Narrative:

On approach to lax runway 24R, we were cleared to descend from 7000 ft to 2500 ft on heading 160 degrees (vectors to ILS, base leg). Good VMC. While on base leg and descending, I noted the leading edge flap amber light illuminated. I asked the captain and so to verify the light and check the so panel for flap indications. Approach control asked if we had lax in sight, we acknowledged, and received clearance for a visual approach to runway 24R, switch to tower. So reported rear panel indicated #3 set of leading edge flaps were still up. With 'flaps 10 degrees' position on trailing edge flaps, all leading edge flaps should be down (B-747/2). Captain then pointed to the alternate flap position switches, located over my head. The alternate flap switch was 'armed' with #3 set of leading edge flaps selected 'up.' captain stated that during cruise (9 plus hour flight, kix-lax) the amber light 'in transit' leading edge flaps illuminated, and the crew on duty (I was off duty) armed the alternate flap system and selected #3 leading edge flaps to 'up' which extinguished the amber 'leading edge flap' light. As so began to lower #3 leading edge flaps, I noted traffic out of the captain's side window (10:30 position) heading inbound to lax for runway 25L. I immediately began my turn to final for runway 24R as tower called the traffic to us 'at 10 O'clock, 1 mi for runway 25L.' my turn resulted in a slight overshoot of runway 24R centerline, but no further south than runway 24L at any time. Due to the converging vector TCASII TA also sounded followed by 'decrease descent.' TCASII advisories came on during my turn. Traffic was always in visual contact, slightly lower than our altitude, and I did decrease my rate of descent to 300 FPM. 'Clear of conflict' call was given when rolling out of turn on final course. We were all distracted by the amber leading edge flap indication, while on the 160 degree heading/base leg. I attribute the slow response time to crew fatigue (9 plus hours all night flight japan to united states). Though we were always VMC with airport in sight, the turn to final was delayed while attention was directed inside the cockpit. Although the traffic conflict was generated, no radical avoidance maneuvers were required nor conducted, since resolution was obtained by completing the turn to final. A contributing factor was that I was not briefed, upon returning to duty, of any abnormality concerning the flaps by the off-going pilot. The captain and so were both on duty when the cruise amber light illuminated. No one mentioned this until I called the amber light illuminated on base leg.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF A WDB OVERSHOT TURN TO FINAL DURING VISUAL APCH RESULTING IN A TCASII RA.

Narrative: ON APCH TO LAX RWY 24R, WE WERE CLRED TO DSND FROM 7000 FT TO 2500 FT ON HDG 160 DEGS (VECTORS TO ILS, BASE LEG). GOOD VMC. WHILE ON BASE LEG AND DSNDING, I NOTED THE LEADING EDGE FLAP AMBER LIGHT ILLUMINATED. I ASKED THE CAPT AND SO TO VERIFY THE LIGHT AND CHK THE SO PANEL FOR FLAP INDICATIONS. APCH CTL ASKED IF WE HAD LAX IN SIGHT, WE ACKNOWLEDGED, AND RECEIVED CLRNC FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R, SWITCH TO TWR. SO RPTED REAR PANEL INDICATED #3 SET OF LEADING EDGE FLAPS WERE STILL UP. WITH 'FLAPS 10 DEGS' POS ON TRAILING EDGE FLAPS, ALL LEADING EDGE FLAPS SHOULD BE DOWN (B-747/2). CAPT THEN POINTED TO THE ALTERNATE FLAP POS SWITCHES, LOCATED OVER MY HEAD. THE ALTERNATE FLAP SWITCH WAS 'ARMED' WITH #3 SET OF LEADING EDGE FLAPS SELECTED 'UP.' CAPT STATED THAT DURING CRUISE (9 PLUS HR FLT, KIX-LAX) THE AMBER LIGHT 'IN TRANSIT' LEADING EDGE FLAPS ILLUMINATED, AND THE CREW ON DUTY (I WAS OFF DUTY) ARMED THE ALTERNATE FLAP SYS AND SELECTED #3 LEADING EDGE FLAPS TO 'UP' WHICH EXTINGUISHED THE AMBER 'LEADING EDGE FLAP' LIGHT. AS SO BEGAN TO LOWER #3 LEADING EDGE FLAPS, I NOTED TFC OUT OF THE CAPT'S SIDE WINDOW (10:30 POS) HDG INBOUND TO LAX FOR RWY 25L. I IMMEDIATELY BEGAN MY TURN TO FINAL FOR RWY 24R AS TWR CALLED THE TFC TO US 'AT 10 O'CLOCK, 1 MI FOR RWY 25L.' MY TURN RESULTED IN A SLIGHT OVERSHOOT OF RWY 24R CTRLINE, BUT NO FURTHER S THAN RWY 24L AT ANY TIME. DUE TO THE CONVERGING VECTOR TCASII TA ALSO SOUNDED FOLLOWED BY 'DECREASE DSCNT.' TCASII ADVISORIES CAME ON DURING MY TURN. TFC WAS ALWAYS IN VISUAL CONTACT, SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN OUR ALT, AND I DID DECREASE MY RATE OF DSCNT TO 300 FPM. 'CLR OF CONFLICT' CALL WAS GIVEN WHEN ROLLING OUT OF TURN ON FINAL COURSE. WE WERE ALL DISTRACTED BY THE AMBER LEADING EDGE FLAP INDICATION, WHILE ON THE 160 DEG HDG/BASE LEG. I ATTRIBUTE THE SLOW RESPONSE TIME TO CREW FATIGUE (9 PLUS HRS ALL NIGHT FLT JAPAN TO UNITED STATES). THOUGH WE WERE ALWAYS VMC WITH ARPT IN SIGHT, THE TURN TO FINAL WAS DELAYED WHILE ATTN WAS DIRECTED INSIDE THE COCKPIT. ALTHOUGH THE TFC CONFLICT WAS GENERATED, NO RADICAL AVOIDANCE MANEUVERS WERE REQUIRED NOR CONDUCTED, SINCE RESOLUTION WAS OBTAINED BY COMPLETING THE TURN TO FINAL. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THAT I WAS NOT BRIEFED, UPON RETURNING TO DUTY, OF ANY ABNORMALITY CONCERNING THE FLAPS BY THE OFF-GOING PLT. THE CAPT AND SO WERE BOTH ON DUTY WHEN THE CRUISE AMBER LIGHT ILLUMINATED. NO ONE MENTIONED THIS UNTIL I CALLED THE AMBER LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON BASE LEG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.