Narrative:

We were on the tipp toe to runway 28L, sfo with no other traffic in sight. I queried ATC as to who we might be following. Bay approach stated that we would follow a B-757 about 12 O'clock and 3 mi. I stated we needed 5 mi for wake turbulence. He questioned my request, then slowed us to 150 KTS (we were at 210 plus KTS). He said, 'if you want, I can break you out and resequence you.' I stated that we would continue and try to slow to get the proper separation. The problem is that he did not give us the proper TA until questioned, did not give us the wake turbulence cautionary advisory as required by 7110.65, either of which would have allowed us to formulate a wake turbulence avoidance plan. We ended up having to fly a steep, de-established approach and encountered the B757's wake at 50-100 ft AGL (wind blowing the wake towards us 050 degrees at 4 KTS). This happens all of the time at sfo. Bay does not comply with the 7110.65 with regard to treating runways separated by less than 2500 ft as one runway for wake turbulence separation. We had not reported the other aircraft in sight until we were almost on top of him. We landed with about 1 mi separation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter suggests that the FAA conduct a review of the advisory program and reemphasize to ATC the importance of advisories and of proper separation. He said that not only should we know the type, speed and range of the preceding traffic, we should also know if we have any overtake or closure rate on that traffic. The worst aircraft for wake are the B757 and the B747 according to this reporter. He feels that the ATC management, air traffic area and other user organizations do not get together and rationalize their traffic volume versus the need for safe traffic separation. If they do not we will continue to have accidents including air carrier accidents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MULTIPLE RWY OP PARALLEL VISUAL APCHS MLG ENCOUNTERED POSSIBLE WAKE TURB FROM B757 ON SHORT FINAL.

Narrative: WE WERE ON THE TIPP TOE TO RWY 28L, SFO WITH NO OTHER TFC IN SIGHT. I QUERIED ATC AS TO WHO WE MIGHT BE FOLLOWING. BAY APCH STATED THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW A B-757 ABOUT 12 O'CLOCK AND 3 MI. I STATED WE NEEDED 5 MI FOR WAKE TURB. HE QUESTIONED MY REQUEST, THEN SLOWED US TO 150 KTS (WE WERE AT 210 PLUS KTS). HE SAID, 'IF YOU WANT, I CAN BREAK YOU OUT AND RESEQUENCE YOU.' I STATED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE AND TRY TO SLOW TO GET THE PROPER SEPARATION. THE PROB IS THAT HE DID NOT GIVE US THE PROPER TA UNTIL QUESTIONED, DID NOT GIVE US THE WAKE TURB CAUTIONARY ADVISORY AS REQUIRED BY 7110.65, EITHER OF WHICH WOULD HAVE ALLOWED US TO FORMULATE A WAKE TURB AVOIDANCE PLAN. WE ENDED UP HAVING TO FLY A STEEP, DE-ESTABLISHED APCH AND ENCOUNTERED THE B757'S WAKE AT 50-100 FT AGL (WIND BLOWING THE WAKE TOWARDS US 050 DEGS AT 4 KTS). THIS HAPPENS ALL OF THE TIME AT SFO. BAY DOES NOT COMPLY WITH THE 7110.65 WITH REGARD TO TREATING RWYS SEPARATED BY LESS THAN 2500 FT AS ONE RWY FOR WAKE TURB SEPARATION. WE HAD NOT RPTED THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT UNTIL WE WERE ALMOST ON TOP OF HIM. WE LANDED WITH ABOUT 1 MI SEPARATION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SUGGESTS THAT THE FAA CONDUCT A REVIEW OF THE ADVISORY PROGRAM AND REEMPHASIZE TO ATC THE IMPORTANCE OF ADVISORIES AND OF PROPER SEPARATION. HE SAID THAT NOT ONLY SHOULD WE KNOW THE TYPE, SPD AND RANGE OF THE PRECEDING TFC, WE SHOULD ALSO KNOW IF WE HAVE ANY OVERTAKE OR CLOSURE RATE ON THAT TFC. THE WORST ACFT FOR WAKE ARE THE B757 AND THE B747 ACCORDING TO THIS RPTR. HE FEELS THAT THE ATC MGMNT, ATA AND OTHER USER ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT GET TOGETHER AND RATIONALIZE THEIR TFC VOLUME VERSUS THE NEED FOR SAFE TFC SEPARATION. IF THEY DO NOT WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE ACCIDENTS INCLUDING ACR ACCIDENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.