Narrative:

As an air carrier mechanic, I was working gates a, B, and C. I checked the inbounds and knew that my next aircraft (X) would be coming into gate a and that it would be an overnight aircraft, would be a 'a' check and would need an oil service. About 10 min before the arrival of the aircraft at a, I went out to B to start and move the gpu to a. The temperature was around 30 degrees and the gpu did not want to start. I kept trying to start the gpu until the arriving aircraft started to turn the corner from the taxiway, I then went over to a and parked the aircraft. After chocking the aircraft, I went back to the gpu and after another 5 min finally got it started. After putting ground power on the aircraft, I proceeded to walk the aircraft and oil it. I then went onboard the aircraft to get the logbook. As I was entering the oil into the logbook, I heard the aircraft arriving on gate B, I saw that the inbound 737 was started into the gate and was waiting for a guide man. I ran over to the guide in line and waved the aircraft into the gate. I knew that gates were congested, but that everything was clear of the inbound aircraft. (Normally I set my chocks at the line that I'm going to stop the aircraft, and normally I wave the plane in from a head on position moving to the aircraft's left.) this time, because of the aircraft's earlier than expected arrival and coming from gate a, I waved the aircraft in from the right side. About 1 ft short of the stop line, the aircraft's left engine contacted the right corner of the jetway knocking the load leveler motor off and into the left engine. I realized that I had moved the aircraft past the 737 stop line and up to the 727 stop line. About 2 hours later I realized that I had parked a 737-500, not a 737-300. Factors contributing to accident: short help to cover all gates. Equipment not starting in the cold WX. The fast pace of the operation. The inconsistencies of the yellow lead in lines. 727 and 737 park lines on some gates and only 737 park lines on others. 727 park lines when we do not use 727 on the operation is very confusing. Jetways extended 5-8 ft beyond the stowed position to save time. A 737-500 coming into the gate when we only had 737-300 on these gates.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR GND CREWMAN DIRECTED AN MLG INTO THE JETWAY.

Narrative: AS AN ACR MECH, I WAS WORKING GATES A, B, AND C. I CHKED THE INBOUNDS AND KNEW THAT MY NEXT ACFT (X) WOULD BE COMING INTO GATE A AND THAT IT WOULD BE AN OVERNIGHT ACFT, WOULD BE A 'A' CHK AND WOULD NEED AN OIL SVC. ABOUT 10 MIN BEFORE THE ARR OF THE ACFT AT A, I WENT OUT TO B TO START AND MOVE THE GPU TO A. THE TEMP WAS AROUND 30 DEGS AND THE GPU DID NOT WANT TO START. I KEPT TRYING TO START THE GPU UNTIL THE ARRIVING ACFT STARTED TO TURN THE CORNER FROM THE TXWY, I THEN WENT OVER TO A AND PARKED THE ACFT. AFTER CHOCKING THE ACFT, I WENT BACK TO THE GPU AND AFTER ANOTHER 5 MIN FINALLY GOT IT STARTED. AFTER PUTTING GND PWR ON THE ACFT, I PROCEEDED TO WALK THE ACFT AND OIL IT. I THEN WENT ONBOARD THE ACFT TO GET THE LOGBOOK. AS I WAS ENTERING THE OIL INTO THE LOGBOOK, I HEARD THE ACFT ARRIVING ON GATE B, I SAW THAT THE INBOUND 737 WAS STARTED INTO THE GATE AND WAS WAITING FOR A GUIDE MAN. I RAN OVER TO THE GUIDE IN LINE AND WAVED THE ACFT INTO THE GATE. I KNEW THAT GATES WERE CONGESTED, BUT THAT EVERYTHING WAS CLR OF THE INBOUND ACFT. (NORMALLY I SET MY CHOCKS AT THE LINE THAT I'M GOING TO STOP THE ACFT, AND NORMALLY I WAVE THE PLANE IN FROM A HEAD ON POS MOVING TO THE ACFT'S L.) THIS TIME, BECAUSE OF THE ACFT'S EARLIER THAN EXPECTED ARR AND COMING FROM GATE A, I WAVED THE ACFT IN FROM THE R SIDE. ABOUT 1 FT SHORT OF THE STOP LINE, THE ACFT'S L ENG CONTACTED THE R CORNER OF THE JETWAY KNOCKING THE LOAD LEVELER MOTOR OFF AND INTO THE L ENG. I REALIZED THAT I HAD MOVED THE ACFT PAST THE 737 STOP LINE AND UP TO THE 727 STOP LINE. ABOUT 2 HRS LATER I REALIZED THAT I HAD PARKED A 737-500, NOT A 737-300. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ACCIDENT: SHORT HELP TO COVER ALL GATES. EQUIP NOT STARTING IN THE COLD WX. THE FAST PACE OF THE OP. THE INCONSISTENCIES OF THE YELLOW LEAD IN LINES. 727 AND 737 PARK LINES ON SOME GATES AND ONLY 737 PARK LINES ON OTHERS. 727 PARK LINES WHEN WE DO NOT USE 727 ON THE OP IS VERY CONFUSING. JETWAYS EXTENDED 5-8 FT BEYOND THE STOWED POS TO SAVE TIME. A 737-500 COMING INTO THE GATE WHEN WE ONLY HAD 737-300 ON THESE GATES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.