Narrative:

Description of incident: at approximately XA15Z, 250 NM south of middleton island (mdo) at FL350 we experienced an arcing in the upper l-hand corner of the copilot's windshield, (R2). The 'cracked or arcing window' procedure was complied with, and the window heat was turned off. At which time the window formed a crack in the outer pane diagonally, from left to right. The MEL was referenced and noted that flight was not allowed into icing conditions. At approximately XA25Z dispatch was contacted through sfo arinc HF. Dispatch and maintenance control concurred that a diversion to seattle was necessary based on the following conditions. WX at anchorage was below minimums (-X2 visibility 1/4 with RVR 1200-1500 on runway 6R) and a temperature of 15 degree F. WX at the alternate, fai, was overcast with snow showers and temperature of 27 degree F. The MEL stipulated, 'no flight into icing conditions.' with approximately 69000 pounds of fuel remaining, ATC clearance direct to seattle (sea) was requested and received. By my rough calculations we would be arriving sea with 19000 pounds fuel remaining and bfi as an alternate. I requested higher altitude and expedited handling with direct routing to seattle in order to conserve fuel. All remaining aspects of flight were normal. Engine start, taxi, takeoff, cruise, descent, approach, landing and taxi-in and engine shutdown were normal as per SOP's. Upon landing in seattle, I was advised by my chief pilot that the FAA was inquiring as to why I had declared a fuel emergency. I replied that I had never declared an emergency, fuel or otherwise. I was asked if I had used the words, 'priority handling.' it appears that those words mean the same as 'declaring an emergency.' in reflecting back as to what was said, I may in my instructions to the copilot, who was handling the radio communications, used the words 'priority' and 'expedited' interchangeably. My original concern was that we arrive into sea with adequate reserve in case of unexpected delays. The only time the word 'emergency' was used was when vancouver center asked us if we still needed 'emergency handling.' I requested the first officer to advise center that we had not declared an emergency nor did we wish to declare one. And this may be the area where the problem began, in that the terminology and meaning of canadian ATC may differ from that of the united states ATC. Upon entering united states airspace, we stated to ZSE that while were still requesting direct sea, we would take a normal approach and landing sequence. Our fuel burn was less than originally estimated, due to using long range cruise, above forecast winds at the high flight level and direct routing. We landed with 25000 pounds. The lesson learned are: keep communications with ATC plain and to the point so as to preclude misinterp. Make sure your crewmembers understand your instructions clearly. Remember that the ICAO language is not universal, yet. A contributing factor to all of this may have been, that we, as a crew, were into our 3RD day (night) of flying the backside of the clock. We were within mins of finishing that night's flight pattern (lax to sfo to anc) and fatigue had set in. My concerns were to get us safely to sea rather than worry about what or how I said things. If an error was made, at least it was on the side of safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B-747 FREIGHTER IN A DIVERSION TO ALTERNATE.

