Narrative:

About 10 mins before the incident occurred, air carrier Y departed the greer airport for atl. About 5 mins after that, I received a call from flow control to go to 20 mi on the intrail. Within 2 mins after that, I got another call from flow to hold all inbounds to atlanta. Because of traffic crossing the arrival at 16000 ft, most inbounds were descending to 17000 ft when we were told to hold. There were 4 aircraft within 75 mi of atl when we were told to hold, including one that was 43 mi from the airport. The radar controller instructed air carrier Y to hold and maintain 17000 ft. He then instructed air carrier X to hold and descend and maintain 16000 ft. Because of frequency congestion the clearance to X was blocked and the pilot did not get the altitude change and the controller did not catch it. Y entered the holding pattern first at 17000 ft and turned to the northeast as published. X was approaching the holding pattern from the northeast still at 17000 ft. The trainers saw the confliction and descended X immediately to 16000 ft, but the closure rate was too fast and the aircraft missed by 1/2 mi or less. Both pilots did report seeing the other aircraft, but I do not believe any evasive action was taken. Contributing factors for this error were: 1) flow control, 2) managed arrival reservoir procedures, 3) training program. 1) flow control. It has become common practice for flow control to make last min drastic changes to the intrail interval. Going from 15 to 20 to hold in a matter of mins puts tremendous stress and confusion to the controllers and to the pilots. Some of these aircraft have been slowed for over 200 mi and provided vectors to achieve the intrail requirements and then are told to hold at a fix they are very near to and in some cases have passed. This is a continuous problem that has been addressed internally through proper channels and the filing of unsafe condition reports. But no action has been taken to alleviate the problem. 2) managed arrival reservoir. This is a procedure proposed by the air transport association where they rather have airplanes hold airborne than take ground delays. This may be good during some periods or at sectors that work arrs only, but at sectors that have a mix of traffic it can lead to dangerous situation. Before managed arrival reservoir, Y might have a ground delay or the controller working position may provide with one. But I have tried to keep some aircraft on ground like Y from greer, which is about 130 mi from atlanta, but have been given direct order from supervisor to allow aircraft to depart. 3) training program. The FAA's train to succeed program is a failure. The trainee involved in this incident, although on last 2 position before receiving fpl status, has limited knowledge of ATC. The instructor spends much time going over and correcting basic procedures. In my opinion, over 1/2 of the fpl's that have checked out in my area within the last 3 yrs would have failed the training 5 yrs ago. Corrective actions: 1) reinstitute ground delay program. 2) require more experience in order to work flow control. Right now a minimum of 1 yr fpl experience is only required. These individuals, which there are quite a few, are barely getting to fully understand ATC and really lack the experience to make decisions that can affect numerous sectors and aircraft. 3) eliminate both the train- to-succeed and the accelerated training program.south 295179: after being vectored onto, then off, then back on, the macey 1 arrival to atl, with a clearance to 16000 ft, passing through 18000 ft, we were given holding instructions at macey as published. Clearance was given approximately 5 mi from the macey fix. Our assigned speed of 280 KTS was 20 KTS above the legal limit and 50 KTS above the desired holding speed. We leveled at 17000 ft to slow and started our left turn when the TCASII RA was announced. Instructions to climb, then descend, were given as well as instructions to descend from ZTL. Traffic passed behind us. He had us in view as he altered his course.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X SAME ALT ASSIGNED RECEIVED TCASII RA HAD LTSS FROM ACR Y. SYS ERROR.

