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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 291047 |
Time | |
Date | 199412 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sat |
State Reference | TX |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 1000 agl bound upper : 1000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sat |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | climbout : initial descent : approach other |
Route In Use | approach : visual |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | other : unknown |
Flight Phase | descent : approach |
Route In Use | approach : straight in |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 200 |
ASRS Report | 291047 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : clearance non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 6000 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
After takeoff I retracted the landing gear, the gear unlocked red light and low hydraulic pressure lights remained illuminated I advised sat tower I needed to come back and land and would maintain VFR. Due to the nature of the problem and distrs from the passenger I thought I had clearance to turn base and land. On base turn approximately 1 mi away I saw an aircraft break out on the ILS 3 about 1000 ft AGL, so I immediately turned to continue downwind. When I tried to communication to tower, I had left the audio selector on the cabin announcement. The tower immediately told the other plane to miss approach not knowing my intentions. I re-established communications and straightened everything out. I was under a lot of pressure from the company to be on time for the meeting in longview. My suggestion to leave the night before was not respected and I had to get up (at XY00 am). This is unusual and put an additional fatigue burden on me affecting my judgement and perceptions. I would like to see more support and authority/authorized given by the FAA to corporate pilot's in dealing with the corporate management. If a pilot says no to his boss on safety issue, it should be respected, without his job being threatened! The pilot is always in the middle and sometimes it is hard to explain why you feel a situation isn't good. I believe a pilot needs to listen to that inner gut feeling, but how do you get the boss to understand that!
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RETURN LAND MANDATED BY ACFT EQUIP PROB.
Narrative: AFTER TKOF I RETRACTED THE LNDG GEAR, THE GEAR UNLOCKED RED LIGHT AND LOW HYD PRESSURE LIGHTS REMAINED ILLUMINATED I ADVISED SAT TWR I NEEDED TO COME BACK AND LAND AND WOULD MAINTAIN VFR. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE PROB AND DISTRS FROM THE PAX I THOUGHT I HAD CLRNC TO TURN BASE AND LAND. ON BASE TURN APPROX 1 MI AWAY I SAW AN ACFT BREAK OUT ON THE ILS 3 ABOUT 1000 FT AGL, SO I IMMEDIATELY TURNED TO CONTINUE DOWNWIND. WHEN I TRIED TO COM TO TWR, I HAD LEFT THE AUDIO SELECTOR ON THE CABIN ANNOUNCEMENT. THE TWR IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE OTHER PLANE TO MISS APCH NOT KNOWING MY INTENTIONS. I RE-ESTABLISHED COMS AND STRAIGHTENED EVERYTHING OUT. I WAS UNDER A LOT OF PRESSURE FROM THE COMPANY TO BE ON TIME FOR THE MEETING IN LONGVIEW. MY SUGGESTION TO LEAVE THE NIGHT BEFORE WAS NOT RESPECTED AND I HAD TO GET UP (AT XY00 AM). THIS IS UNUSUAL AND PUT AN ADDITIONAL FATIGUE BURDEN ON ME AFFECTING MY JUDGEMENT AND PERCEPTIONS. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE SUPPORT AND AUTH GIVEN BY THE FAA TO CORPORATE PLT'S IN DEALING WITH THE CORPORATE MGMNT. IF A PLT SAYS NO TO HIS BOSS ON SAFETY ISSUE, IT SHOULD BE RESPECTED, WITHOUT HIS JOB BEING THREATENED! THE PLT IS ALWAYS IN THE MIDDLE AND SOMETIMES IT IS HARD TO EXPLAIN WHY YOU FEEL A SIT ISN'T GOOD. I BELIEVE A PLT NEEDS TO LISTEN TO THAT INNER GUT FEELING, BUT HOW DO YOU GET THE BOSS TO UNDERSTAND THAT!
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.