Narrative:

While taxiing for takeoff at mfr, the WX went below takeoff minimums in fog. We shut the engines down at the end of the runway. When the WX improved sufficiently 30 mins later, the captain wanted to start the engines immediately (being a 'hurry-up' type), but I insisted on running through the before start checklist. After start, he told the tower that we were ready to go, and we were cleared for takeoff, I hurriedly went through my cockpit flows, and was reading the lengthy before takeoff checklist while the captain taxied onto the runway. (This is a new checklist that has been imposed on all fleets. It has received numerous complaints for being lengthy, disjointed, and requiring too much to be done while moving. It also has omitted some important items.) as I was 'head-down' accomplishing and reading the final items on the checklist, the captain began his takeoff without verifying that they were complete. (They weren't. The anti-skid was off. I corrected this at 80 KTS.) the departure out of mfr is complicated, requiring intercepting an NDB, VOR radial, and VOR arc, while reporting altitudes in a non-radar environment. At 23000 ft, the captain turned off the APU, and we lost electrical power since he had forgotten to put the generators on the line before the takeoff. We then had a loss of pressurization from the power interruption, which we didn't notice until the cabin altitude warning horn went off. I corrected the problem before we had to descend. The APU was on the old checklist, and said, 'verify with captain,' before turning it off. Had we been in WX, we would have been in trouble. This new, flawed checklist coupled with the 'hurry-up' attitude of many capts is a very unsafe combination.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG RUSHED TKOF THEN AT ALT TURNED OFF APU WITHOUT GENERATORS ON. LOST ELECTRICAL AND PRESSURIZATION.

Narrative: WHILE TAXIING FOR TKOF AT MFR, THE WX WENT BELOW TKOF MINIMUMS IN FOG. WE SHUT THE ENGS DOWN AT THE END OF THE RWY. WHEN THE WX IMPROVED SUFFICIENTLY 30 MINS LATER, THE CAPT WANTED TO START THE ENGS IMMEDIATELY (BEING A 'HURRY-UP' TYPE), BUT I INSISTED ON RUNNING THROUGH THE BEFORE START CHKLIST. AFTER START, HE TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WERE READY TO GO, AND WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF, I HURRIEDLY WENT THROUGH MY COCKPIT FLOWS, AND WAS READING THE LENGTHY BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WHILE THE CAPT TAXIED ONTO THE RWY. (THIS IS A NEW CHKLIST THAT HAS BEEN IMPOSED ON ALL FLEETS. IT HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS FOR BEING LENGTHY, DISJOINTED, AND REQUIRING TOO MUCH TO BE DONE WHILE MOVING. IT ALSO HAS OMITTED SOME IMPORTANT ITEMS.) AS I WAS 'HEAD-DOWN' ACCOMPLISHING AND READING THE FINAL ITEMS ON THE CHKLIST, THE CAPT BEGAN HIS TKOF WITHOUT VERIFYING THAT THEY WERE COMPLETE. (THEY WEREN'T. THE ANTI-SKID WAS OFF. I CORRECTED THIS AT 80 KTS.) THE DEP OUT OF MFR IS COMPLICATED, REQUIRING INTERCEPTING AN NDB, VOR RADIAL, AND VOR ARC, WHILE RPTING ALTS IN A NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENT. AT 23000 FT, THE CAPT TURNED OFF THE APU, AND WE LOST ELECTRICAL PWR SINCE HE HAD FORGOTTEN TO PUT THE GENERATORS ON THE LINE BEFORE THE TKOF. WE THEN HAD A LOSS OF PRESSURIZATION FROM THE PWR INTERRUPTION, WHICH WE DIDN'T NOTICE UNTIL THE CABIN ALT WARNING HORN WENT OFF. I CORRECTED THE PROB BEFORE WE HAD TO DSND. THE APU WAS ON THE OLD CHKLIST, AND SAID, 'VERIFY WITH CAPT,' BEFORE TURNING IT OFF. HAD WE BEEN IN WX, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN IN TROUBLE. THIS NEW, FLAWED CHKLIST COUPLED WITH THE 'HURRY-UP' ATTITUDE OF MANY CAPTS IS A VERY UNSAFE COMBINATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.