Narrative:

On the morning of feb/xa/98, cruising inbound to bro under trip #1XX, the captain was flying and I was working radios. The captain got his own ATIS and wrote it down on his yoke pad, which I recall was 1 fog 1 overcast. He conducted a brief radio conversation, with whom I do not know. He then asked me to contact lrd tower and check their WX, which I did, and they reported VFR. A briefing for an ILS runway 13R bro was given by the captain. The following sequence of events is from the best of my memory and from notes I wrote down afterwards. We contacted approach 120.7 and began our arrival. Into the arrival we were told to contact approach on 119.5 and were asked if we had latest ATIS information wind 320 degrees 4 KTS, 1/2 mi visibility in fog, 1 scattered, 24 broken, 35 overcast, temperature 16 degrees, dewpoint 16 degrees, altimeter 29.89, OM O/south, RVR O/south. I reported this to the captain and he said that we would 'take a peek at it, otherwise we would go to lrd.' as we were being vectored to final, we heard approach give another aircraft the bro WX which all I recall was 1/4 mi. The captain stated that since the RVR was OTS it was no factor. As approach was giving us our final vector I told them (approach control) that we would be needing a 1/2 mi for the approach. At that time the captain said that, 'he knows what we need.' (this captain becomes very nervous and irritable when shooting tight IFR approachs and we have had other disagreements over such matters. I did not wish to antagonize him, so I said nothing more.) approach then gave us final instructions and cleared us for the approach. (I am not certain if it was then, or when we were told to contact tower, but I do think approach told us that we would receive WX from the tower.) as we were doing our final check, we were told to contact tower on final approach just prior to the final approach segment. I contacted tower and all I can recall of the WX was that it was 320 degrees 4 KTS 1/4 mi. The captain said that we were 'on the final segment and would continue.' we were given landing clearance with missed approach instructions. I gave the captain some advisory calls as tothe localizer and GS which he took and graciously accepted and commented that he was correcting for the tailwind. About this point the captain had me confirm with tower that the lighting system was set to high intensity. The tower replied affirmative. At approximately 500 ft we began to encounter decreasing visibility very rapidly. At 100 ft above decision ht (required call), I noticed the captain looking up over the glare shield. I told him 'get back on the gauges' which he did. At 200 ft decision ht, I called out 'decision ht nothing in sight.' nothing happened as I waited for the go around call. At this point I was confused, shocked and dismayed that the captain did not state his intentions as this is not SOP. (Thoughts raced through my mind, do I take control, call missed approach, apply power and risk a 'who is in command' below 200 ft, or do I let him go to satisfy himself that the landing is not feasible?) I returned my scan to the flight instruments, but was distraction by the radio altimeter going through an off cycle. At that time the glow of the strobes became visible. I do not know if the captain was still on the gauges or looking visually at this point because