Narrative:

On mar/fri/95 I arrived in the san diego flight operations briefing area where I received the preflight packet for this days flying. Included within the packet was a logbook discrepancy item showing that the inbound aircraft had some sort of rudder related malfunction. The inbound aircraft in question arrived from chicago at approximately XA10 pm. I immediately sought after the inbound captain for a more thorough debrief on this logbook item. As we entered the operations room he indicated to my copilot and I that the rudder incident that had just occurred to him had also occurred exactly the same way on feb/xx/95 2 weeks prior, as indicated by a previous logbook write-up he found. He indicated to me that upon his rotation in chicago he felt a metallic clank in the right rudder pedal. Simultaneously the aircraft's right rudder displaced, an ensuing yaw then took place. He indicated that the yaw translated back through the cabin with sufficient force to prompt a call from his flight attendant crew. They indicated their concern and also indicated there had been a passenger concern as well. The captain indicated further that the aircraft showed no abnormality immediately after the incident and he elected to continue to the intended destination of san diego. At this point the inbound captain elected to call maintenance and further discuss the particulars of the incident as well as bring to the maintenance controllers attention the past write-up of feb/xx/95. My concerns were: 1) 'the past history of the aircraft and what had been done procedurally at that point' and 2) 'what planned procedure did he have to address this current write- up?' he indicated to me that the procedures on feb/xx/95 included a change of the yaw damper coupler and that there was an 'eg item' performed. I asked him to clarify an 'eg' item. He indicated that meant an engineering test had been performed and it consisted of some sort of taxi test. Also he relayed to me that they had planned for another yaw damper coupler change. Confirming my belief that something more extensive needed to be done to insure the safety of both passenger and crew, I now proceeded to the line maintenance room ro discuss my concerns with the maintenance crew, which I was told had just arrived from los angeles. Upon entering the line maintenance room I met with the 3 mechanics and introduced myself by name and as the outbound captain. I asked if I could discuss with them my concerns about the proposed maintenance procedures. I indicated that because of the past history of this aircraft as well as the counsel I had received from the inbound crew, I felt further procedures would be appropriate and necessary before I would be able to accept the aircraft for the outbound flight. The lead mechanic, mr. X, expressed empathy for my concerns and suggested that we contact his supervisor, mr. Y (a supervisor I assumed for either line maintenance or mr. X). The mechanic contacted mr. Y and after a brief discussion, handed me the telephone so I could express my concerns directly. After explaining the history as I knew it of this aircraft and expressing my concerns of an obvious continuing problem, mr. Y then researched the history of this aircraft on his computer and confirmed the feb/xx/95 yaw damper coupler replacement as well as the taxi test that had been performed. In addition to this, he also found that an additional inspection had been done on feb/yy/95 (a week later). The information revealed the inspection of the control rods that are associated with the rudder. After he realized the history of the aircraft he agreed that further inspections and/or procedures needed to be completed. He recommended that the following be done in addition to the yaw damper coupler change: 1) pulling the inspection panels below the cockpit to inspect rudder cabling. 