Narrative:

Our dispatcher informed us that we should fill out a NASA form because of a possible deviation that he observed during our flight on jan/xx/95, from baton rouge to houston intercontinental. He says that we may have strayed beyond the 50 mi limit over water, while we were not over water equipped. I do not know this to be the case myself, except for what he told us. It was the captain's leg. Our flight plan called for us to go direct lake charles, then iah. After we were airborne, the ZHU controllers informed us that the only route accepted due to WX and traffic was one that went to corpus christi, then back to palacios for the gland arrival to iah. We had heard this might be the case, so the dispatchers had given us plenty of fuel for this contingency. Before we got to lake charles, the controller vectored us towards corpus christi. We tuned our radios to corpus, but were not receiving it yet. I tuned my radio to palacios, which we did receive and left it there. The captain left his on corpus. I do not recall any particular position or mileage from the palacios VOR, just that we were going by it on our way to corpus. Just as we were crossing the shoreline (I remember that because it was the first time in several hours that I'd seen the ground,) we got vectored south in order to sequence us into the heavy traffic that was doing the same thing we were. This vector lasted a few min. Then we were told to go direct to corpus. Before we got to the corpus VOR, the WX we were circumventing, had moved north enough to cut the corner early. We asked for and received clearance to do this. We headed straight for palacios for awhile, then were again vectored west and north for sequencing. We intercepted the radial off of iah for the gland arrival and were subsequently vectored for an ILS approach to runway 8. The approach and landing were uneventful. After landing, the gate agent in houston said for the captain to call flight control and talk to our dispatcher immediately. He did and was told that we should both fill out NASA forms as we may have deviated beyond the 50 mi limit over water. I'm caught up now with the scenario. The problem started with bad WX. It got worse because of no support from our dispatcher and an undue amount of pressure from him to make decisoins that could have been disastrous. We did not make the decisions that he wanted us to. We chose the safe path as far as WX is concerned. On our flight from baton rouge to iah, we followed the flight plan that the dispatcher wrote and the instructions of the center controllers. We couldn't go west because of WX. We couldn't go north because the WX was so far north that we would have run into the same fuel problem we'd had earlier and the WX was now moving north. We couldn't go southwest because of an overload of center traffic going on the corpus, palacios, houston route. We could turn around and go east back to baton rouge or wherever, for a second WX divert in one night to the same destination, or we could go south a bit. The 50 mi limit never entered my mind. If it occurred to the captain, he never mentioned it to me. Maybe we would have thought of it without the pressure we received from our supervisors to 'get to houston, or else!' supplemental information from acn 293892: the flight crew accepted clearance from ATC that took it over 50 NM offshore. The flight had no overwater equipment and was at 1 point 110 NM off shore. The reson for the rerte was thunderstorm avoidance. There were other rtes available that would have kept the aircraft over land. I was aware of rerte, but did not anticipate exceeding the distance from shore. Flcs need more education on ATC's purpose. They separate aircraft, but are not responsibile for all far's compliance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: OVERWATER FLT WITHOUT OVERWATER EQUIP.