my concern was with the visual reference to the outside surroundings with the attitude of the aircraft as the captain appeared to be 'going for it.' I called out 'approach lights coming into sight' immediately followed by 'runway coming into sight' as we were slightly left of centerline. The captain was making some power reductions as he crossed over the centerline passing over the threshold to the right side of the runway. Only 2-3 sets of runway distance markers could be seen at any given time and at approximately the 1500-2000 ft markers we were to the right edge of the runway and felt high to me. It was at this point that I called out 'this is not good, let's get out of here.' the flight engineer made some comment that it was too late for a go around. I assumed it was because the engines were spooled down. The aircraft seemed to float as the captain kicked it back toward the runway center, but still right of the centerline when the power was cut and the acftdropped in and reverse thrust applied. My normal landing callouts are 120 KTS and 100 KTS, both of which I missed as my attention was to back up the controls if need be to keep the aircraft on the runway as forward visibility was poor. When I felt we were safely under control, the airspeed was already down to 85 KTS and tower was calling asking our situation. I informed tower that we had landed (touchdown XA15Z) and that we would be going to the end for the turn around. As we taxied in, normal checks were completed and not another word was said until we approached the ramp and I notified tower of our position. The captain then chuckled and made a comment to the effect that we could not see the cargo building 500-1000 ft away much less the ramp. Parking checks were completed and no further comments were made. Other human performance: after leaving bro, on the next trip, we arrived feb/xb/98, at the hub. Flight following had not received our commercial radio message due to some technical problem and wanted to know what trip number we had filed under because we were not in the ATC system and they could not verify our departure from bro. The flight follower began to reprimand me for filing under a different trip number. I explained that I was doing what I was told to do and the flight follower needed to talk to the captain. When the captain came in, he called flight following and had a brief discussion after which he slammed the phone down and told me to file the trip under our company number of 5XX. There was no other personal communication between us, other than what was required for the remainder of our line of time. I have been with this captain through several training sessions and his initial line check. He performs as trained and conforms to company standards, when observed. However on the line he is very moody and seems to feel that he must exert his authority/authorized to prove himself capable. When it comes to CRM he can get very defensive and will, at times, argue the point in a very sarcastic manner. It is my opinion that this airman is not fit to be in the position he is in, as PIC, due to his lack of judgement, safety and CRM. I personally do not wish to fly with this individual again, especially after this incident, even though he is approaching retirement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC8 CARGO ACFT ON APCH IN MINIMUM WX CONDITIONS, PF, CAPT CONTINUES APCH AT DECISION HT, THOUGH RWY IS NOT IN SIGHT. MANAGES TO LAND TO SIDE OF RWY. RPTR FO FAULTS DISREGARD FOR SOP, SAFETY AND CRM.

