Narrative:

We were cleared for approach runway 4R, maintain 8000 ft until established. The captain tuned the ILS and I used ord VOR/DME for distance. The captain confirmed we were on the localizer and had intercepted the GS while well above 8000 ft. ATC asked for 190 KTS or better to rekks intersection and we were at 210 KTS in flap/slat 0 extension confign. Xchks confirmed tracking ILS. Approaching rekks intersection, I had my hand on the flaps expecting a call for them. We were cleared to land. The captain called for the gear on a warning and, as it extended, I selected flaps 35 degrees. The situation was beyond my comfort level but appeared workable. Touchdown was long and fast but still appeared workable. Braking was satisfactory at first but not what I expected near the runway end. The nose was over the end on stopping and left of centerline. A right 270 degree turn was made off the runway as there was more room to the right. It was reported several runway end lights were run over and 2 tires were replaced. I have flown with the captain often, and who often, while not necessarily non-SOP or unsafe, starts dscnts later and goes farther into sits than I am comfortable with. I have let this slowly erode the limits I tolerate and, when the real limit was exceeded, that threshold was not firm enough to alert me to stop the situation -- call for a go around. While we should never allow a situation to require it, our stopping performance toward the runway end was not what I expected. While I know that end zones are normally more slick, new types of anti- and deicing chemicals and in much greater quantities are being used on runways and aircraft which shear off and wind up on runways. Do these chemicals deserve new and further consideration in their effect on braking? An approach can be stabilized for a long time and very quickly become unstabilized for its stage. Crew members can allow nothing to interfere with immediate recognition and corrective action. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer flies the dc-10 for a major united states air carrier. He has flown with this captain for about 8 yrs. The captain is not easy to deal with. The landing gear was not started down till about 700 ft and was not fully down till about 400 ft. This operation is typical of this captain but he 'always comes out smelling like a rose.' the captain and first officer got retraining because of this incident. The captain thought that he should get lots of the simulator stick time and fought with the instructor about this when it was the cockpit resource management aspects that really were at issue. The captain did nothing intentional, it is just his nature to be behind and count on his crew to get him out of fixes. He is normally late in starting his dscnts. The reporter 'would not have gone this far with anyone else.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNSTABILIZED APCH AND LONG LNDG.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR APCH RWY 4R, MAINTAIN 8000 FT UNTIL ESTABLISHED. THE CAPT TUNED THE ILS AND I USED ORD VOR/DME FOR DISTANCE. THE CAPT CONFIRMED WE WERE ON THE LOC AND HAD INTERCEPTED THE GS WHILE WELL ABOVE 8000 FT. ATC ASKED FOR 190 KTS OR BETTER TO REKKS INTXN AND WE WERE AT 210 KTS IN FLAP/SLAT 0 EXTENSION CONFIGN. XCHKS CONFIRMED TRACKING ILS. APCHING REKKS INTXN, I HAD MY HAND ON THE FLAPS EXPECTING A CALL FOR THEM. WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE GEAR ON A WARNING AND, AS IT EXTENDED, I SELECTED FLAPS 35 DEGS. THE SIT WAS BEYOND MY COMFORT LEVEL BUT APPEARED WORKABLE. TOUCHDOWN WAS LONG AND FAST BUT STILL APPEARED WORKABLE. BRAKING WAS SATISFACTORY AT FIRST BUT NOT WHAT I EXPECTED NEAR THE RWY END. THE NOSE WAS OVER THE END ON STOPPING AND L OF CTRLINE. A R 270 DEG TURN WAS MADE OFF THE RWY AS THERE WAS MORE ROOM TO THE R. IT WAS RPTED SEVERAL RWY END LIGHTS WERE RUN OVER AND 2 TIRES WERE REPLACED. I HAVE FLOWN WITH THE CAPT OFTEN, AND WHO OFTEN, WHILE NOT NECESSARILY NON-SOP OR UNSAFE, STARTS DSCNTS LATER AND GOES FARTHER INTO SITS THAN I AM COMFORTABLE WITH. I HAVE LET THIS SLOWLY ERODE THE LIMITS I TOLERATE AND, WHEN THE REAL LIMIT WAS EXCEEDED, THAT THRESHOLD WAS NOT FIRM ENOUGH TO ALERT ME TO STOP THE SIT -- CALL FOR A GAR. WHILE WE SHOULD NEVER ALLOW A SIT TO REQUIRE IT, OUR STOPPING PERFORMANCE TOWARD THE RWY END WAS NOT WHAT I EXPECTED. WHILE I KNOW THAT END ZONES ARE NORMALLY MORE SLICK, NEW TYPES OF ANTI- AND DEICING CHEMICALS AND IN MUCH GREATER QUANTITIES ARE BEING USED ON RWYS AND ACFT WHICH SHEAR OFF AND WIND UP ON RWYS. DO THESE CHEMICALS DESERVE NEW AND FURTHER CONSIDERATION IN THEIR EFFECT ON BRAKING? AN APCH CAN BE STABILIZED FOR A LONG TIME AND VERY QUICKLY BECOME UNSTABILIZED FOR ITS STAGE. CREW MEMBERS CAN ALLOW NOTHING TO INTERFERE WITH IMMEDIATE RECOGNITION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO FLIES THE DC-10 FOR A MAJOR UNITED STATES ACR. HE HAS FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT FOR ABOUT 8 YRS. THE CAPT IS NOT EASY TO DEAL WITH. THE LNDG GEAR WAS NOT STARTED DOWN TILL ABOUT 700 FT AND WAS NOT FULLY DOWN TILL ABOUT 400 FT. THIS OP IS TYPICAL OF THIS CAPT BUT HE 'ALWAYS COMES OUT SMELLING LIKE A ROSE.' THE CAPT AND FO GOT RETRAINING BECAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT. THE CAPT THOUGHT THAT HE SHOULD GET LOTS OF THE SIMULATOR STICK TIME AND FOUGHT WITH THE INSTRUCTOR ABOUT THIS WHEN IT WAS THE COCKPIT RESOURCE MGMNT ASPECTS THAT REALLY WERE AT ISSUE. THE CAPT DID NOTHING INTENTIONAL, IT IS JUST HIS NATURE TO BE BEHIND AND COUNT ON HIS CREW TO GET HIM OUT OF FIXES. HE IS NORMALLY LATE IN STARTING HIS DSCNTS. THE RPTR 'WOULD NOT HAVE GONE THIS FAR WITH ANYONE ELSE.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.