Narrative: OUR DISPATCHER INFORMED US THAT WE SHOULD FILL OUT A NASA FORM BECAUSE OF A POSSIBLE DEV THAT HE OBSERVED DURING OUR FLT ON JAN/XX/95, FROM BATON ROUGE TO HOUSTON INTERCONTINENTAL. HE SAYS THAT WE MAY HAVE STRAYED BEYOND THE 50 MI LIMIT OVER WATER, WHILE WE WERE NOT OVER WATER EQUIPPED. I DO NOT KNOW THIS TO BE THE CASE MYSELF, EXCEPT FOR WHAT HE TOLD US. IT WAS THE CAPT'S LEG. OUR FLT PLAN CALLED FOR US TO GO DIRECT LAKE CHARLES, THEN IAH. AFTER WE WERE AIRBORNE, THE ZHU CTLRS INFORMED US THAT THE ONLY RTE ACCEPTED DUE TO WX AND TFC WAS ONE THAT WENT TO CORPUS CHRISTI, THEN BACK TO PALACIOS FOR THE GLAND ARR TO IAH. WE HAD HEARD THIS MIGHT BE THE CASE, SO THE DISPATCHERS HAD GIVEN US PLENTY OF FUEL FOR THIS CONTINGENCY. BEFORE WE GOT TO LAKE CHARLES, THE CTLR VECTORED US TOWARDS CORPUS CHRISTI. WE TUNED OUR RADIOS TO CORPUS, BUT WERE NOT RECEIVING IT YET. I TUNED MY RADIO TO PALACIOS, WHICH WE DID RECEIVE AND LEFT IT THERE. THE CAPT LEFT HIS ON CORPUS. I DO NOT RECALL ANY PARTICULAR POS OR MILEAGE FROM THE PALACIOS VOR, JUST THAT WE WERE GOING BY IT ON OUR WAY TO CORPUS. JUST AS WE WERE XING THE SHORELINE (I REMEMBER THAT BECAUSE IT WAS THE FIRST TIME IN SEVERAL HRS THAT I'D SEEN THE GND,) WE GOT VECTORED S IN ORDER TO SEQUENCE US INTO THE HVY TFC THAT WAS DOING THE SAME THING WE WERE. THIS VECTOR LASTED A FEW MIN. THEN WE WERE TOLD TO GO DIRECT TO CORPUS. BEFORE WE GOT TO THE CORPUS VOR, THE WX WE WERE CIRCUMVENTING, HAD MOVED N ENOUGH TO CUT THE CORNER EARLY. WE ASKED FOR AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO DO THIS. WE HEADED STRAIGHT FOR PALACIOS FOR AWHILE, THEN WERE AGAIN VECTORED W AND N FOR SEQUENCING. WE INTERCEPTED THE RADIAL OFF OF IAH FOR THE GLAND ARR AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY VECTORED FOR AN ILS APCH TO RWY 8. THE APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. AFTER LNDG, THE GATE AGENT IN HOUSTON SAID FOR THE CAPT TO CALL FLT CTL AND TALK TO OUR DISPATCHER IMMEDIATELY. HE DID AND WAS TOLD THAT WE SHOULD BOTH FILL OUT NASA FORMS AS WE MAY HAVE DEVIATED BEYOND THE 50 MI LIMIT OVER WATER. I'M CAUGHT UP NOW WITH THE SCENARIO. THE PROB STARTED WITH BAD WX. IT GOT WORSE BECAUSE OF NO SUPPORT FROM OUR DISPATCHER AND AN UNDUE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE FROM HIM TO MAKE DECISOINS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS. WE DID NOT MAKE THE DECISIONS THAT HE WANTED US TO. WE CHOSE THE SAFE PATH AS FAR AS WX IS CONCERNED. ON OUR FLT FROM BATON ROUGE TO IAH, WE FOLLOWED THE FLT PLAN THAT THE DISPATCHER WROTE AND THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CTR CTLRS. WE COULDN'T GO W BECAUSE OF WX. WE COULDN'T GO N BECAUSE THE WX WAS SO FAR N THAT WE WOULD HAVE RUN INTO THE SAME FUEL PROB WE'D HAD EARLIER AND THE WX WAS NOW MOVING N. WE COULDN'T GO SW BECAUSE OF AN OVERLOAD OF CTR TFC GOING ON THE CORPUS, PALACIOS, HOUSTON RTE. WE COULD TURN AROUND AND GO E BACK TO BATON ROUGE OR WHEREVER, FOR A SECOND WX DIVERT IN ONE NIGHT TO THE SAME DEST, OR WE COULD GO S A BIT. THE 50 MI LIMIT NEVER ENTERED MY MIND. IF IT OCCURRED TO THE CAPT, HE NEVER MENTIONED IT TO ME. MAYBE WE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT OF IT WITHOUT THE PRESSURE WE RECEIVED FROM OUR SUPVRS TO 'GET TO HOUSTON, OR ELSE!' SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 293892: THE FLC ACCEPTED CLRNC FROM ATC THAT TOOK IT OVER 50 NM OFFSHORE. THE FLT HAD NO OVERWATER EQUIP AND WAS AT 1 POINT 110 NM OFF SHORE. THE RESON FOR THE RERTE WAS TSTM AVOIDANCE. THERE WERE OTHER RTES AVAILABLE THAT WOULD HAVE KEPT THE ACFT OVER LAND. I WAS AWARE OF RERTE, BUT DID NOT ANTICIPATE EXCEEDING THE DISTANCE FROM SHORE. FLCS NEED MORE EDUCATION ON ATC'S PURPOSE. THEY SEPARATE ACFT, BUT ARE NOT RESPONSIBILE FOR ALL FAR'S COMPLIANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.