Narrative:

Preflight and first flight of the day checks were uneventful, and we taxied out to runway 4L for takeoff. Rotation was normal as was the climb up to 300 ft. At that point the cockpit emergency escape hatch, above the first officer's head, blew off. We continued the climb, while analyzing the situation. Tower advised us at T his point that runway 22R was available and pulled the power back and initiated a descent. However, due to the steep turn and descent rate involved (aircraft is unpressurized), I felt it would be safer to continue climbing, and wait to land VFR on runway 4R. This is what we did, and the landing was accomplished without incident. Upon exiting the runway, we stopped -- let the fire trucks inspect us for external damage, and then taxied to the gate. Although we completed all our checklists per our company's instructions, and both aircraft and passenger were returned to the gate safely in this incident, both the first officer and I feel we have been subjected to trial by the press, and have been found guilty by the company and the FAA. (Our incident occurred 2 weeks after a fatal crash of a large turboprop commuter which raised the usual safety concerns of the travelling public.) we followed all the appropriate checklists and cooperated fully with the authorities but wonder why we should take the blame for this incident (which has happened 3 times before) when we had done nothing wrong. The problem of the escape hatch staying shut can be solved by safety wiring the handle shut and visually checking that the wire is intact, on the cockpit clean-up checklist. This would ensure that the handle cannot be accidentally moved, the integrity of the hatch is secure and any unauthorized movement would be immediately noticeable. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the company had suspended him and the copilot with pay for 2 weeks until they could determine the reason for the door opening. They concluded that the copilot was responsible to assure proper closure during the 'clean-up cockpit checklist prior to every flight. However, since the outside hatch handle can be in a different position than the inside handle, the door may accidently open aerodynamically due to the lack of outside handle closure and the negative air pressure on top of the fuselage. The aircraft operating checklists do have the reminder to the flight crew to check the door outside on the preflight walk around and on the inside during the clean-up cockpit checklist. He further stated that FAA personnel have indicated that a suggestion has been made to safety wire the door handle in such a way that it can be over ridden if an emergency requires the door to be opened. The FAA has investigated this incident. However, as of this date there have been no new changes made to prevent this happening again. He has heard of several other incidents with his and other operators.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF SHORTS SD-360 RETURNED AND LANDED AFTER THE COCKPIT EMER ESCAPE HATCH DOOR OPENED AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: PREFLT AND FIRST FLT OF THE DAY CHKS WERE UNEVENTFUL, AND WE TAXIED OUT TO RWY 4L FOR TKOF. ROTATION WAS NORMAL AS WAS THE CLB UP TO 300 FT. AT THAT POINT THE COCKPIT EMER ESCAPE HATCH, ABOVE THE FO'S HEAD, BLEW OFF. WE CONTINUED THE CLB, WHILE ANALYZING THE SIT. TWR ADVISED US AT T HIS POINT THAT RWY 22R WAS AVAILABLE AND PULLED THE PWR BACK AND INITIATED A DSCNT. HOWEVER, DUE TO THE STEEP TURN AND DSCNT RATE INVOLVED (ACFT IS UNPRESSURIZED), I FELT IT WOULD BE SAFER TO CONTINUE CLBING, AND WAIT TO LAND VFR ON RWY 4R. THIS IS WHAT WE DID, AND THE LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT INCIDENT. UPON EXITING THE RWY, WE STOPPED -- LET THE FIRE TRUCKS INSPECT US FOR EXTERNAL DAMAGE, AND THEN TAXIED TO THE GATE. ALTHOUGH WE COMPLETED ALL OUR CHKLISTS PER OUR COMPANY'S INSTRUCTIONS, AND BOTH ACFT AND PAX WERE RETURNED TO THE GATE SAFELY IN THIS INCIDENT, BOTH THE FO AND I FEEL WE HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO TRIAL BY THE PRESS, AND HAVE BEEN FOUND GUILTY BY THE COMPANY AND THE FAA. (OUR INCIDENT OCCURRED 2 WKS AFTER A FATAL CRASH OF A LARGE TURBOPROP COMMUTER WHICH RAISED THE USUAL SAFETY CONCERNS OF THE TRAVELLING PUBLIC.) WE FOLLOWED ALL THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND COOPERATED FULLY WITH THE AUTHORITIES BUT WONDER WHY WE SHOULD TAKE THE BLAME FOR THIS INCIDENT (WHICH HAS HAPPENED 3 TIMES BEFORE) WHEN WE HAD DONE NOTHING WRONG. THE PROB OF THE ESCAPE HATCH STAYING SHUT CAN BE SOLVED BY SAFETY WIRING THE HANDLE SHUT AND VISUALLY CHKING THAT THE WIRE IS INTACT, ON THE COCKPIT CLEAN-UP CHKLIST. THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT THE HANDLE CANNOT BE ACCIDENTALLY MOVED, THE INTEGRITY OF THE HATCH IS SECURE AND ANY UNAUTH MOVEMENT WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY NOTICEABLE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE COMPANY HAD SUSPENDED HIM AND THE COPLT WITH PAY FOR 2 WKS UNTIL THEY COULD DETERMINE THE REASON FOR THE DOOR OPENING. THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE COPLT WAS RESPONSIBLE TO ASSURE PROPER CLOSURE DURING THE 'CLEAN-UP COCKPIT CHKLIST PRIOR TO EVERY FLT. HOWEVER, SINCE THE OUTSIDE HATCH HANDLE CAN BE IN A DIFFERENT POS THAN THE INSIDE HANDLE, THE DOOR MAY ACCIDENTLY OPEN AERODYNAMICALLY DUE TO THE LACK OF OUTSIDE HANDLE CLOSURE AND THE NEGATIVE AIR PRESSURE ON TOP OF THE FUSELAGE. THE ACFT OPERATING CHKLISTS DO HAVE THE REMINDER TO THE FLC TO CHK THE DOOR OUTSIDE ON THE PREFLT WALK AROUND AND ON THE INSIDE DURING THE CLEAN-UP COCKPIT CHKLIST. HE FURTHER STATED THAT FAA PERSONNEL HAVE INDICATED THAT A SUGGESTION HAS BEEN MADE TO SAFETY WIRE THE DOOR HANDLE IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT CAN BE OVER RIDDEN IF AN EMER REQUIRES THE DOOR TO BE OPENED. THE FAA HAS INVESTIGATED THIS INCIDENT. HOWEVER, AS OF THIS DATE THERE HAVE BEEN NO NEW CHANGES MADE TO PREVENT THIS HAPPENING AGAIN. HE HAS HEARD OF SEVERAL OTHER INCIDENTS WITH HIS AND OTHER OPERATORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.