPT PERSONNEL TO PERFORM THE RWY SWEEP. AN ABBREVIATED OR 'HURRIED' RWY INSPECTION WAS COMPLETED AS SPC TAXIED TOWARD THE RWY, IT WAS DELAYED FOR APPROX 30 SECONDS TO ALLOW THE INSPECTION VEHICLE TO CLR THE RWY. THE ADDITIONAL ARRIVING ACFT CREATED UNSAFE AND CONGESTED AIRSPACE ABOVE THE INBOUND MOTORCADE. ON 2 OCCASIONS I HAD TO CIRCLE THE HELI FOLLOWING THE MOTORCADE TO ALLOW ARRIVING ACFT TO PASS THROUGH THE AIRSPACE ABOVE IT. THIS SAME TYPE OF ACTION WAS EXPERIENCED A FEW YRS AGO DURING A VISIT BY ANOTHER VIP AND THE SAME AREA MGR AUTH THE DEV FROM THE COORDINATED SECURITY MEASURES. I HAVE CONFRONTED THE AREA MGR AND RECEIVED THE RESPONSE 'WE DON'T HAVE TO ABIDE BY THE COORDINATED MEASURES, WE CAN ADJUST THEM TO ACCOMMODATE OUR TFC NEEDS.' I BELIEVE, IN BOTH INSTANCES MENTIONED ABOVE, THAT NATIONAL SECURITY SHOULD TAKE PRECEDENCE. HOW CAN THE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES PROVIDE SECURITY WHEN 1 INDIVIDUAL DECIDES TO DEVIATE FROM THE COORDINATED MEASURES BECAUSE HE PERSONALLY FEELS THEM TO BE UNNECESSARY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.