Narrative: ON THE MORNING OF FEB/XA/98, CRUISING INBOUND TO BRO UNDER TRIP #1XX, THE CAPT WAS FLYING AND I WAS WORKING RADIOS. THE CAPT GOT HIS OWN ATIS AND WROTE IT DOWN ON HIS YOKE PAD, WHICH I RECALL WAS 1 FOG 1 OVCST. HE CONDUCTED A BRIEF RADIO CONVERSATION, WITH WHOM I DO NOT KNOW. HE THEN ASKED ME TO CONTACT LRD TWR AND CHK THEIR WX, WHICH I DID, AND THEY RPTED VFR. A BRIEFING FOR AN ILS RWY 13R BRO WAS GIVEN BY THE CAPT. THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IS FROM THE BEST OF MY MEMORY AND FROM NOTES I WROTE DOWN AFTERWARDS. WE CONTACTED APCH 120.7 AND BEGAN OUR ARR. INTO THE ARR WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT APCH ON 119.5 AND WERE ASKED IF WE HAD LATEST ATIS INFO WIND 320 DEGS 4 KTS, 1/2 MI VIS IN FOG, 1 SCATTERED, 24 BROKEN, 35 OVCST, TEMP 16 DEGS, DEWPOINT 16 DEGS, ALTIMETER 29.89, OM O/S, RVR O/S. I RPTED THIS TO THE CAPT AND HE SAID THAT WE WOULD 'TAKE A PEEK AT IT, OTHERWISE WE WOULD GO TO LRD.' AS WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO FINAL, WE HEARD APCH GIVE ANOTHER ACFT THE BRO WX WHICH ALL I RECALL WAS 1/4 MI. THE CAPT STATED THAT SINCE THE RVR WAS OTS IT WAS NO FACTOR. AS APCH WAS GIVING US OUR FINAL VECTOR I TOLD THEM (APCH CTL) THAT WE WOULD BE NEEDING A 1/2 MI FOR THE APCH. AT THAT TIME THE CAPT SAID THAT, 'HE KNOWS WHAT WE NEED.' (THIS CAPT BECOMES VERY NERVOUS AND IRRITABLE WHEN SHOOTING TIGHT IFR APCHS AND WE HAVE HAD OTHER DISAGREEMENTS OVER SUCH MATTERS. I DID NOT WISH TO ANTAGONIZE HIM, SO I SAID NOTHING MORE.) APCH THEN GAVE US FINAL INSTRUCTIONS AND CLRED US FOR THE APCH. (I AM NOT CERTAIN IF IT WAS THEN, OR WHEN WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT TWR, BUT I DO THINK APCH TOLD US THAT WE WOULD RECEIVE WX FROM THE TWR.) AS WE WERE DOING OUR FINAL CHK, WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT TWR ON FINAL APCH JUST PRIOR TO THE FINAL APCH SEGMENT. I CONTACTED TWR AND ALL I CAN RECALL OF THE WX WAS THAT IT WAS 320 DEGS 4 KTS 1/4 MI. THE CAPT SAID THAT WE WERE 'ON THE FINAL SEGMENT AND WOULD CONTINUE.' WE WERE GIVEN LNDG CLRNC WITH MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS. I GAVE THE CAPT SOME ADVISORY CALLS AS TOTHE LOC AND GS WHICH HE TOOK AND GRACIOUSLY ACCEPTED AND COMMENTED THAT HE WAS CORRECTING FOR THE TAILWIND. ABOUT THIS POINT THE CAPT HAD ME CONFIRM WITH TWR THAT THE LIGHTING SYS WAS SET TO HIGH INTENSITY. THE TWR REPLIED AFFIRMATIVE. AT APPROX 500 FT WE BEGAN TO ENCOUNTER DECREASING VISIBILITY VERY RAPIDLY. AT 100 FT ABOVE DECISION HT (REQUIRED CALL), I NOTICED THE CAPT LOOKING UP OVER THE GLARE SHIELD. I TOLD HIM 'GET BACK ON THE GAUGES' WHICH HE DID. AT 200 FT DECISION HT, I CALLED OUT 'DECISION HT NOTHING IN SIGHT.' NOTHING HAPPENED AS I WAITED FOR THE GAR CALL. AT THIS POINT I WAS CONFUSED, SHOCKED AND DISMAYED THAT THE CAPT DID NOT STATE HIS INTENTIONS AS THIS IS NOT SOP. (THOUGHTS RACED THROUGH MY MIND, DO I TAKE CTL, CALL MISSED APCH, APPLY PWR AND RISK A 'WHO IS IN COMMAND' BELOW 200 FT, OR DO I LET HIM GO TO SATISFY HIMSELF THAT THE LNDG IS NOT FEASIBLE?) I RETURNED MY SCAN TO THE FLT INSTS, BUT WAS DISTR BY THE RADIO ALTIMETER GOING THROUGH AN OFF CYCLE. AT THAT TIME THE GLOW OF THE STROBES