Narrative:

During the arrival phase of the flight from, honolulu to dallas fort worth, we were initially radar vectored for landing on runway 36L. My first officer (PF), subsequently briefed the approach for runway 36L, which would be a visual, as the WX was sky clear, and visibility in excess of 5 mi. Within approximately 10 mi of the airport, we were given a runway change, by approach control, to runway 35L. Since we were being vectored from the southwest, the airport area could be seen, but in the XA00 darkness, the runway lights were not yet visible. I pulled out my chart for runway 35L, and gave the crew a quick brief for runway 35L, and set the radios for the newly assigned runway. At this point, my first officer was hand-flying the aircraft. On the second query from the approach controller, I saw the sequenced flashers and the lights (turned up bright) on the left runway, and called runway in sight after confirming, with my first officer. Approach then cleared us for the visual runway 35L, and changed us over to tower. Initially tower was talking to another aircraft, and I utilized this time to complete the approach and before landing checklists with the so. During this time a clearance to land was received from tower for runway 35L. At approximately 1500 ft AGL, tower had just completed giving an IFR clearance to an aircraft on the ground. I used this break in tower communication to ask that the runway lights be dimmed. The tower came back with 'you are lined- up on the wrong runway,' (call sign), cleared to land on runway 36L.' a quick look back inside, at my flight instruments confirmed that we were indeed off scale to the left of the localizer for runway 35L. A quick reconfirmation with the tower was made, and we did. I had allowed myself to get so busy during that 10 mi segment, with a runway change (which is almost a routine experience), re-briefing, approach and landing checklists, that I had missed an important callout (localizer alive), which had never occurred, due to my being sucked in by the bright lights of runway 36L. Ironically, earlier in the flight I had commented to my so, who is about to upgrade to first officer, the importance of using the instruments as a backup during visual approachs. This was a classic example of why. It is also an example of how the system is not supposed to work. I know better than to get caught up in a situation like this, and yet I am again, reminded, after thousands and thousands of flight hours.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING THE PRE-DAWN HRS, A FATIGUED FLC, FLEW THE VISUAL APCH TO THE WRONG RWY. THE CTLR INTERVENED, AND ISSUED A CLRNC TO LAND, ON THAT RWY.

Narrative: DURING THE ARR PHASE OF THE FLT FROM, HONOLULU TO DALLAS FORT WORTH, WE WERE INITIALLY RADAR VECTORED FOR LNDG ON RWY 36L. MY FO (PF), SUBSEQUENTLY BRIEFED THE APCH FOR RWY 36L, WHICH WOULD BE A VISUAL, AS THE WX WAS SKY CLR, AND VISIBILITY IN EXCESS OF 5 MI. WITHIN APPROX 10 MI OF THE ARPT, WE WERE GIVEN A RWY CHANGE, BY APCH CTL, TO RWY 35L. SINCE WE WERE BEING VECTORED FROM THE SW, THE ARPT AREA COULD BE SEEN, BUT IN THE XA00 DARKNESS, THE RWY LIGHTS WERE NOT YET VISIBLE. I PULLED OUT MY CHART FOR RWY 35L, AND GAVE THE CREW A QUICK BRIEF FOR RWY 35L, AND SET THE RADIOS FOR THE NEWLY ASSIGNED RWY. AT THIS POINT, MY FO WAS HAND-FLYING THE ACFT. ON THE SECOND QUERY FROM THE APCH CTLR, I SAW THE SEQUENCED FLASHERS AND THE LIGHTS (TURNED UP BRIGHT) ON THE L RWY, AND CALLED RWY IN SIGHT AFTER CONFIRMING, WITH MY FO. APCH THEN CLRED US FOR THE VISUAL RWY 35L, AND CHANGED US OVER TO TWR. INITIALLY TWR WAS TALKING TO ANOTHER ACFT, AND I UTILIZED THIS TIME TO COMPLETE THE APCH AND BEFORE LNDG CHKLISTS WITH THE SO. DURING THIS TIME A CLRNC TO LAND WAS RECEIVED FROM TWR FOR RWY 35L. AT APPROX 1500 FT AGL, TWR HAD JUST COMPLETED GIVING AN IFR CLRNC TO AN ACFT ON THE GND. I USED THIS BREAK IN TWR COM TO ASK THAT THE RWY LIGHTS BE DIMMED. THE TWR CAME BACK WITH 'YOU ARE LINED- UP ON THE WRONG RWY,' (CALL SIGN), CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 36L.' A QUICK LOOK BACK INSIDE, AT MY FLT INSTRUMENTS CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE INDEED OFF SCALE TO THE L OF THE LOC FOR RWY 35L. A QUICK RECONFIRMATION WITH THE TWR WAS MADE, AND WE DID. I HAD ALLOWED MYSELF TO GET SO BUSY DURING THAT 10 MI SEGMENT, WITH A RWY CHANGE (WHICH IS ALMOST A ROUTINE EXPERIENCE), RE-BRIEFING, APCH AND LNDG CHKLISTS, THAT I HAD MISSED AN IMPORTANT CALLOUT (LOC ALIVE), WHICH HAD NEVER OCCURRED, DUE TO MY BEING SUCKED IN BY THE BRIGHT LIGHTS OF RWY 36L. IRONICALLY, EARLIER IN THE FLT I HAD COMMENTED TO MY SO, WHO IS ABOUT TO UPGRADE TO FO, THE IMPORTANCE OF USING THE INSTRUMENTS AS A BACKUP DURING VISUAL APCHS. THIS WAS A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF WHY. IT IS ALSO AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE SYS IS NOT SUPPOSED TO WORK. I KNOW BETTER THAN TO GET CAUGHT UP IN A SIT LIKE THIS, AND YET I AM AGAIN, REMINDED, AFTER THOUSANDS AND THOUSANDS OF FLT HRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.