2) pulling the inspection panels behind the pressure bulk head to inspect rudder cabling. 3) pulling the inspection panels and performing an operational check as well as a visual check of the PCU. 4) performing a high speed taxi test. My. Y indicated this test would have to be performed by the line crew because the mechanics were only qualified to perform a low speed taxi test. He further went on to state that if there was a subtle abnormality or malfunction that we as line crew were better suited to recognize such subtleties. I concurred with his plan, thanked him for his time and returned the phone to the los angeles mechanic, mr. X. After approximately 2 hours the mechanics returned to inform me of the procedures performed and their findings. They indicated that no abnormalities had been located in the cabling below the cockpit, the cabling behind the pressure bulkhead in the tail or in the PCU inspection. They did however indicate that the newly install yaw damper coupler was a unit with newer modifications as mandated by the FAA. I believe these newer modifications were referred to as 'H' and 'K' mo's. One of the mechanics indicated that the newer modifications may eliminate the problem but that we would only be certain after the high speed taxi test was complete. After an agreement to do just the high speed taxi, we proceeded to the aircraft, crew and mechanics to perform the operation. Upon arriving at the stairs to the aircraft first officer expressed concern about the need to obtain a dispatch release message. Dispatch release message was not necessary but that I was not opposed to double checks to ensure a safe and legal operation. He was successful in contacting dispatch and I believe acted as liaison between dispatch and myself. I asked if it was necessary to obtain a dispatch message for a taxi test that was about to be completed here in san diego. The response was that no dispatch release message was necessary. Upon hearing this response from dispatch my copilot's concerns in this area had been eliminated. I explained to first officer my philosophical belief that all team members needed to be in agreement in order for this operation to be safely done. If he was not comfortable in any way he needed to let me know now. He finally acknowledge that he was not comfortable and it was here that I elected to abort the operation. I contacted the crew man in chicago and requested that I be allowed to talk with the duty manager. Upon contactingzz I briefed him as to the operation and also explained that my copilot was not comfortable, zz's response was 'what's the copilot's problem.' I explained that I was unsure what the specific reason was but thought perhaps he simply needed further reassurance or approval from someone like himself. I was interrupted by my copilot, telling me if he received approval from the duty manager that he would now be willing to continue with the operation. Upon hearing this, I relayed the information to zz and handed the phone to first officer. First officer received the approval which he had requested and once again we were ready to perform the operation. First officer and I continued with the high speed taxi operation and it was completed to both our satisfactions. We returned to the gate where we were met by a mechanic that debriefed us on the operation. We indicated to him our satisfaction with the taxi run and he indicated to us that he would make the appropriate signoff and return the logbook to us for our departure to san francisco which was not scheduled within mins. This was the end of the irregular operation that took place that day and now we were back to our SOP for normal scheduled acrs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PIC RPT ON YAW DAMPER COUPLER PROB THAT HAD TO BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO NEXT FLT.