Narrative: DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT: AT APPROX XA15Z, 250 NM S OF MIDDLETON ISLAND (MDO) AT FL350 WE EXPERIENCED AN ARCING IN THE UPPER L-HAND CORNER OF THE COPLT'S WINDSHIELD, (R2). THE 'CRACKED OR ARCING WINDOW' PROC WAS COMPLIED WITH, AND THE WINDOW HEAT WAS TURNED OFF. AT WHICH TIME THE WINDOW FORMED A CRACK IN THE OUTER PANE DIAGONALLY, FROM L TO R. THE MEL WAS REFERENCED AND NOTED THAT FLT WAS NOT ALLOWED INTO ICING CONDITIONS. AT APPROX XA25Z DISPATCH WAS CONTACTED THROUGH SFO ARINC HF. DISPATCH AND MAINT CTL CONCURRED THAT A DIVERSION TO SEATTLE WAS NECESSARY BASED ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS. WX AT ANCHORAGE WAS BELOW MINIMUMS (-X2 VISIBILITY 1/4 WITH RVR 1200-1500 ON RWY 6R) AND A TEMP OF 15 DEG F. WX AT THE ALTERNATE, FAI, WAS OVCST WITH SNOW SHOWERS AND TEMP OF 27 DEG F. THE MEL STIPULATED, 'NO FLT INTO ICING CONDITIONS.' WITH APPROX 69000 LBS OF FUEL REMAINING, ATC CLRNC DIRECT TO SEATTLE (SEA) WAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED. BY MY ROUGH CALCULATIONS WE WOULD BE ARRIVING SEA WITH 19000 LBS FUEL REMAINING AND BFI AS AN ALTERNATE. I REQUESTED HIGHER ALT AND EXPEDITED HANDLING WITH DIRECT ROUTING TO SEATTLE IN ORDER TO CONSERVE FUEL. ALL REMAINING ASPECTS OF FLT WERE NORMAL. ENG START, TAXI, TKOF, CRUISE, DSCNT, APCH, LNDG AND TAXI-IN AND ENG SHUTDOWN WERE NORMAL AS PER SOP'S. UPON LNDG IN SEATTLE, I WAS ADVISED BY MY CHIEF PLT THAT THE FAA WAS INQUIRING AS TO WHY I HAD DECLARED A FUEL EMER. I REPLIED THAT I HAD NEVER DECLARED AN EMER, FUEL OR OTHERWISE. I WAS ASKED IF I HAD USED THE WORDS, 'PRIORITY HANDLING.' IT APPEARS THAT THOSE WORDS MEAN THE SAME AS 'DECLARING AN EMER.' IN REFLECTING BACK AS TO WHAT WAS SAID, I MAY IN MY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COPLT, WHO WAS HANDLING THE RADIO COMS, USED THE WORDS 'PRIORITY' AND 'EXPEDITED' INTERCHANGEABLY. MY ORIGINAL CONCERN WAS THAT WE ARRIVE INTO SEA WITH ADEQUATE RESERVE IN CASE OF UNEXPECTED DELAYS. THE ONLY TIME THE WORD 'EMER' WAS USED WAS WHEN VANCOUVER CTR ASKED US IF WE STILL NEEDED 'EMER HANDLING.' I REQUESTED THE FO TO ADVISE CTR THAT WE HAD NOT DECLARED AN EMER NOR DID WE WISH TO DECLARE ONE. AND THIS MAY BE THE AREA WHERE THE PROB BEGAN, IN THAT THE TERMINOLOGY AND MEANING OF CANADIAN ATC MAY DIFFER FROM THAT OF THE UNITED STATES ATC. UPON ENTERING UNITED STATES AIRSPACE, WE STATED TO ZSE THAT WHILE WERE STILL REQUESTING DIRECT SEA, WE WOULD TAKE A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG SEQUENCE. OUR FUEL BURN WAS LESS THAN ORIGINALLY ESTIMATED, DUE TO USING LONG RANGE CRUISE, ABOVE FORECAST WINDS AT THE HIGH FLT LEVEL AND DIRECT ROUTING. WE LANDED WITH 25000 LBS. THE LESSON LEARNED ARE: KEEP COMS WITH ATC PLAIN AND TO THE POINT SO AS TO PRECLUDE MISINTERP. MAKE SURE YOUR CREWMEMBERS UNDERSTAND YOUR INSTRUCTIONS CLRLY. REMEMBER THAT THE ICAO LANGUAGE IS NOT UNIVERSAL, YET. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO ALL OF THIS MAY HAVE BEEN, THAT WE, AS A CREW, WERE INTO OUR 3RD DAY (NIGHT) OF FLYING THE BACKSIDE OF THE CLOCK. WE WERE WITHIN MINS OF FINISHING THAT NIGHT'S FLT PATTERN (LAX TO SFO TO ANC) AND FATIGUE HAD SET IN. MY CONCERNS WERE TO GET US SAFELY TO SEA RATHER THAN WORRY ABOUT WHAT OR HOW I SAID THINGS. IF AN ERROR WAS MADE, AT LEAST IT WAS ON THE SIDE OF SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.