Narrative:

ZNY advised us (air carrier XXX) to cross rbv at FL200. As I was flying the aircraft I expected the captain to install the descent in the FMC after getting the altitude but he was involved in cabin announcements and getting the ATIS. I set the crossing/descent point in the FMC but quickly saw that we were passing the descent point. I then set vertical speed to give me a green arc which showed I would cross rbv VOR at FL200 with the help of 3/4 speed brakes. At FL260, it looked as if we would cross just fine. With about 3000 ft remaining, the headwind decreased greatly. I added full speed brakes and it initially looked like I would cross ok. I should have changed to a larger scale on the FMC because I actually crossed rbv about 700 ft high. I cleared the area visually and also with TCASII. My initial response should have been full speed brakes. I may have put 'being smooth' ahead of meeting the altitude although I was confident I would make it. Better communication among the crew should have provided a quick call to ATC when we saw the altitude may be in question. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter said the captain called a few days after the event and suggested they should send in the report that he, the captain, was just in case. The report was done from memory so the ATC really assigned FL200 at rev and not 25 mi northeast. The altitude miss was 500-700 ft. The type aircraft was a 767. The activity in the cockpit was heavy with flight attendant chores that occupied the captain's attention as they were nearing their washington destination. There wasn't socializing but legitimate airline and passenger needs that needed to be communicated. The workload gets heavy on international arrs with the variety of communications that need to be accomplished. Forms to be filled out, customs declarations, gate information, special handling requirements, delays, connections, PA, ATIS, approach radios tuned and idented and courses and altitudes for the arrs and the approachs set in. It is a shame flight attendants do not have their own company radio frequency to accomplish their agenda from their workstation. Without careful pre-planning and cockpit management and coordination the PF could in reality be effectively flying the aircraft solo during this very crucial phase of flight.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR MISSED XING RESTR ON DSCNT BY 700 FT.

Narrative: ZNY ADVISED US (ACR XXX) TO CROSS RBV AT FL200. AS I WAS FLYING THE ACFT I EXPECTED THE CAPT TO INSTALL THE DSCNT IN THE FMC AFTER GETTING THE ALT BUT HE WAS INVOLVED IN CABIN ANNOUNCEMENTS AND GETTING THE ATIS. I SET THE XING/DSCNT POINT IN THE FMC BUT QUICKLY SAW THAT WE WERE PASSING THE DSCNT POINT. I THEN SET VERT SPD TO GIVE ME A GREEN ARC WHICH SHOWED I WOULD CROSS RBV VOR AT FL200 WITH THE HELP OF 3/4 SPD BRAKES. AT FL260, IT LOOKED AS IF WE WOULD CROSS JUST FINE. WITH ABOUT 3000 FT REMAINING, THE HEADWIND DECREASED GREATLY. I ADDED FULL SPD BRAKES AND IT INITIALLY LOOKED LIKE I WOULD CROSS OK. I SHOULD HAVE CHANGED TO A LARGER SCALE ON THE FMC BECAUSE I ACTUALLY CROSSED RBV ABOUT 700 FT HIGH. I CLRED THE AREA VISUALLY AND ALSO WITH TCASII. MY INITIAL RESPONSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FULL SPD BRAKES. I MAY HAVE PUT 'BEING SMOOTH' AHEAD OF MEETING THE ALT ALTHOUGH I WAS CONFIDENT I WOULD MAKE IT. BETTER COM AMONG THE CREW SHOULD HAVE PROVIDED A QUICK CALL TO ATC WHEN WE SAW THE ALT MAY BE IN QUESTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR SAID THE CAPT CALLED A FEW DAYS AFTER THE EVENT AND SUGGESTED THEY SHOULD SEND IN THE RPT THAT HE, THE CAPT, WAS JUST IN CASE. THE RPT WAS DONE FROM MEMORY SO THE ATC REALLY ASSIGNED FL200 AT REV AND NOT 25 MI NE. THE ALT MISS WAS 500-700 FT. THE TYPE ACFT WAS A 767. THE ACTIVITY IN THE COCKPIT WAS HVY WITH FLT ATTENDANT CHORES THAT OCCUPIED THE CAPT'S ATTN AS THEY WERE NEARING THEIR WASHINGTON DEST. THERE WASN'T SOCIALIZING BUT LEGITIMATE AIRLINE AND PAX NEEDS THAT NEEDED TO BE COMMUNICATED. THE WORKLOAD GETS HVY ON INTL ARRS WITH THE VARIETY OF COMS THAT NEED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. FORMS TO BE FILLED OUT, CUSTOMS DECLARATIONS, GATE INFO, SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIREMENTS, DELAYS, CONNECTIONS, PA, ATIS, APCH RADIOS TUNED AND IDENTED AND COURSES AND ALTS FOR THE ARRS AND THE APCHS SET IN. IT IS A SHAME FLT ATTENDANTS DO NOT HAVE THEIR OWN COMPANY RADIO FREQ TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR AGENDA FROM THEIR WORKSTATION. WITHOUT CAREFUL PRE-PLANNING AND COCKPIT MGMNT AND COORD THE PF COULD IN REALITY BE EFFECTIVELY FLYING THE ACFT SOLO DURING THIS VERY CRUCIAL PHASE OF FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.