Narrative:

We were flying the last leg of a very long 6 leg day. We had experienced a lot of WX that day but now the WX in the valley was vastly improving. I got WX off the duats computer. It indicated that the WX was 5 mi in haze and clear below 12000 ft. There were no NOTAMS listed for visalia. I later learned that the method the company published to the pilots to get WX off the duats computer sometimes results in some NOTAMS being left out. Basically, we are taught to use the 'altitude F-5' key. We are not given access to any manuals on using duats software. I believe this was a contributing factor. As we were arriving at visalia, the controller asked if we got the NOTAM for visalia. At this point we were about 12 mi from the airport. I had reviewed the NOTAMS in my WX packet but did not remember seeing a NOTAM for visalia. My first officer asked what NOTAM the controller was talking about and he said that the medium intensity runway lights were out. I told the first officer it must be in the WX package so she told the controller we had that NOTAM (I later learned that the NOTAM indeed was not in the packet). After this things happened very fast since we were so near the airport. My first officer and I had a short discussion on whether or not the low intensity lights would still work. We thought they would. We also discussed whether or not we could land at night without any runway lights. We both thought we could. In the meantime, the VASI was working great and we were on the GS. I briefly considered diverting to fat. Both landing lights were working and before I knew it I had made an extremely smooth touchdown in visalia. I was not as happy with my decision making process, however. I believe what I should have done was immediately ask the controller for vectors to holding so I could research the situation. It turned out that we were not supposed to land at night without runway lights. I believe the following contributed to a bad decision: 1) the flight departed 1/2 hour late from sfo. 2) passenger were complaining about being late and having to fly in such a small airplane. 3) I really wanted to do a good job for the company and 'get the job done.' 4) short time allowed to make a decision -- due to reasons outlined above. Overlaying these reasons, I realized as I finished writing this report, I apparently have an eagerness to please others that I was not aware of. In the future, it would behoove me to be aware of this character trait when I'm making a decision and be careful that it does not color my decision making process. Part of my strategy for combating this propensity will be to keep the cockpit door closed as much as possible (sometimes they don't work). It is a common practice at our company to leave the cockpit door open to improve ventilation and give the front row passenger some more room. Given my personality profile, it is better for me to keep the cockpit door closed and put up with the poor ventilation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LNDG WITHOUT RWY LIGHTS.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING THE LAST LEG OF A VERY LONG 6 LEG DAY. WE HAD EXPERIENCED A LOT OF WX THAT DAY BUT NOW THE WX IN THE VALLEY WAS VASTLY IMPROVING. I GOT WX OFF THE DUATS COMPUTER. IT INDICATED THAT THE WX WAS 5 MI IN HAZE AND CLR BELOW 12000 FT. THERE WERE NO NOTAMS LISTED FOR VISALIA. I LATER LEARNED THAT THE METHOD THE COMPANY PUBLISHED TO THE PLTS TO GET WX OFF THE DUATS COMPUTER SOMETIMES RESULTS IN SOME NOTAMS BEING LEFT OUT. BASICALLY, WE ARE TAUGHT TO USE THE 'ALT F-5' KEY. WE ARE NOT GIVEN ACCESS TO ANY MANUALS ON USING DUATS SOFTWARE. I BELIEVE THIS WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR. AS WE WERE ARRIVING AT VISALIA, THE CTLR ASKED IF WE GOT THE NOTAM FOR VISALIA. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ABOUT 12 MI FROM THE ARPT. I HAD REVIEWED THE NOTAMS IN MY WX PACKET BUT DID NOT REMEMBER SEEING A NOTAM FOR VISALIA. MY FO ASKED WHAT NOTAM THE CTLR WAS TALKING ABOUT AND HE SAID THAT THE MEDIUM INTENSITY RWY LIGHTS WERE OUT. I TOLD THE FO IT MUST BE IN THE WX PACKAGE SO SHE TOLD THE CTLR WE HAD THAT NOTAM (I LATER LEARNED THAT THE NOTAM INDEED WAS NOT IN THE PACKET). AFTER THIS THINGS HAPPENED VERY FAST SINCE WE WERE SO NEAR THE ARPT. MY FO AND I HAD A SHORT DISCUSSION ON WHETHER OR NOT THE LOW INTENSITY LIGHTS WOULD STILL WORK. WE THOUGHT THEY WOULD. WE ALSO DISCUSSED WHETHER OR NOT WE COULD LAND AT NIGHT WITHOUT ANY RWY LIGHTS. WE BOTH THOUGHT WE COULD. IN THE MEANTIME, THE VASI WAS WORKING GREAT AND WE WERE ON THE GS. I BRIEFLY CONSIDERED DIVERTING TO FAT. BOTH LNDG LIGHTS WERE WORKING AND BEFORE I KNEW IT I HAD MADE AN EXTREMELY SMOOTH TOUCHDOWN IN VISALIA. I WAS NOT AS HAPPY WITH MY DECISION MAKING PROCESS, HOWEVER. I BELIEVE WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE WAS IMMEDIATELY ASK THE CTLR FOR VECTORS TO HOLDING SO I COULD RESEARCH THE SIT. IT TURNED OUT THAT WE WERE NOT SUPPOSED TO LAND AT NIGHT WITHOUT RWY LIGHTS. I BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING CONTRIBUTED TO A BAD DECISION: 1) THE FLT DEPARTED 1/2 HR LATE FROM SFO. 2) PAX WERE COMPLAINING ABOUT BEING LATE AND HAVING TO FLY IN SUCH A SMALL AIRPLANE. 3) I REALLY WANTED TO DO A GOOD JOB FOR THE COMPANY AND 'GET THE JOB DONE.' 4) SHORT TIME ALLOWED TO MAKE A DECISION -- DUE TO REASONS OUTLINED ABOVE. OVERLAYING THESE REASONS, I REALIZED AS I FINISHED WRITING THIS RPT, I APPARENTLY HAVE AN EAGERNESS TO PLEASE OTHERS THAT I WAS NOT AWARE OF. IN THE FUTURE, IT WOULD BEHOOVE ME TO BE AWARE OF THIS CHARACTER TRAIT WHEN I'M MAKING A DECISION AND BE CAREFUL THAT IT DOES NOT COLOR MY DECISION MAKING PROCESS. PART OF MY STRATEGY FOR COMBATING THIS PROPENSITY WILL BE TO KEEP THE COCKPIT DOOR CLOSED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE (SOMETIMES THEY DON'T WORK). IT IS A COMMON PRACTICE AT OUR COMPANY TO LEAVE THE COCKPIT DOOR OPEN TO IMPROVE VENTILATION AND GIVE THE FRONT ROW PAX SOME MORE ROOM. GIVEN MY PERSONALITY PROFILE, IT IS BETTER FOR ME TO KEEP THE COCKPIT DOOR CLOSED AND PUT UP WITH THE POOR VENTILATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.