Narrative: ON MAR/FRI/95 I ARRIVED IN THE SAN DIEGO FLT OPS BRIEFING AREA WHERE I RECEIVED THE PREFLT PACKET FOR THIS DAYS FLYING. INCLUDED WITHIN THE PACKET WAS A LOGBOOK DISCREPANCY ITEM SHOWING THAT THE INBOUND ACFT HAD SOME SORT OF RUDDER RELATED MALFUNCTION. THE INBOUND ACFT IN QUESTION ARRIVED FROM CHICAGO AT APPROX XA10 PM. I IMMEDIATELY SOUGHT AFTER THE INBOUND CAPT FOR A MORE THOROUGH DEBRIEF ON THIS LOGBOOK ITEM. AS WE ENTERED THE OPS ROOM HE INDICATED TO MY COPLT AND I THAT THE RUDDER INCIDENT THAT HAD JUST OCCURRED TO HIM HAD ALSO OCCURRED EXACTLY THE SAME WAY ON FEB/XX/95 2 WEEKS PRIOR, AS INDICATED BY A PREVIOUS LOGBOOK WRITE-UP HE FOUND. HE INDICATED TO ME THAT UPON HIS ROTATION IN CHICAGO HE FELT A METALLIC CLANK IN THE R RUDDER PEDAL. SIMULTANEOUSLY THE ACFT'S R RUDDER DISPLACED, AN ENSUING YAW THEN TOOK PLACE. HE INDICATED THAT THE YAW TRANSLATED BACK THROUGH THE CABIN WITH SUFFICIENT FORCE TO PROMPT A CALL FROM HIS FLT ATTENDANT CREW. THEY INDICATED THEIR CONCERN AND ALSO INDICATED THERE HAD BEEN A PAX CONCERN AS WELL. THE CAPT INDICATED FURTHER THAT THE ACFT SHOWED NO ABNORMALITY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INCIDENT AND HE ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO THE INTENDED DEST OF SAN DIEGO. AT THIS POINT THE INBOUND CAPT ELECTED TO CALL MAINT AND FURTHER DISCUSS THE PARTICULARS OF THE INCIDENT AS WELL AS BRING TO THE MAINT CTLRS ATTN THE PAST WRITE-UP OF FEB/XX/95. MY CONCERNS WERE: 1) 'THE PAST HISTORY OF THE ACFT AND WHAT HAD BEEN DONE PROCEDURALLY AT THAT POINT' AND 2) 'WHAT PLANNED PROC DID HE HAVE TO ADDRESS THIS CURRENT WRITE- UP?' HE INDICATED TO ME THAT THE PROCS ON FEB/XX/95 INCLUDED A CHANGE OF THE YAW DAMPER COUPLER AND THAT THERE WAS AN 'EG ITEM' PERFORMED. I ASKED HIM TO CLARIFY AN 'EG' ITEM. HE INDICATED THAT MEANT AN ENGINEERING TEST HAD BEEN PERFORMED AND IT CONSISTED OF SOME SORT OF TAXI TEST. ALSO HE RELAYED TO ME THAT THEY HAD PLANNED FOR ANOTHER YAW DAMPER COUPLER CHANGE. CONFIRMING MY BELIEF THAT SOMETHING MORE EXTENSIVE NEEDED TO BE DONE TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF BOTH PAX AND CREW, I NOW PROCEEDED TO THE LINE MAINT ROOM RO DISCUSS MY CONCERNS WITH THE MAINT CREW, WHICH I WAS TOLD HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM LOS ANGELES. UPON ENTERING THE LINE MAINT ROOM I MET WITH THE 3 MECHS AND INTRODUCED MYSELF BY NAME AND AS THE OUTBOUND CAPT. I ASKED IF I COULD DISCUSS WITH THEM MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROPOSED MAINT PROCS. I INDICATED THAT BECAUSE OF THE PAST HISTORY OF THIS ACFT AS WELL AS THE COUNSEL I HAD RECEIVED FROM THE INBOUND CREW, I FELT FURTHER PROCS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY BEFORE I WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT THE ACFT FOR THE OUTBOUND FLT. THE LEAD MECH, MR. X, EXPRESSED EMPATHY FOR MY CONCERNS AND SUGGESTED THAT WE CONTACT HIS SUPVR, MR. Y (A SUPVR I ASSUMED FOR EITHER LINE MAINT OR MR. X). THE MECH CONTACTED MR. Y AND AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION, HANDED ME THE TELEPHONE SO I COULD EXPRESS MY CONCERNS DIRECTLY. AFTER EXPLAINING THE HISTORY AS I KNEW IT OF THIS ACFT AND EXPRESSING MY CONCERNS OF AN OBVIOUS CONTINUING PROB, MR. Y THEN RESEARCHED THE HISTORY OF THIS ACFT ON HIS COMPUTER AND CONFIRMED THE FEB/XX/95 YAW DAMPER COUPLER REPLACEMENT AS WELL AS THE TAXI TEST THAT HAD BEEN PERFORMED. IN ADDITION TO THIS, HE ALSO FOUND THAT AN ADDITIONAL INSPECTION HAD BEEN DONE ON FEB/YY/95 (A WK LATER). THE INFO REVEALED THE INSPECTION OF THE CTL RODS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE RUDDER. AFTER HE REALIZED THE HISTORY OF THE ACFT HE AGREED THAT FURTHER INSPECTIONS AND/OR PROCS NEEDED TO BE COMPLETED. