Narrative:

Many times after a flight I reflection the event and how it went. If it was normal I don't reflect long. Today I reflected longer than normal. While I felt we were on top of the situation, something was missing. I pass this experience on to NASA ASRS, as it often do, because I hope my experience will be part of the statistics that will make us all safer or at least prevent others from a similar oversight. Destination airport, dtw, was only accepting arrs on 1 runway, with 1 runway closed for maintenance and the other used for departures. Aircraft were holding for arrival due to the 1 runway and WX, 3000 ft broken 3SW. We conversed with dispatch regarding fuel and alternates, and we determined our minimum fuel to depart holding for destination. Otherwise we would divert. We departed holding with plus 500 pounds extra reference dispatch or at about minimum required per our figures (100 pounds for kids, 100 pounds for wife). Normally from our holding position, at 41 DME, the approach is essentially straight in. Today we were vectored to abeam the airport and then turned for a 25 mi downwind and subsequently a 25 mi final. Before it was over I am sure we flew 100 mi to the airport. About 10 mi prior to base turn we observed that we were using some of our reserve fuel, 200 pounds so far. This was due to all anti-ice/deice on and slowed to below minimum maneuver speed clean (maneuver flaps extended). Never at dtw had I been slowed this early or this slow, however we saw this coming and we were not upset. After all, there were still 3 runways essentially available if we needed them (assuming maintenance can clear their runway). There was also another suitable alternate within 10 mi, yip (not preferred but sometimes used for paper legality by our company and definitely available). So we pressed on. Approach and landing were uneventful for us even though ceiling and visibility were less than advertised. Some aircraft ahead and behind us were given s-turns for spacing but things all worked out fine. When we got to the gate we had used 1000 pounds of our reserve and alternate fuel (we had 5000 pounds remaining or almost 1 hour). I believe we were safe and evaluated the options prudently. I also believe reserve fuel is to be used within consideration. But there is just one thing we did not do. In retrospect we should have declared 'minimum fuel' advisory to ATC. We had in fact drifted into a minimum fuel situation while essentially on the approach. Although this occurred while we were expecting to turn final at any second, declaring minimum fuel would have prevented any surprises if we had to go around or had been taken off the approach for spacing or who knows what else. Indeed, had we gone around we would have gone from diligent fuel planning to a fuel emergency with no forewarning at ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: USE OF TERM 'MINIMUM FUEL' TO LET ATC KNOW ACFT IS GETTING LOW ON FUEL.

Narrative: MANY TIMES AFTER A FLT I REFLECTION THE EVENT AND HOW IT WENT. IF IT WAS NORMAL I DON'T REFLECT LONG. TODAY I REFLECTED LONGER THAN NORMAL. WHILE I FELT WE WERE ON TOP OF THE SIT, SOMETHING WAS MISSING. I PASS THIS EXPERIENCE ON TO NASA ASRS, AS IT OFTEN DO, BECAUSE I HOPE MY EXPERIENCE WILL BE PART OF THE STATISTICS THAT WILL MAKE US ALL SAFER OR AT LEAST PREVENT OTHERS FROM A SIMILAR OVERSIGHT. DEST ARPT, DTW, WAS ONLY ACCEPTING ARRS ON 1 RWY, WITH 1 RWY CLOSED FOR MAINT AND THE OTHER USED FOR DEPS. ACFT WERE HOLDING FOR ARR DUE TO THE 1 RWY AND WX, 3000 FT BROKEN 3SW. WE CONVERSED WITH DISPATCH REGARDING FUEL AND ALTERNATES, AND WE DETERMINED OUR MINIMUM FUEL TO DEPART HOLDING FOR DEST. OTHERWISE WE WOULD DIVERT. WE DEPARTED HOLDING WITH PLUS 500 LBS EXTRA REF DISPATCH OR AT ABOUT MINIMUM REQUIRED PER OUR FIGURES (100 LBS FOR KIDS, 100 LBS FOR WIFE). NORMALLY FROM OUR HOLDING POS, AT 41 DME, THE APCH IS ESSENTIALLY STRAIGHT IN. TODAY WE WERE VECTORED TO ABEAM THE ARPT AND THEN TURNED FOR A 25 MI DOWNWIND AND SUBSEQUENTLY A 25 MI FINAL. BEFORE IT WAS OVER I AM SURE WE FLEW 100 MI TO THE ARPT. ABOUT 10 MI PRIOR TO BASE TURN WE OBSERVED THAT WE WERE USING SOME OF OUR RESERVE FUEL, 200 LBS SO FAR. THIS WAS DUE TO ALL ANTI-ICE/DEICE ON AND SLOWED TO BELOW MINIMUM MANEUVER SPD CLEAN (MANEUVER FLAPS EXTENDED). NEVER AT DTW HAD I BEEN SLOWED THIS EARLY OR THIS SLOW, HOWEVER WE SAW THIS COMING AND WE WERE NOT UPSET. AFTER ALL, THERE WERE STILL 3 RWYS ESSENTIALLY AVAILABLE IF WE NEEDED THEM (ASSUMING MAINT CAN CLR THEIR RWY). THERE WAS ALSO ANOTHER SUITABLE ALTERNATE WITHIN 10 MI, YIP (NOT PREFERRED BUT SOMETIMES USED FOR PAPER LEGALITY BY OUR COMPANY AND DEFINITELY AVAILABLE). SO WE PRESSED ON. APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL FOR US EVEN THOUGH CEILING AND VISIBILITY WERE LESS THAN ADVERTISED. SOME ACFT AHEAD AND BEHIND US WERE GIVEN S-TURNS FOR SPACING BUT THINGS ALL WORKED OUT FINE. WHEN WE GOT TO THE GATE WE HAD USED 1000 LBS OF OUR RESERVE AND ALTERNATE FUEL (WE HAD 5000 LBS REMAINING OR ALMOST 1 HR). I BELIEVE WE WERE SAFE AND EVALUATED THE OPTIONS PRUDENTLY. I ALSO BELIEVE RESERVE FUEL IS TO BE USED WITHIN CONSIDERATION. BUT THERE IS JUST ONE THING WE DID NOT DO. IN RETROSPECT WE SHOULD HAVE DECLARED 'MINIMUM FUEL' ADVISORY TO ATC. WE HAD IN FACT DRIFTED INTO A MINIMUM FUEL SIT WHILE ESSENTIALLY ON THE APCH. ALTHOUGH THIS OCCURRED WHILE WE WERE EXPECTING TO TURN FINAL AT ANY SECOND, DECLARING MINIMUM FUEL WOULD HAVE PREVENTED ANY SURPRISES IF WE HAD TO GAR OR HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF THE APCH FOR SPACING OR WHO KNOWS WHAT ELSE. INDEED, HAD WE GONE AROUND WE WOULD HAVE GONE FROM DILIGENT FUEL PLANNING TO A FUEL EMER WITH NO FOREWARNING AT ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.