Narrative:

The sequence of events that led up to this aborted takeoff from my perspective are as follows. Pushback and engine start were normal. Following the start of the second engine my normal flow pattern was interrupted by the captain calling for the after start checklist before I was ready. Because of the renewed emphasis that we accomplish all checklists 'verbatim' I reached for the checklist after accomplishing my items but prior to positioning the flap handle to flaps 5 which is the normal flow pattern but which is not on the 'after start' checklist. I read each item on the 'after start' checklist and the captain responded correctly to each of his items. I was reading my items when the captain began to advance the throttles in preparation to taxi. I finished my items quickly and reached for the 'microphone' to call ramp control for 'taxi.' as we started to roll forward ramp control told us to follow an f- 28 coming from our right to left to spot 7 then contact clt ground for taxi to runway 18L. Following that transmission there was a couple of radio exchanges between the F-28 and a dc-9 who had cut in front of the F-28. All of this distraction me some more. We finally managed to follow the F-28 to spot 7, there I switched to ground and was told to taxi to runway 18L via taxiway 'M and C' and to hold short of taxiway C-9. As we were turning onto taxiway C, ground called the aircraft in front of us to chastise him for not holding short of taxiway C-9. Ground then called us and reminded us to hold short of C-9. I acknowledged ground and said that we would hold short of taxiway C-9. As we taxied down taxiway C I asked the captain if he was ready for the 'before takeoff' checklist, he said 'go ahead.' with the checklist in my hand I started reading the checklist. The first item -- 'recall' captain said checked:' next item 'flight controls.' I checked the ailerons/spoilers and the captain checked the rudders and we both responded 'checked.' the next item 'takeoff data' I looked down at the ACARS and 'west and B' was flashing, I touched the screen and looked at the data and then began to enter it into the FMS and then checked the trim and went to the takeoff page of the FMS and selected 'derate' and then entered the assumed temperature and then entered V1, vr, V2 in the FMS and then asked the captain if he was ready to set his speed bugs. He said go ahead. I read the speeds V1, vr, V2, flaps 1 maneuvering speed and flaps zero maneuvering speed. Just as I finished reading the speeds and said 'checked and set' the captain said 'damn' or something like that, that got my attention. 'We've got a 'reverser' light.' I looked up at the overhead and sure enough the left overhead reverser light was on. About the same time ground told us to follow the dash 8 coming out taxiway C-9 to runway 18L and to switch to tower. We were trying to trouble-shoot the reverser light while we moved forward toward taxiway C-10. The captain said that he was going to hold short of taxiway C-10 to keep his 'options open.' we finally got the 'reverser' light out. I pushed the recall again and it checked good. About this time the tower called us and told us to move up on 'C' taxiway as he wanted to put a dash 8 behind us on runway 18L via taxiway C-10. As we moved forward the captain asked 'how are we doing on the checklist,' I looked down and my thumb was on 'stabilizer and trim,' so I read it and said '5.0, zero and zero' while checking the trim. The captain double checked the trim '5.0, zero and zero.' I next read 'takeoff briefing' captain reported 'completed.' I then said 'before takeoff checklist completed' even though I completely missed the flaps and they were still up. We waited our turn for takeoff. We were cleared on the runway and then cleared for takeoff. I announced over the PA that we were cleared on the runway (to warn the flight attendants). I completed the takeoff checklist of 1) min takeoff fuel 2) notify flight attendants 3) start switches -- continued 4) transponder -- TA/RA. When the captain received takeoff clearance (as per the new procedures) he first ran to power up to approximately 40 percent N1, released the brakes, and advanced the throttles to the 12 O'clock position and then hit the 'toga' button as soon as the throttles advanced we received atkof warning horn. He pulled the throttles back and the horn went out. We both looked at the trim first (the normal cause of a warning) and then simultaneously at the flaps and saw that they were up. The tower asked if we could hold short of runway 23 to which I responded, yes, and that we would clear at taxiway 'M.' the moral of this event is that if a 'checklist' is interrupted start over at its beginning to ensure that it's completed in its entirety. Additionally don't let yourself be rushed when performing flow items.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG ABORTS TKOF DUE NO FLAPS.