BECAME VISIBLE. I DO NOT KNOW IF THE CAPT WAS STILL ON THE GAUGES OR LOOKING VISUALLY AT THIS POINT BECAUSE MY CONCERN WAS WITH THE VISUAL REF TO THE OUTSIDE SURROUNDINGS WITH THE ATTITUDE OF THE ACFT AS THE CAPT APPEARED TO BE 'GOING FOR IT.' I CALLED OUT 'APCH LIGHTS COMING INTO SIGHT' IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY 'RWY COMING INTO SIGHT' AS WE WERE SLIGHTLY L OF CTRLINE. THE CAPT WAS MAKING SOME PWR REDUCTIONS AS HE CROSSED OVER THE CTRLINE PASSING OVER THE THRESHOLD TO THE R SIDE OF THE RWY. ONLY 2-3 SETS OF RWY DISTANCE MARKERS COULD BE SEEN AT ANY GIVEN TIME AND AT APPROX THE 1500-2000 FT MARKERS WE WERE TO THE R EDGE OF THE RWY AND FELT HIGH TO ME. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT I CALLED OUT 'THIS IS NOT GOOD, LET'S GET OUT OF HERE.' THE FE MADE SOME COMMENT THAT IT WAS TOO LATE FOR A GAR. I ASSUMED IT WAS BECAUSE THE ENGS WERE SPOOLED DOWN. THE ACFT SEEMED TO FLOAT AS THE CAPT KICKED IT BACK TOWARD THE RWY CTR, BUT STILL R OF THE CTRLINE WHEN THE PWR WAS CUT AND THE ACFTDROPPED IN AND REVERSE THRUST APPLIED. MY NORMAL LNDG CALLOUTS ARE 120 KTS AND 100 KTS, BOTH OF WHICH I MISSED AS MY ATTN WAS TO BACK UP THE CTLS IF NEED BE TO KEEP THE ACFT ON THE RWY AS FORWARD VISIBILITY WAS POOR. WHEN I FELT WE WERE SAFELY UNDER CTL, THE AIRSPD WAS ALREADY DOWN TO 85 KTS AND TWR WAS CALLING ASKING OUR SIT. I INFORMED TWR THAT WE HAD LANDED (TOUCHDOWN XA15Z) AND THAT WE WOULD BE GOING TO THE END FOR THE TURN AROUND. AS WE TAXIED IN, NORMAL CHKS WERE COMPLETED AND NOT ANOTHER WORD WAS SAID UNTIL WE APCHED THE RAMP AND I NOTIFIED TWR OF OUR POS. THE CAPT THEN CHUCKLED AND MADE A COMMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT WE COULD NOT SEE THE CARGO BUILDING 500-1000 FT AWAY MUCH LESS THE RAMP. PARKING CHKS WERE COMPLETED AND NO FURTHER COMMENTS WERE MADE. OTHER HUMAN PERFORMANCE: AFTER LEAVING BRO, ON THE NEXT TRIP, WE ARRIVED FEB/XB/98, AT THE HUB. FLT FOLLOWING HAD NOT RECEIVED OUR COMMERCIAL RADIO MESSAGE DUE TO SOME TECHNICAL PROB AND WANTED TO KNOW WHAT TRIP NUMBER WE HAD FILED UNDER BECAUSE WE WERE NOT IN THE ATC SYS AND THEY COULD NOT VERIFY OUR DEP FROM BRO. THE FLT FOLLOWER BEGAN TO REPRIMAND ME FOR FILING UNDER A DIFFERENT TRIP NUMBER. I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS DOING WHAT I WAS TOLD TO DO AND THE FLT FOLLOWER NEEDED TO TALK TO THE CAPT. WHEN THE CAPT CAME IN, HE CALLED FLT FOLLOWING AND HAD A BRIEF DISCUSSION AFTER WHICH HE SLAMMED THE PHONE DOWN AND TOLD ME TO FILE THE TRIP UNDER OUR COMPANY NUMBER OF 5XX. THERE WAS NO OTHER PERSONAL COM BTWN US, OTHER THAN WHAT WAS REQUIRED FOR THE REMAINDER OF OUR LINE OF TIME. I HAVE BEEN WITH THIS CAPT THROUGH SEVERAL TRAINING SESSIONS AND HIS INITIAL LINE CHK. HE PERFORMS AS TRAINED AND CONFORMS TO COMPANY STANDARDS, WHEN OBSERVED. HOWEVER ON THE LINE HE IS VERY MOODY AND SEEMS TO FEEL THAT HE MUST EXERT HIS AUTH TO PROVE HIMSELF CAPABLE. WHEN IT COMES TO CRM HE CAN GET VERY DEFENSIVE AND WILL, AT TIMES, ARGUE THE POINT IN A VERY SARCASTIC MANNER. IT IS MY OPINION THAT THIS AIRMAN IS NOT FIT TO BE IN THE POS HE IS IN, AS PIC, DUE TO HIS LACK OF JUDGEMENT, SAFETY AND CRM. I PERSONALLY DO NOT WISH TO FLY WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL AGAIN, ESPECIALLY AFTER THIS INCIDENT, EVEN THOUGH HE IS APCHING RETIREMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.