Narrative: ABOUT 10 MINS BEFORE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED, ACR Y DEPARTED THE GREER ARPT FOR ATL. ABOUT 5 MINS AFTER THAT, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM FLOW CTL TO GO TO 20 MI ON THE INTRAIL. WITHIN 2 MINS AFTER THAT, I GOT ANOTHER CALL FROM FLOW TO HOLD ALL INBOUNDS TO ATLANTA. BECAUSE OF TFC XING THE ARR AT 16000 FT, MOST INBOUNDS WERE DSNDING TO 17000 FT WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD. THERE WERE 4 ACFT WITHIN 75 MI OF ATL WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD, INCLUDING ONE THAT WAS 43 MI FROM THE ARPT. THE RADAR CTLR INSTRUCTED ACR Y TO HOLD AND MAINTAIN 17000 FT. HE THEN INSTRUCTED ACR X TO HOLD AND DSND AND MAINTAIN 16000 FT. BECAUSE OF FREQ CONGESTION THE CLRNC TO X WAS BLOCKED AND THE PLT DID NOT GET THE ALT CHANGE AND THE CTLR DID NOT CATCH IT. Y ENTERED THE HOLDING PATTERN FIRST AT 17000 FT AND TURNED TO THE NE AS PUBLISHED. X WAS APCHING THE HOLDING PATTERN FROM THE NE STILL AT 17000 FT. THE TRAINERS SAW THE CONFLICTION AND DSNDED X IMMEDIATELY TO 16000 FT, BUT THE CLOSURE RATE WAS TOO FAST AND THE ACFT MISSED BY 1/2 MI OR LESS. BOTH PLTS DID RPT SEEING THE OTHER ACFT, BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE ANY EVASIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS FOR THIS ERROR WERE: 1) FLOW CTL, 2) MANAGED ARR RESERVOIR PROCS, 3) TRAINING PROGRAM. 1) FLOW CTL. IT HAS BECOME COMMON PRACTICE FOR FLOW CTL TO MAKE LAST MIN DRASTIC CHANGES TO THE INTRAIL INTERVAL. GOING FROM 15 TO 20 TO HOLD IN A MATTER OF MINS PUTS TREMENDOUS STRESS AND CONFUSION TO THE CTLRS AND TO THE PLTS. SOME OF THESE ACFT HAVE BEEN SLOWED FOR OVER 200 MI AND PROVIDED VECTORS TO ACHIEVE THE INTRAIL REQUIREMENTS AND THEN ARE TOLD TO HOLD AT A FIX THEY ARE VERY NEAR TO AND IN SOME CASES HAVE PASSED. THIS IS A CONTINUOUS PROB THAT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED INTERNALLY THROUGH PROPER CHANNELS AND THE FILING OF UNSAFE CONDITION RPTS. BUT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO ALLEVIATE THE PROB. 2) MANAGED ARR RESERVOIR. THIS IS A PROC PROPOSED BY THE AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION WHERE THEY RATHER HAVE AIRPLANES HOLD AIRBORNE THAN TAKE GND DELAYS. THIS MAY BE GOOD DURING SOME PERIODS OR AT SECTORS THAT WORK ARRS ONLY, BUT AT SECTORS THAT HAVE A MIX OF TFC IT CAN LEAD TO DANGEROUS SIT. BEFORE MANAGED ARR RESERVOIR, Y MIGHT HAVE A GND DELAY OR THE CTLR WORKING POS MAY PROVIDE WITH ONE. BUT I HAVE TRIED TO KEEP SOME ACFT ON GND LIKE Y FROM GREER, WHICH IS ABOUT 130 MI FROM ATLANTA, BUT HAVE BEEN GIVEN DIRECT ORDER FROM SUPVR TO ALLOW ACFT TO DEPART. 3) TRAINING PROGRAM. THE FAA'S TRAIN TO SUCCEED PROGRAM IS A FAILURE. THE TRAINEE INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT, ALTHOUGH ON LAST 2 POS BEFORE RECEIVING FPL STATUS, HAS LIMITED KNOWLEDGE OF ATC. THE INSTRUCTOR SPENDS MUCH TIME GOING OVER AND CORRECTING BASIC PROCS. IN MY OPINION, OVER 1/2 OF THE FPL'S THAT HAVE CHKED OUT IN MY AREA WITHIN THE LAST 3 YRS WOULD HAVE FAILED THE TRAINING 5 YRS AGO. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) REINSTITUTE GND DELAY PROGRAM. 2) REQUIRE MORE EXPERIENCE IN ORDER TO WORK FLOW CTL. RIGHT NOW A MINIMUM OF 1 YR FPL EXPERIENCE IS ONLY REQUIRED. THESE INDIVIDUALS, WHICH THERE ARE QUITE A FEW, ARE BARELY GETTING TO FULLY UNDERSTAND ATC AND REALLY LACK THE EXPERIENCE TO MAKE DECISIONS THAT CAN AFFECT NUMEROUS SECTORS AND ACFT. 3) ELIMINATE BOTH THE TRAIN- TO-SUCCEED AND THE ACCELERATED TRAINING PROGRAM.S 295179: AFTER BEING VECTORED ONTO, THEN OFF, THEN BACK ON, THE MACEY 1 ARR TO ATL, WITH A CLRNC TO 16000 FT, PASSING THROUGH 18000 FT, WE WERE GIVEN HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS AT MACEY AS PUBLISHED. CLRNC WAS GIVEN APPROX 5 MI FROM THE MACEY FIX. OUR ASSIGNED SPD OF 280 KTS WAS 20 KTS ABOVE THE LEGAL LIMIT AND 50 KTS ABOVE THE DESIRED HOLDING SPD. WE LEVELED AT 17000 FT TO SLOW AND STARTED OUR L TURN WHEN THE TCASII RA WAS ANNOUNCED. INSTRUCTIONS TO CLB, THEN DSND, WERE GIVEN AS WELL AS INSTRUCTIONS TO DSND FROM ZTL. TFC PASSED BEHIND US. HE HAD US IN VIEW AS HE ALTERED HIS COURSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.