Narrative: THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THIS ABORTED TKOF FROM MY PERSPECTIVE ARE AS FOLLOWS. PUSHBACK AND ENG START WERE NORMAL. FOLLOWING THE START OF THE SECOND ENG MY NORMAL FLOW PATTERN WAS INTERRUPTED BY THE CAPT CALLING FOR THE AFTER START CHKLIST BEFORE I WAS READY. BECAUSE OF THE RENEWED EMPHASIS THAT WE ACCOMPLISH ALL CHKLISTS 'VERBATIM' I REACHED FOR THE CHKLIST AFTER ACCOMPLISHING MY ITEMS BUT PRIOR TO POSITIONING THE FLAP HANDLE TO FLAPS 5 WHICH IS THE NORMAL FLOW PATTERN BUT WHICH IS NOT ON THE 'AFTER START' CHKLIST. I READ EACH ITEM ON THE 'AFTER START' CHKLIST AND THE CAPT RESPONDED CORRECTLY TO EACH OF HIS ITEMS. I WAS READING MY ITEMS WHEN THE CAPT BEGAN TO ADVANCE THE THROTTLES IN PREPARATION TO TAXI. I FINISHED MY ITEMS QUICKLY AND REACHED FOR THE 'MIKE' TO CALL RAMP CTL FOR 'TAXI.' AS WE STARTED TO ROLL FORWARD RAMP CTL TOLD US TO FOLLOW AN F- 28 COMING FROM OUR R TO L TO SPOT 7 THEN CONTACT CLT GND FOR TAXI TO RWY 18L. FOLLOWING THAT XMISSION THERE WAS A COUPLE OF RADIO EXCHANGES BTWN THE F-28 AND A DC-9 WHO HAD CUT IN FRONT OF THE F-28. ALL OF THIS DISTR ME SOME MORE. WE FINALLY MANAGED TO FOLLOW THE F-28 TO SPOT 7, THERE I SWITCHED TO GND AND WAS TOLD TO TAXI TO RWY 18L VIA TXWY 'M AND C' AND TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY C-9. AS WE WERE TURNING ONTO TXWY C, GND CALLED THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US TO CHASTISE HIM FOR NOT HOLDING SHORT OF TXWY C-9. GND THEN CALLED US AND REMINDED US TO HOLD SHORT OF C-9. I ACKNOWLEDGED GND AND SAID THAT WE WOULD HOLD SHORT OF TXWY C-9. AS WE TAXIED DOWN TXWY C I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WAS READY FOR THE 'BEFORE TKOF' CHKLIST, HE SAID 'GO AHEAD.' WITH THE CHKLIST IN MY HAND I STARTED READING THE CHKLIST. THE FIRST ITEM -- 'RECALL' CAPT SAID CHKED:' NEXT ITEM 'FLT CTLS.' I CHKED THE AILERONS/SPOILERS AND THE CAPT CHKED THE RUDDERS AND WE BOTH RESPONDED 'CHKED.' THE NEXT ITEM 'TKOF DATA' I LOOKED DOWN AT THE ACARS AND 'W AND B' WAS FLASHING, I TOUCHED THE SCREEN AND LOOKED AT THE DATA AND THEN BEGAN TO ENTER IT INTO THE FMS AND THEN CHKED THE TRIM AND WENT TO THE TKOF PAGE OF THE FMS AND SELECTED 'DERATE' AND THEN ENTERED THE ASSUMED TEMP AND THEN ENTERED V1, VR, V2 IN THE FMS AND THEN ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WAS READY TO SET HIS SPD BUGS. HE SAID GO AHEAD. I READ THE SPDS V1, VR, V2, FLAPS 1 MANEUVERING SPD AND FLAPS ZERO MANEUVERING SPD. JUST AS I FINISHED READING THE SPDS AND SAID 'CHKED AND SET' THE CAPT SAID 'DAMN' OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT, THAT GOT MY ATTN. 'WE'VE GOT A 'REVERSER' LIGHT.' I LOOKED UP AT THE OVERHEAD AND SURE ENOUGH THE L OVERHEAD REVERSER LIGHT WAS ON. ABOUT THE SAME TIME GND TOLD US TO FOLLOW THE DASH 8 COMING OUT TXWY C-9 TO RWY 18L AND TO SWITCH TO TWR. WE WERE TRYING TO TROUBLE-SHOOT THE REVERSER LIGHT WHILE WE MOVED FORWARD TOWARD TXWY C-10. THE CAPT SAID THAT HE WAS GOING TO HOLD SHORT OF TXWY C-10 TO KEEP HIS 'OPTIONS OPEN.' WE FINALLY GOT THE 'REVERSER' LIGHT OUT. I PUSHED THE RECALL AGAIN AND IT CHKED GOOD. ABOUT THIS TIME THE TWR CALLED US AND TOLD US TO MOVE UP ON 'C' TXWY AS HE WANTED TO PUT A DASH 8 BEHIND US ON RWY 18L VIA TXWY C-10. AS WE MOVED FORWARD THE CAPT ASKED 'HOW ARE WE DOING ON THE CHKLIST,' I LOOKED DOWN AND MY THUMB WAS ON 'STAB AND TRIM,' SO I READ IT AND SAID '5.0, ZERO AND ZERO' WHILE CHKING THE TRIM. THE CAPT DOUBLE CHKED THE TRIM '5.0, ZERO AND ZERO.' I NEXT READ 'TKOF BRIEFING' CAPT RPTED 'COMPLETED.' I THEN SAID 'BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST COMPLETED' EVEN THOUGH I COMPLETELY MISSED THE FLAPS AND THEY WERE STILL UP. WE WAITED OUR TURN FOR TKOF. WE WERE CLRED ON THE RWY AND THEN CLRED FOR TKOF. I ANNOUNCED OVER THE PA THAT WE WERE CLRED ON THE RWY (TO WARN THE FLT ATTENDANTS). I COMPLETED THE TKOF CHKLIST OF 1) MIN TKOF FUEL 2) NOTIFY FLT ATTENDANTS 3) START SWITCHES -- CONTINUED 4) XPONDER -- TA/RA. WHEN THE CAPT RECEIVED TKOF CLRNC (AS PER THE NEW PROCS) HE FIRST RAN TO PWR UP TO APPROX 40 PERCENT N1, RELEASED THE BRAKES, AND ADVANCED THE THROTTLES TO THE 12 O'CLOCK POS AND THEN HIT THE 'TOGA' BUTTON AS SOON AS THE THROTTLES ADVANCED WE RECEIVED ATKOF WARNING HORN. HE PULLED THE THROTTLES BACK AND THE HORN WENT OUT. WE BOTH LOOKED AT THE TRIM FIRST (THE NORMAL CAUSE OF A WARNING) AND THEN SIMULTANEOUSLY AT THE FLAPS AND SAW THAT THEY WERE UP. THE TWR ASKED IF WE COULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 23 TO WHICH I RESPONDED, YES, AND THAT WE WOULD CLR AT TXWY 'M.' THE MORAL OF THIS EVENT IS THAT IF A 'CHKLIST' IS INTERRUPTED START OVER AT ITS BEGINNING TO ENSURE THAT IT'S COMPLETED IN ITS ENTIRETY. ADDITIONALLY DON'T LET YOURSELF BE RUSHED WHEN PERFORMING FLOW ITEMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.