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE FOLLOWING BE DONE IN ADDITION TO THE YAW DAMPER COUPLER CHANGE: 1) PULLING THE INSPECTION PANELS BELOW THE COCKPIT TO INSPECT RUDDER CABLING. 2) PULLING THE INSPECTION PANELS BEHIND THE PRESSURE BULK HEAD TO INSPECT RUDDER CABLING. 3) PULLING THE INSPECTION PANELS AND PERFORMING AN OPERATIONAL CHK AS WELL AS A VISUAL CHK OF THE PCU. 4) PERFORMING A HIGH SPD TAXI TEST. MY. Y INDICATED THIS TEST WOULD HAVE TO BE PERFORMED BY THE LINE CREW BECAUSE THE MECHS WERE ONLY QUALIFIED TO PERFORM A LOW SPD TAXI TEST. HE FURTHER WENT ON TO STATE THAT IF THERE WAS A SUBTLE ABNORMALITY OR MALFUNCTION THAT WE AS LINE CREW WERE BETTER SUITED TO RECOGNIZE SUCH SUBTLETIES. I CONCURRED WITH HIS PLAN, THANKED HIM FOR HIS TIME AND RETURNED THE PHONE TO THE LOS ANGELES MECH, MR. X. AFTER APPROX 2 HRS THE MECHS RETURNED TO INFORM ME OF THE PROCS PERFORMED AND THEIR FINDINGS. THEY INDICATED THAT NO ABNORMALITIES HAD BEEN LOCATED IN THE CABLING BELOW THE COCKPIT, THE CABLING BEHIND THE PRESSURE BULKHEAD IN THE TAIL OR IN THE PCU INSPECTION. THEY DID HOWEVER INDICATE THAT THE NEWLY INSTALL YAW DAMPER COUPLER WAS A UNIT WITH NEWER MODIFICATIONS AS MANDATED BY THE FAA. I BELIEVE THESE NEWER MODIFICATIONS WERE REFERRED TO AS 'H' AND 'K' MO'S. ONE OF THE MECHS INDICATED THAT THE NEWER MODIFICATIONS MAY ELIMINATE THE PROB BUT THAT WE WOULD ONLY BE CERTAIN AFTER THE HIGH SPD TAXI TEST WAS COMPLETE. AFTER AN AGREEMENT TO DO JUST THE HIGH SPD TAXI, WE PROCEEDED TO THE ACFT, CREW AND MECHS TO PERFORM THE OP. UPON ARRIVING AT THE STAIRS TO THE ACFT FO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE NEED TO OBTAIN A DISPATCH RELEASE MESSAGE. DISPATCH RELEASE MESSAGE WAS NOT NECESSARY BUT THAT I WAS NOT OPPOSED TO DOUBLE CHKS TO ENSURE A SAFE AND LEGAL OP. HE WAS SUCCESSFUL IN CONTACTING DISPATCH AND I BELIEVE ACTED AS LIAISON BTWN DISPATCH AND MYSELF. I ASKED IF IT WAS NECESSARY TO OBTAIN A DISPATCH MESSAGE FOR A TAXI TEST THAT WAS ABOUT TO BE COMPLETED HERE IN SAN DIEGO. THE RESPONSE WAS THAT NO DISPATCH RELEASE MESSAGE WAS NECESSARY. UPON HEARING THIS RESPONSE FROM DISPATCH MY COPLT'S CONCERNS IN THIS AREA HAD BEEN ELIMINATED. I EXPLAINED TO FO MY PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEF THAT ALL TEAM MEMBERS NEEDED TO BE IN AGREEMENT IN ORDER FOR THIS OP TO BE SAFELY DONE. IF HE WAS NOT COMFORTABLE IN ANY WAY HE NEEDED TO LET ME KNOW NOW. HE FINALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HE WAS NOT COMFORTABLE AND IT WAS HERE THAT I ELECTED TO ABORT THE OP. I CONTACTED THE CREW MAN IN CHICAGO AND REQUESTED THAT I BE ALLOWED TO TALK WITH THE DUTY MGR. UPON CONTACTINGZZ I BRIEFED HIM AS TO THE OP AND ALSO EXPLAINED THAT MY COPLT WAS NOT COMFORTABLE, ZZ'S RESPONSE WAS 'WHAT'S THE COPLT'S PROB.' I EXPLAINED THAT I WAS UNSURE WHAT THE SPECIFIC REASON WAS BUT THOUGHT PERHAPS HE SIMPLY NEEDED FURTHER REASSURANCE OR APPROVAL FROM SOMEONE LIKE HIMSELF. I WAS INTERRUPTED BY MY COPLT, TELLING ME IF HE RECEIVED APPROVAL FROM THE DUTY MGR THAT HE WOULD NOW BE WILLING TO CONTINUE WITH THE OP. UPON HEARING THIS, I RELAYED THE INFO TO ZZ AND HANDED THE PHONE TO FO. FO RECEIVED THE APPROVAL WHICH HE HAD REQUESTED AND ONCE AGAIN WE WERE READY TO PERFORM THE OP. FO AND I CONTINUED WITH THE HIGH SPD TAXI OP AND IT WAS COMPLETED TO BOTH OUR SATISFACTIONS. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE WHERE WE WERE MET BY A MECH THAT DEBRIEFED US ON THE OP. WE INDICATED TO HIM OUR SATISFACTION WITH THE TAXI RUN AND HE INDICATED TO US THAT HE WOULD MAKE THE APPROPRIATE SIGNOFF AND RETURN THE LOGBOOK TO US FOR OUR DEP TO SAN FRANCISCO WHICH WAS NOT SCHEDULED WITHIN MINS. THIS WAS THE END OF THE IRREGULAR OP THAT TOOK PLACE THAT DAY AND NOW WE WERE BACK TO OUR SOP FOR NORMAL SCHEDULED ACRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.